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Medication incidents were reported by the National Patient Safety Agency in England 
and Wales as the third most common type of incidents in 2014. Incidents during the 
administration stage of the medication use process were reported as one of the most 
frequent types of medication incidents.  
 
A retrospective, quantitative study using incidents reports was performed to determine 
the rate of medication administration incidents (MAI) relative to capacity and bed 
occupancy, types of incidents, drugs involved and severity of patient harm in 
medication incidents reported in one UK acute NHS hospital electronic reporting 
system over 12 months. The results confirmed that administration incidents were the 
most common incident stage, accounting for 49.6% (937/1889) of incidents in all stages 
of medication use processes. Most common incident types were drug omission and 
wrong dose, frequency, or infusion rate. The highest number of incidents was from 
Children's Services (215/937). However the number of medication administration 
incidents per 1000 bed-days was highest in the Perioperative, Critical Care and Pain 
directorate (16.9 MAIs/1000 patient days) followed by Children's Services (3.9 
MAIs/1000 patient days), then Surgery (3.8 MAIs/1000 patient days). Morphine was 
the most common drug involved in MAI followed by enoxaparin. Weighting MAI rates 
by bed occupancy may be more appropriate measure than simple frequency of reported 
incidents from each clinical directorate and it is a better method of prioritising 
interventions for improvement. Determining the causes and contributing factors of 
MAIs is essential to plan intervention to reduce these incidents. 
 
A semi-structure interview-based study was undertaken to investigate the views of 
nurses’ and midwives about factors contributing to MAIs in hospitals. Twenty-five 
nurses with differing years of experience and from a range of clinical directorates were 
included in the study. Interviews were transcribed and thematically analysed using 
NVIVO software. Different factors related to the work environment, task, team, 
personal, organisational, and patients related factors were identified. Common work 
environment factors reported were staffing level, skill-mix, workload, night shifts, and 
frequent interruption / distraction during the preparation and administration of 
medicines. The main task factors included inappropriate checking and non-availability 
of laboratory results required for medication administration. Heparin, insulin, and drugs 
requiring dose adjustment based on blood tests were reported as high risk medications. 
Patient-specific factors identified were patients with complex clinical conditions, 
confused, unconscious or patients with dementia. Team factors such as poor 
communication within teams or with doctors were also considered risks. Organisational 
factors identified included inadequate training, lack of feedback on medication 
incidents, and unclear policies /guidelines. Finally, personal factors reported included 
nurses’ fatigue and sleepiness particularly during long and night shifts, and inadequate 
knowledge, or skills about medicines. 
 
The nurse interview study identified that fatigue / sleepiness were considered by nurses 
to significantly contribute to MAI particularly during long shifts and night shifts. 
Results from an American study which aimed to assess the impact of extended shifts 





work hours and the likelihood of error by nurses. However, this study relied on self-
reported errors by nurses using logbooks. Therefore, the third study aimed to investigate 
whether nurses’ fatigue and sleepiness during long shifts (12 hours shift) have an impact 
on the error rate and type during IV preparation and administration. This study was 
based on a direct observation method using simulated tasks of IV preparation and 
administration. Participants completed a baseline fatigue scale (OFER) scale for acute 
fatigue, chronic fatigue, and inter-shift recovery) at the start of their shift and their acute 
sleepiness was measured at different testing points: at start of shift, 8 hours and at end 
of the shift (12h) using Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS). Both previously validated 
scales were short (8 to 15 questions). Nurses also prepared an injectable medication of 
similar level of complexity at the start and end of their shift. Nurses were presented with 
a prescription in the format routinely used on the study wards. The simulated task 
consisted of preparation of a medicine, including, as required: selection of materials, 
calculations, manipulations, labelling and set up for infusion. The simulated 
preparations were performed in ward medication preparation areas. Deviations from 
hospital standards for drug preparation, errors and preparation time were recorded. 
Using SPSS 22, the internal consistency of all subscales in the fatigue scale was 
assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. The number and mean of deviations from standards 
and errors for each period of observation (pre and post shift) were calculated. Paired t-
tests and Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test were used to determine differences in fatigue 
levels, sleepiness scores, deviations from standards, means of errors and time needed 
between periods of observation (pre and post shift). 39 nurses were observed from 
medical wards (n=14), surgery wards (n=12), and intensive care units (n=13). 
Sleepiness scores were significantly higher at the end of shift compared to the beginning 
of the shift. The mean number of deviations from standards (6.33) at the end of the shift 
was significantly higher from the mean (4.18) at the beginning of the shift. However, 
the number of observed errors, and time needed did not significantly differ. McNemar's 
test showed a significant association between being sleepy and making errors at the end 
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  Glossary of Terms 
ADE: Adverse drug event 
ADR: Adverse drug reaction 
AHRQ: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
AIMS: Australian Incident Monitoring System 
ANA: American Nurses Association 
APSF: Australian Patient Safety Foundation 
ASHP: American Society of Health-System Pharmacists 
BNF: British National Formulary 
CQC: Care Quality Commission 
DoH: Department of Health 
EPMA: Electronic prescribing and medicines administration system 
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ISMP: Institute for Safe Medication Practices 
JADE: Japan Adverse Drug Events 
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MAE: Medication administration error 
MAI: Medication administration incident 
ME: Medication error 
MHRA: Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
MI: Medication incident 
MUP: Medication-use process 
NCC MERP: National Co-ordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting 
and Prevention 
NHS: National Health Service 
NPSA: National Patient Safety Agency 
NRLS: National Reporting and Learning System 
OBD: Occupied bed day 
PSI: Patient safety incident 
UK: United Kingdom 
US: United States 
USP: United State Pharmacopeia 
WHO: World Health Organization 
Chapter1: General Introduction 
















Chapter 1. General introduction 
  
Chapter1: General Introduction 




Patient safety is considered the foundation of good patient care. Although there is 
continuous development of healthcare services, healthcare itself can be a source of 
patient harm, especially with the inherent risk of medicines involved. Vincent (2011) 
stated that: 
 
“As you will see however there is compelling evidence that, while healthcare brings 
enormous benefits to us all, errors are common and patients are frequently harmed. The 
nature and scale of this harm is hard to comprehend. It is made up, worldwide, of 
hundreds of thousands of individual tragedies every year in which patients are 
traumatised, suffer unnecessary pain, are left disabled or die. Many more people have 
their care interrupted or delayed by minor errors and problems; these incidents are not 
as serious for patients but are a massive and relentless drain on scarce healthcare 
resources.” (Vincent 2011, p2) 
 
A broad definition of patient safety is used by the World Health Organization (WHO): 
 
“The prevention of errors and adverse effects to patients associated with health care.” 
(World Health Organisation, p.1) 
 
Vincent (2011) has also simply defined patient safety as:  
 
‘The avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming 
from the process of healthcare’ (Vincent 2011 p4). 
 
The complexity of current healthcare systems provide considerable potential to harm 
patients, especially with new innovations and technology, which may bring unforeseen 
risks (Vincent et al. 2001). However, harm caused by medical treatment is now widely 
recognised and accepted by governments and healthcare organisations since much 
research and many reports have been published over the past 30 years on healthcare 
related harm in America, including the Harvard Medical Practice Study (Brennan et al. 
2004) and the report of the US Institute of Medicine (IoM) (1999), Australia (Wilson et 
al. 1995), and UK (Department of Health 2000). Moreover, there is recognition that this 
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issue needs to be addressed at both a national and an international level (Legido-
Quigley et al. 2008).  
 
1.2.  Patient safety and healthcare 
The study by Schimmel (1964) was one of the first studies published on patient safety 
which prospectively investigated the occurence of hospital-induced complications in 
one teaching hospital. This analysis involving over 1000 patients, found that 20% 
(n=198) of admitted patients experienced at least one untoward episode (n= 240), of 
which 16 episodes were fatal. The “Harvard Medical Practice Study” (Brennan et al. 
2004) is one of the pioneer studies in patient safety and is still influential today. In 1984 
the study’s authors found that adverse events (AEs) occurred in 3.7% of 30,121 
reviewed patient records from 51 hospitals in New York. Furthermore, 27.6% of the 
identified AEs were preventable with 2.6% of these AEs leading to permanent injuries 
and 13.6% resulted in death. Another large Australian study reviewed more than 14,179 
admissions to 28 hospitals in Australia and found that 16.6% (n= 2,302) of reviewed 
admissions were associated with an AE. Of the AEs, 51% were judged to be highly 
preventable (Wilson et al. 1995).  
 
Despite the previous studies, medical errors were rarely discussed in the medical 
literature until the report of the US IoM ‘To err is human’ published in 1999 (Kohn et 
al. 2000). This report clearly set out the harm caused by medical errors in the US and 
also called for action and recommended strategies to improve patient safety (Kohn et al. 
2000). In 2000, the UK Department of Health (DoH) published, “An organisation with a 
memory: learning from adverse events in the NHS” to set out the problem of failures in 
healthcare. The report revealed that AEs affected 10% of admissions causing nearly 400 
deaths or serious injuries every year. The report also showed that around 28,000 
complaints regarding clinical management were made a year in hospitals, costing the 
National Health Service (NHS) around £400 million/ year in claims. In one recent 
study, James (2013) estimated that preventable patient safety incidents (PSIs) were 
responsible for a minimum of 2 million serious injuries and 210,000 deaths occurring 
annually in the US. These figures were based on data from four large studies that used 
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) Global Trigger Tool to detect PSIs from 
hospital medical records.  
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The World Health Organization (WHO) (2013) report of PSIs in hospitalised patients in 
the European Union (EU) revealed that between 8% - 12% of hospitalised patients were 
affected by PSIs and estimated that 50–70% of these incidents are preventable. Finally, 
in the UK, a recent report from the UK DoH and Secretary of State for Health (2013) 
stated that in 2011/2012, preventable PSIs harmed around half a million NHS patients 
(0.4%) and caused death to 3,000 (0.003%). 
 
These studies revealed that AEs are common in healthcare and that they can be a serious 
source of patient harm. A large proportion of these events were considered preventable. 
Clinical governance had been introduced as a comprehensive strategy to address patient 
safety issues and improve the quality of healthcare on both individual and 
organisational levels (Scally and Donaldson 1998). 
 
1.2.1. Clinical governance and patient safety 
With the increasing complexity of clinical practice and the rapid development of 
medications, there is a need for systems which ensure safe provision of care for 
everyone (Kohn et al. 2000). Clinical governance is a system for NHS organisations and 
individuals which aims to improve the quality of healthcare delivered and ensure that a 
safe and high standard of care is provided and achieved. It consists of several key 
components which integrate together to form a high quality of healthcare (Figure 1.1) 
(Starey 2001). Clinical Governance was described by Scally and Donaldson (1998, 
p.62) as: 
 
 “A system through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously 
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by 
creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish”.  
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Figure 1.1. The elements of clinical governance (Starey 2001, p.2) 
 
The DoH (1998) report, “The new NHS: modern, dependable” identified the essential 
actions required by organisations to ensure efficient clinical governance. These key 
actions involved: ensuring quality improvement procedures e.g., clinical audit are in 
place; assessing risk management and implementing risk reduction programs, applying 
evidence-based practice; implementing continuous development programs; developing 
leadership skills; and making responsibilities clear at clinical team levels. WHO and 
IoM have also recommended risk management and ensuring safety as major elements of 
effective and high quality healthcare (World Health Organisation 1989, Institute for 
Safe Medication Practices 2001). Therefore, clinical risk management was introduced 
into healthcare to reduce the occurrence and harm of preventable AEs and to minimise 
the harm results from AEs (Vincent and Moss 1995). 
 
1.3. Medication safety incidents 
1.3.1. Diversity of terms used for medication safety incidents 
One of the main difficulties in studying medication safety is the multiplicity of terms 
and definitions used in describing medication related problems (Allan and Barker 1990, 
O'Shea 1999, Lisby et al. 2010, Kongkaew et al. 2013). For example, “medication 
incidents (MIs)”, “medication errors (MEs)” “adverse drug event (ADEs)”, “adverse 
drug reaction (ADRs)”, and “potential adverse drug events” are all used to describe 
Chapter1: General Introduction 
   
21 
 
problems with medication use (Australian Council For Safety And Quality In Health 
Care 2002).  In a review of 160 patient safety websites, 25 different terms related to 
medication safety were found, with 119 different definitions (Yu et al. 2005). The term 
‘adverse event’ was the most frequently defined term with 21 definitions, followed by 
‘error’ (13 definitions). Another survey of ADEs in 132 intensive care units (ICUs) 
highlighted that sometimes different definitions were used within the same institution 
(Kane-Gill and Devlin 2006). The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) generated a 
standardised classification system for patient safety terms based on the incident type 
and the harm caused to patients (Table 1.1). The NPSA used the term “patient safety 
incidents” to cover all these terms.  
 
Table 1.1. The National Patient Safety Agency patient safety incident taxonomy 
(from NPSA, 2004, p.97) 
 
This lack of standard definitions is considered a main reason for underreporting of MEs 
(Caldwell et al. 2001, Armitage and Knapman 2003). Furthermore, it results in variable 
categorisation and hence rates of medication-related incidents between studies, making 
comparison between studies complicated (Ghaleb et al. 2010, Kongkaew et al. 2013) or 
Old term New term Definition 
Clinical risk Patient safety The identification, analysis and 
management of patient-related risks 
and incidents, in order to make 
patient care safer and minimise 
harm to patients 









Patient safety incident Any unintended or unexpected 
incident(s) that could have or did 
lead to harm for one or more 
persons receiving healthcare 
   
No harm event Patient safety incident 
(level of severity no 
harm) 
A patient safety incident that caused 
no harm but was not prevented 
(‘impact not prevented’) or a patient 
safety incident that was prevented 
   
Near miss/close call Patient safety incident 
(prevented) 
Any patient safety incident that had 
the potential to cause harm but was 
prevented, resulting in no harm to 
patients receiving healthcare 
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even invalid (Bates 1996). Additionally, building effective interventions to reduce ME 
occurrence and mitigating their impact requires reliable comparison of MEs, which 
cannot be achieved without an explicit, agreed-upon definition of ME and related terms 
(Aronson 2009, Ferner 2009). In this thesis, the term “medication incident” will be 
used, although when quoting verbatim the term used by the author (e.g. MEs) will be 
used. 
 
1.3.2. Definition of medication errors 
Different definitions of medication-related incidents were used by ME studies and 
institutions concerning medication safety. Some definitions of ME focused only on the 
part of the medication use process (MUP) after writing the prescription, and excluded 
errors in the prescribing phase. Bates (1996) argued that this definition of MEs was not 
accurate because prescribing errors are most likely to harm patients. Table 1.2 
demonstrates examples of definitions that focus on the discrepancies between ordered 
and administered medicines/doses. Other definitions covered all stages of MUP. 
Table1.3 presents examples of definitions that included all MUP, using the term 
“error(s)” and related MEs to the preventability of errors. Ferner and Aronson (2006) 
proposed a conclusive and comprehensive definition of “medication error” as: 
 
“A failure in the treatment process that leads to, or has the potential to lead to, harm to 
the patient”(Ferner and Aronson 2006 p1013).  
 
The authors clarified the wider meaning of “treatment process” as the process that 
begins after the decision to initiate treatment and included prescribing, transcribing, 
compounding, dispensing, administration, and monitoring of therapy (Ferner and 
Aronson 2006). This definition was found to be the most robust when tested against 
different scenarios of MEs (Yu et al. 2005). The NPSA definition of MEs covered all 
medication process. The NPSA defined “medication incidents” as: 
 
“Any incident where there has been an error in the process of prescribing, dispensing, 
preparing, administering, monitoring or providing medicines advice, regardless of 
whether any harm occurred or was possible” (National Patient Safety Agency 2009, 
p6). 
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Table 1.2. Definitions that covered all medication process, and used the term “error(s)”  
Reference Definition 
Bates et al. (1995) “Errors occurring at any stage in the process of ordering or delivering a medication, regardless of whether an injury occurred or the 
potential for injury were present. They include the entire range of severity, from trivial errors to life-threatening errors.” 
US Pharmacopeia 
(1995) 
“Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient harm while the drug is in the control of 
the health care professional, patient or consumer” 
American Society of 
Hospital Pharmacists 
(1998)  
“Any preventable event that may cause, or lead to, inappropriate medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the 
control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer. (Such events may be related to professional practice, health care 
products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing, order communication, product labelling, packaging, compounding, 
dispensing, distribution, administration, education, monitoring, and use).” 
Kohn et al. (2000) “An error occurring at any stage in the process of delivering a medication. They include the entire range of severity, from trivial 
errors, such as orders that necessitated clarification or missing doses, to life-threatening errors, (such as a patient receiving a ten-
fold overdose of a toxic agent.” 
NCC MERP (2005) “Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the 
control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to professional practice, health care 
products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order communication; product labelling, packaging, and nomenclature; 
compounding; dispensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and use” 
Lisby et al. (2005) “Errors in the medication process: ordering, transcription, dispensing, administration and discharge summaries” 
Kopp et al. (2006) An error occurring during the medication use process, regardless of whether an injury occurred or the potential for injury was 
present 
National Patient Safety 
Agency (2007) 
“Incidents in which there has been an error in the process of prescribing, dispensing, preparing, administering, monitoring, or 
providing medicine advice, regardless of whether any harm occurred or was possible” 
Kongkaew et al. (2013)  “Any error in the prescribing, dispensing, or administration of a drug, irrespective of whether such errors lead to adverse 
consequences or not” 
Wold Health Organization 
(2009) 
“Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the 
control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer” 
 Lisby et al. (2012) “An error in the stages of the medication process − ordering, dispensing, and administering and monitoring the effect − causing 
harm or implying a risk of harming the patient” 
Australian Council For 
Safety And Quality In 
Health Care (2002)  
“Failure in the (drug) treatment process that leads to or has the potential to lead to, harm to the patient and includes an act of 
omission or commission” 
Ferner and Aronson (2006) “Failure in the treatment process that leads to or has the potential to lead to harm to the patient.” 
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Table 1.3. Examples of definitions focusing on discrepancies between ordered and 
administered medicines or doses 
Reference Definition 
Allan and Barker 
(1990) 
“Deviation from the physician’s medication order as 
written on the patients chart.” 
Cooper (1995) “A dose of medication that deviates from the physician’s 
medication order on the patients chart.” 
Dean et al. (1995) “A dose administered (or omitted) that deviated from the 
most recently written medication order for that patient” 
Dean and Barber 
(2001) 
“Any discrepancies between the medication prescribed and 
that administered” 
Barker et al. (2002) “A discrepancy between the dose ordered and the dose 
received” 
Barker et al. (2002) “Any discrepancy between the prescriber’s interpretable 
medication order and what was administered to a patient” 
 
1.3.3. The relationship between medication errors, adverse drug 
events, and potential adverse drug events 
An overlap exists between medication-related incident categories. It is important to 
clarify the relationship between MEs, ADEs, and potential ADEs, when researching and 
seeking to improve safety in medication use (Bates et al. 1995, Morimoto et al. 2004). 
The term ADE involves injuries that result from medicines (Morimoto et al. 2004). 
Bates et al. (1995) defined ADEs as:  
 
“Injuries resulting from medical interventions related to a drug” (Bates et al. 1995, 
p199). 
 
In general, ADEs have been classified as “preventable ADE”, which involves MEs 
resulting in patient harm, and “non-preventable ADE”, which involve injury from 
medication not involving any error and in this case they are called ADRs (Von Laue et 
al. 2003). MEs that do not cause patient harm but have the potential to cause harm are 
“potential ADEs” (Morimoto et al. 2004). However, some MEs with little or no 
potential to cause patient harm are not considered potential ADEs, but are still 
considered MEs, e.g. when a non-critical medicine is administered late (Bates et al. 
1995, Morimoto et al. 2004). Figure 1.2 represents the relationship between ADEs, 
MEs, and ADRs. The large circle represents the preventable drug events (all MEs, all 
potential ADEs, and preventable ADEs). The figure shows that only a small number of 
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MEs are potential ADEs or ADEs. Moreover, it shows that all potential ADEs are MEs 

















1.3.4. Prevalence and preventability of  medication related incidents in 
hospitals 
The NPSA (2007) report revealed that around half a million prescriptions are written by 
doctors in hospitals every day. The cost of prescribed medicines in English hospitals 
accounted for 40% of the overall NHS expenditure in 2013-2014 compared to 37.5% in 
2012-2013. From 2012 to 2014, medicine costs in hospitals rose by 15% to £5.8bn 
(Health and Social Care Information Centre (2014). 
 
Medication related incidents are common and represent a large proportion of medical 
errors. Between 2005 and 2010, MIs were the second most common type of incidents 
reported to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) in England and Wales, 
after patient accidents (Cousins et al. (2012). In this report, MIs accounted for 9.7% of 
all PSIs. The proportion of MIs increased from 8.2% to 11.2% between 2005 and 2010, 
to 11.4% (n=149,409) and 11.1% (n=158,951) in 2011 and 2012. In 2013 it was the 




Preventable ADEs (ADEs with 
medication errors) 
Non-preventable ADEs (ADRs) 
             
ADEs 
 
Figure 1.2. The relationship between medication errors, ADEs and 
potential ADEs (Bates et al. 1995,  p.201) 
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(National Patient Safety Agency 2013). A retrospective review of 1000 adult deaths in 
10 acute hospitals in England in 2009 judged that 5.2% of the deaths had a 50% or 
greater chance of being preventable. 21.1% of these preventable deaths were due to 
inadequate drug or fluid management (Hogan et al. 2012). Another study of AEs in an 
NHS hospital used incident reports, active surveillance of prescription charts by 
pharmacists and record review at time of discharge and showed that ADEs comprised 
half of the total number of AEs detected and affected 10% of patients (Olsen et al. 
2007). 
 
In the US, about 10% of hospitalised patients suffered injuries caused by MIs. 
Furthermore, MIs appeared in 2-15% of hospital admissions and were also considered 
as a main cause of resulting injuries (Leape 1994). Another US study of 4,031 adult 
patients by Bates et al. (1995) identified 247 actual ADEs (11.5/ 1000 patient-day) and 
194 potential ADEs (9.1/ 1000 patient-day). ADEs were judged preventable in 28% of 
all ADEs and in 42% (n=44) of the life-threatening and serious ADEs. Furthermore, in 
two large-scale studies of AEs in hospitalised patients, medication related AEs were 
found to represent 19% of all AEs in the Harvard Medical Practice Study (Leape et al. 
1991) and the most common type of non-operative AEs in the Utah and Colorado study 
(Thomas et al. 2000). 
 
Williams (2007) stated that MIs affect between 2 and 14% of patients admitted to 
hospitals. An analysis of 3,875 incident reports from three voluntary reporting systems 
in two US hospitals showed that MIs were the most common type of PSI, accounting 
for 29% (n=1094) of all reported incidents. Around 93% (n=1017) of these MIs were 
preventable. The proportion of preventable MIs represented 45.4% of all preventable 
incidents analysed in the study, which reflects the increased preventability of MIs 
compared to other types of incidents (Nuckols et al. 2007). 
 
In Japan, 1,010 ADEs (17/ 1000 patient-day) and 514 MEs (8.71/000 patient-days) were 
identified in three tertiary care hospitals over six months. Of all ADEs, 14% were 
preventable and 1.6%, 4.9%, and 33% were fatal, life threatening, and serious, 
respectively (Morimoto et al. 2010). In Australia, the Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study (1995) reviewed the medical records of 14,179 admissions to 28 hospitals in 
Australia and revealed that 10.8% (n=249) of all AEs (n=2952) for inpatients were 
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medication related. Of these, 43% (n=108) were judged to have high preventability, 8% 
(n=20) resulted in death, and 17% (n=42) were associated with permanent disability 
(Wilson et al. 1995). In another Australian study, MIs represented 26% (n=7155/27000) 
of incidents reported in hospitals. (Runciman et al. 2003). A voluntary anonymous 
system in general practice in Australia, also showed that 50.1% (n=1294/2582) reports 
were medication related (Runciman et al. 2003) and that 2–4% of all hospital 
admissions (up to 30% in patients older than 75 years) were medication related with 
three quarters of these medication-related hospital admissions were preventable.  
 
Von Laue et al. (2003) systematically reviewed the incidence and preventability of 
ADEs internationally in hospital settings and identified that ADEs affected between 
0.7% and 6.5% of hospitalised patients and that up to 56.6% of these ADEs were 
determined to be preventable. ADEs were also found to be the cause of 2.4% to 4.1% of 
admissions with a preventability of up to 69% of these events. 
 
1.3.5. Cost of medication incidents 
In addition to the harm that may result from MIs, their costs and financial consequences 
may be significant. In the UK, the DoH (2004) reported that 10 to 20% of all AEs were 
medication related and estimated to cost the NHS £200-400 million with annual 
litigation costs estimated at £750 million (Smith 2004). The NPSA (2007) report 
estimated the cost of preventable harm resulting from medicines and revealed that 
preventable medication-related incidents cost the NHS a total of £774 million every 
year. This was the cost of preventable inpatient harms (£411m), avoidable admissions 
due to harm from medicines (£359m), and the cost of litigation (£4m).  
 
Using a case-control method, Bates et al. (1997) estimated the cost of a total of 190 
ADEs, of which 60 were preventable, for hospitalised patients in the US. They found 
that ADEs significantly increased the length of hospital stays for the ADE group by 2.2 
days with an estimated post-event cost of $2595. In preventable ADEs, the length of 
hospitalisation increased by 4.6 days with estimated post-event cost of $4685. The IoM 
(2007) report estimated the extra cost of treating each preventable ADE that occurs in 
hospitals to be at $8,750 and with the assumption that 400,000 preventable ADEs occur 
every year, the total extra cost of all these medication-related events on the US 
healthcare system was estimated as $3.5 billion per year. 
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In Australia, Roughead and Semple (2009) suggested that around 190,000 hospital 
admissions occur every year due to medication-related problems, which account for 2-
3% of admissions to Australian hospitals. This was estimated to cost $660 million. 
Approximately, 50% of these incidents were potentially preventable. 
 
1.4. Medication use process 
The term medication-use process refers to the multiple stages which are described in 
Figure 1.3 through which medications pass before reaching to the patient. In hospital 
settings, these stages encompass (1) prescribing e.g. by doctors or pharmacists; (2) 
transcribing; (3) preparing and dispensing; (4) preparing and administration, often by 
nurses; and (5) monitoring for both therapeutic effect and possible adverse events 
(Institute of Medicine et al. 2007). These stages form a complicated system that 
involves around 20 steps and consequently there are 20 opportunities for MEs to occur. 
Wrong medicine, wrong dose, wrong route, wrong time, and wrong patient are known 
as the classic types of medication errors and called the “five wrongs”. These errors can 
occur at any stage of prescribing, transcribing, dispensing or administration. Moreover, 
adequate monitoring of therapeutic effect and adverse events is not always undertaken 































































































































Chapter1: General Introduction 
   
29 
 
1.5. Medication incidents based on the stage of occurrence in 
the medication-use process 
1.5.1. Prescribing and transcription Errors 
Different definitions has been used by researchers to define prescribing errors (Tully 
2012). However, the definition developed by Dean et al. (2000) is considered one of the 
most commonly used definitions in studies from the UK and Europe (Tully 2012). Dean 
and colleagues have defined prescribing errors as:  
 
“A clinically meaningful prescribing error occurs when, as a result of a prescribing 
decision or prescription writing process, there is an unintentional significant (1) 
reduction in the probability of treatment being timely and effective or (2) increase in the 
risk of harm when compared with generally accepted practice.” (Dean et al. 2000, 
p235) 
 
Prescribing errors are common in hospitals and many MEs are caused by inappropriate 
prescribing, primarily made by junior doctors (Ashcroft et al. 2015). A UK prospective 
study conducted by Dean et al. (2002) assessed the incidence and clinical significance 
of prescribing errors in a UK hospital. The study involved 36,200 written medication 
orders over four weeks and identified a prescribing error in 1.5% (n=538) of the written 
orders. Most errors (61%, n=328) occurred during the order writing process, whereas 
39% (n=210) of errors occurred during the prescribing decision process. The nature of 
errors involved dosing errors (54%, n=289), errors in deciding the need for medicine 
therapy (18%, n=96), giving instructions on how to supply the medicines (13%, n=69), 
and giving administration instructions (9%, n=51). Most of the serious errors (58%) 
occurred during the order writing process. The transcribing error rate was 1%. In total, 
26% (n=142) of errors were potentially serious, of which, 58% occurred in the 
prescribing decision process. 
 
Another recent UK study (Ashcroft et al. 2015) was conducted across 20 hospitals to 
compare the rate of prescribing errors made by junior doctors with those made by senior 
doctors and other prescribers. During the study period, pharmacists checked medication 
orders for prescribing errors. Of 124,260 checked medication orders 11,235 prescribing 
errors were identified in 10,986 orders giving a mean error rate of 8.8% for all 
prescribers. The results showed significantly higher rates of errors for doctors in 
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training compared to the rates for consultants. The error rates in prescriptions written by 
doctors in training was 8.6% for foundation year 1 doctors and 10.2% for foundation 
year 2 doctors, compared to 4.87% error rate for consultants. The most common type of 
errors identified in the study was the omitting of required medicine on admission (28.5 
%), followed by under-dosage (10.9 %), and over-dosage prescribing (8.4 %). 
 
In the US, researchers (Bates et al. 1995) assessed the incidence and preventability of 
ADEs in two US tertiary-care hospitals by reviewing self-reports and charts by nurses 
and pharmacists. They found that 49% (n=128) of 264 preventable ADEs occurred 
during the prescribing stage and that 11% (n=29) occurred during transcribing. In 
another US study to identify the nature of MIs (Winterstein et al. 2004), researchers 
analysed MIs reports in one tertiary hospital. The study found that 72.5% (n=174/240) 
of analysed MIs occurred in the prescribing stage and 6.3% (n=15/240) were in the 
transcribing stage. 
 
In paediatrics, prescribing errors are also common. In the UK, the study conducted by 
Ghaleb et al. (2010) in five London NHS hospitals concluded that 13.2% (n=391/2955) 
of medication orders were associated with prescribing errors. Incomplete prescriptions 
(41.2%, n=161), use of abbreviations (24%, n=94), and dosing errors (11.3%, n=44) 
were the most common types of prescribing errors. A prospective cohort study for MEs 
in paediatric wards in two US teaching hospitals revealed that most of MEs occurred 
during the prescribing stage with 74% (n=454/616) errors reported, and 10% 
(n=62/414) occurring in the transcribing stage. The most common error type was dosing 
errors (34%) (Kaushal et al. 2001). 
 
Lewis et al. (2009) conducted a systematic review of the prevalence, incidence and 
nature of errors associated with the prescribing stage in hospitals for adults or paediatric 
settings. The review which included 65 studies (22 from the UK and 25 from the US) 
identified 7% of medication orders associated with errors, which is equivalent to 52 
errors/100 admissions and 24 errors/1000 patient days. It showed that the most common 
error was prescribing the incorrect dosage (Lewis et al. 2009).  
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The studies discussed above involved large numbers of patients and errors. These 
studies show that prescribing errors are common among adults and paediatric 
populations, although the rates of prescribing errors vary.  
 
1.5.2. Dispensing error 
Dispensing is considered core function of pharmacy professionals. The NPSA (2007) 
reported that around 900 million prescription items were dispensed every year by 
hospital and community pharmacies in England and Wales. In 2013, over 1.0 billion 
prescription items were dispensed in the community in England. Dispensing errors have 
been defined as: 
 
“A discrepancy between a prescription and the medicine that the pharmacy delivers to 
the patient or distributes to the ward on the basis of this prescription, including the 
dispensing of a medicine with inferior pharmaceutical or informational 
quality.”(Cheung et al. 2009, p.676). 
 
Although dispensing errors can be associated with significant harm to patients, limited 
research has been performed to investigate the incidence and types of dispensing errors 
in hospital pharmacies. Errors during the dispensing stage were shown to have lower 
rates than during administration and prescribing stages (Bates et al. 1995, Ashcroft and 
Cooke 2006, Morimoto et al. 2010, National Patient Safety Agency 2013). In the UK, 
11.1% (n=7,436) of MIs reported to the NPSA in 2009 from England and Wales 
hospitals occurred during the stage of preparation and dispensing of medicines 
compared to 53.4%, (n=34,137) during the administration stage and 17.5% (n=11,180) 
during prescribing (National Patient Safety Agency 2009). Another study (Beso et al. 
2005) investigated dispensing errors identified in a NHS hospital pharmacy and found 
that 2.1% of 4,849 dispensed items had one or more dispensing errors.  
 
In the US, an observational study for detected and undetected dispensing errors in a 
tertiary-care hospital identified 5,075 dispensing errors in 140,755 doses (3.6%). Of 
these errors, 79% were detected during routine checking, leaving 21% of observed 
errors undetected. Of undetected errors, 23.5% were potentially harmful, of which 0.8% 
were life threatening (Cina et al. 2006). In a French military hospital, Bohand et al. 
(2009) determined the error rate in 9,719 filled unit dose cassettes. The study found 706 
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dispensing errors (0.8%) in 88,609 filled unit doses involved in the study (including 
omitted doses). A study by Silva et al. (2011) investigated prescribing and dispensing 
errors associated with high-alert medications in a Brazilian paediatric unit and identified 
at least one dispensing error with each high-alert medication dispensed. A total of 1,707 
dispensing errors were identified in 705 doses. In total, 723 (42.4%) of identified 
dispensing errors were also associated with prescribing errors. 
 
James et al. (2009) conducted a literature review of international studies on the 
incidence and nature of dispensing errors. The review involved 18 studies from the UK 
and 18 studies from the US, which reported the errors from the hospital pharmacies.  
The review identified the rate of both prevented (i.e., errors intercepted before they 
leave the pharmacy) and unprevented dispensing errors (i.e., detected after the medicine 
has left to the units). In UK hospitals, the rate of prevented dispensing errors ranged 
from 0.11% to 2.7% (8 studies) and from 0.008 to 0.02% (n= 9 studies) for unprevented 
errors. Higher rates were found in US hospitals where prevented dispensing errors rates 
ranged from 0.06% to 18% (16 studies) while only one study reported the rate of 
unprevented dispensing errors at 0.75%. The most common types of unprevented errors 
were dispensing the wrong medicine, dosage, quantity, or strength. Labelling errors and 
dispensing the wrong medicine or strength were the most common types of prevented 
dispensing errors in both automated and manual systems. However, different studies 
from the UK revealed that automation systems significantly decreased medicine content 
errors (e.g., wrong medicine, wrong form, wrong quantity, and wrong strength) 
(Fitzpatrick et al. 2005, Franklin et al. 2008). 
 
A large study undertaken by James et al. (2011) compared the rate and nature of 
prevented and unprevented dispensing incidents reported in five Welsh NHS hospital 
pharmacies. Amongst 221 670 items, the study found a significant differences between 
prevented incidents (n=131/100 000 items) and unprevented incidents (n=16/100 000 
items). The study also found significant differences in the proportion of incidents 
involving wrong directions or warning on the label (p = 0.02), incorrect drug details on 
the label” (p = 0.01), dispensing incorrect strength (p = 0.02), and expiry date issues (p 
= 0.002) between prevented and unprevented incidents.  
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1.5.3. Medication administration errors 
As medication administration is the last stage of MUP, the issue of errors during 
medication administration in hospitals has long been the focus of research. Medication 
administration was defined by the Nursing Interventions Classification as: 
  
“Preparing, giving, and evaluating effectiveness of prescription and non-prescription 
medications” (Gonzales 2010, p555).  
 
Medication administration incidents (MAIs) have been defined as:  
“The administration of a dose of medication that deviates from the prescription, as 
written on the patient medication chart, or from standard hospital policy and 
procedures. This includes errors in the preparation, and administration of intravenous 
medicines on the ward” (Ghaleb et al. 2010, p114) 
 
In the UK, the proportion of administration incidents was significantly higher than other 
stages of the MUP and varied between 46.5% (Ashcroft and Cooke 2006) and 83.3% 
(Maidment and Thorn 2005). Ashcroft and Cooke (2006) conducted a retrospective 
analysis of MIs reported over a 26-month period to an online reporting system in a large 
teaching hospital (1,000 beds). They found that 46.5% of the 495 submitted incidents 
were related to administration stage compared to 38.8% in the prescribing and 14.7% 
during the dispensing stage. A further retrospective study to analyse MIs reported to an 
online reporting system in acute and community hospitals and primary care facilities in 
Scotland over a 46-month-period also showed that administration incidents accounted 
for the majority of reported MIs (59%, n=1,571/2,666) (Alrwisan et al. 2011).  
 
In US studies, the proportion of error during administration stage was slightly lower 
than prescribing (Bates et al. 1995, Leape et al. 1995, Kopp et al. 2006). Leape and his 
colleagues (1995) reviewed the patients’ records in two hospitals and identified that 
39% (n=130) of 334 errors occurred during the prescribing stage, and 38% (n=126) in 
the administration stage. Wrong dosage (27%, n=34), wrong administration technique 
(14%, n=18), administering the wrong medicine (12%, n=15), and omissions (8%, 
n=10) were the most common types of medication administration errors (MAEs). A 
retrospective study, conducted in a general hospital in Brazil to identify and classify 
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ADEs reported by nurses, revealed that 64.3% of 230 reported errors occurred during 
the medication preparation and administration stage (Silva et al. 2011).  
 
Direct observation is a common method used to evaluate the rate, types, and severity of 
MAEs. Studies that used this approach identified the error rate to the total of 
opportunities of error (TOE). TOE is the sum of all doses ordered plus all the unordered 
doses given (Allan and Barker 1990). An international systematic review of 91 
observational studies to review the prevalence and nature of MAEs found a median 
error rate of adults and/or paediatrics studies of 19.6%, including timing errors and 
8.0% without timing errors. Timing errors (in studies reporting timing errors), 
omissions, wrong dosage, and unauthorised medicines were the most common errors in 
most studies (Keers et al. 2013). The median error rate in another systematic review of 
MAEs in hospitals was 10.5% (22.5% with timing errors) of TOEs in 34 cross-sectional 
studies. The median error rate in another 15 before and- after studies was 6.9% (22.5% 
with timing errors) of TOEs (Berdot et al. 2013).  
 
Many observational studies have been conducted in the UK. The incidence of 
administration errors observed in the UK ranged from 3% to 10.7% (Dean et al. 1995, 
Kelly et al. 2011). Kelly et al. (2011) identified that out of 2,129 observed medicine 
administrations, 10.7% (n=228) involved errors. This increased to 38% when timing 
errors were included. Commonly observed errors were wrong time (72.1%, n=589), 
wrong preparation (8.0%, n=65), omissions (4.9%, n=40), wrong form (4.7%, n=38), 
and wrong dose (3.1%, n=25). A systematic review of UK observational MAE studies 
(n=16) identified an overall error rate of 5.6% (excluding timing errors) for non IV 
doses and 35% of IV doses. The review showed that MAEs in IV doses were five times 
more likely than non IV doses (McLeod et al. 2013).  
 
In A US study of 36 healthcare facilities (24 hospitals & 12 nursing homes) accredited 
by Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the rate of MAEs 
was 19% (n=605/3,216) of all administered doses as determined by a Barker et al. 
(2002). Although the rate was slightly lower at hospitals (16.4%, n=290/1,765) 
compared to nursing homes (21.7%, n=315/1,451), this difference was not significant 
(P=0.82). The most common types of errors were timing, omission, administering the 
wrong dose, and administering an unauthorized medicine. Poon et al. (2010) observed 
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6,732 medication administrations in medical, surgical, and ICU units in a 735-bed 
tertiary hospital in the US and found an 11.5% error rate (n=776) without timing errors. 
Wrong administration route (38.4%, n=289), wrong documentation (24.7%, n=192), and 
dosing errors (17.5%, n=163) were the most common errors. In total, 1.8% (n=123) of 
observed administrations were classified as potentially clinically significant, while 1.3% 
(n=88) were serious, and 0.03% (n=2) were life-threatening. 
 
In an Australian study, Runciman et al. (2003) demonstrated that errors occur in 15–
20% of dose administrations when ward floor stock systems were used and in 5–8% 
when unit dose supply systems were used. In a prospective Japanese study conducted to 
assess the incidence of ADEs, 68 errors (14.1%) were recorded at the administration 
stage compared to 319 errors (66.3%) at the prescribing stage, 8 errors (1.7%) during 
dispensing, and 83 (17.3%) monitoring errors (Morimoto et al. 2010). In Spain, 
Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al. (2012) identified that 22% (n=509/2,314) of administered 
doses in two medical units with automated prescribing and dispensing systems were 
associated with errors. Of these, 13.4% (n=68) were during the preparation stage and 
86.6% (n=441) were at administration. The most commonly observed errors were “use 
of wrong administration techniques” (13.9%, n=321), mainly due to an interaction with 
food intake, wrong preparation i.e. wrong reconstitution/dilution (1.7%, n=40), 
omission (1.4%, n=32), and wrong infusion rate (1.2%, n=27). Of these, 95.7% did not 
cause harm, while 2.3% required monitoring, and 0.4% were associated with temporary 
harm (Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al. 2012). In France, an observational study was 
conducted by Tissot et al. (2003) in two units in a university hospital. The MAEs rates 
were 14.9% (with timing errors) and 11.1% (without wrong time errors) in all observed 
doses. The observed incidence of MAEs by a Malaysian observational study was 11.4% 
(n=127) of 1,118 observed doses (reduced to 8.7% if wrong timing errors were 
excluded). Of these, 10.4% were potentially life-threatening (Chua et al. 2009). Similar 
to the previous studies, incorrect administration time (25.2%, n=34), wrong 
administration technique (16.3%, n=22), and unauthorized medicine errors (14.1%, 19) 
were the most common errors. IV doses were found to be more likely to have errors 
compared with non IV routes (21.3% vs. 7.9%, P < 0.001).  
 
In paediatrics, a systematic review of incidence of MEs in paediatric inpatients was 
conducted by Ghaleb et al. (2006) and involved eight observational studies from five 
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different countries including the UK. The study found that the observed MAE rate 
ranged from 0.6% and 10.3% when IV doses were excluded, and a higher rate of 18.2% 
and 27% was found of observed administrations when IV doses were included. Wrong 
administration route, wrong frequency of administration, and omission errors were the 
most common observed errors. More recent UK observational study also was conducted 
to identify MAEs in paediatric inpatients. The study involved 161 nurses preparing and 
administering medicines and identified 429 administration errors in 2,249 opportunities 
for error (19.1%) (Ghaleb et al. 2010). A study conducted in New Zealand showed that 
44.6% (n=164) of errors occurred at the administration stage compared to 60.9% 
(n=224) during prescribing, 9.2% (n=34) at dispensing, and 14.9% (n=55) when 
monitoring (Kunac and Reith 2008).  
 
In ICUs, medication related errors were particularly more common than other settings. 
This is because in ICU, patients receive about twice as many administrations as patients 
in general wards, and also most medicine administration involves calculations for bolus 
administration or continuous infusion (Kiekkas et al. 2011). Observational studies of 
MEs in ICUs identified that error rates ranged from 6.6% and 56.2% of observed 
administrations (Tissot et al. 1999, Van den Bemt et al. 2002). Valentin et al. (2009) 
conducted an international observational study of 113 ICUs from 27 countries including 
16 units from the UK to evaluate MAEs with parenteral medicines. This multinational 
study showed that MAEs occurred in 7.3% (n=861\11,725) of administrations and 
affected 33.2% of patients. The study also showed that there were 74.5 errors per 100 
patient days. Omissions (30.1%, n=386), wrong time (44.8%, n=259), and wrong dose 
(13.7%, n=118) were most common. In the US, Kopp et al. (2006) found that errors 
occurred in 26.7% of administrations in the ICU unit in a tertiary care hospital. Among 
errors with potential or actual harm (n=42), the most common types were omissions 
(48%, n=20), administering extra dose (14%, n=6), wrong administration technique 
(14%, n=6), and wrong dosage (12%, n=5). Details from studies using direct 
observation to detect MAEs are described in Table 1.4.  
 
Higher error rates were observed in IV preparation and administration. The observed 
error rate in IV doses ranged from 7% (n=32/249) (Taxis and Barber 2003) to 31% 
(n=42/134) (Wirtz et al. 2003) during the IV preparation process. Whilst during the IV 
administration process, error rates ranged from 8% (n=118/1391) (Anselmi et al. 2007) 
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to 49% (n=53/109) (Wirtz et al. 2003). The overall rate of error in IV preparation and 
administration ranged from 25% (Bruce and Wong 2001) in one UK-based study to 
69.7% in two studies from Australian and UK (Cousins et al. 2005, Westbrook et al. 
2011). Taxis and Barber (2003) in an observational study in two UK hospitals identified 
that 49% of 430 observed IV doses were associated with one or more errors. The most 
common errors observed involved fast administration of bolus dose (37.9%, 
n=136/430), using wrong solvent or diluents (8%, n=36/430), preparing wrong dose 
(3%, n=12/430), and omissions (3%, n=12/430). In total, 1.2% of errors were 
potentially severe, 57.8% moderate, and 40.9% minor. Cousins et al. (2005) observed 
errors associated with preparation and administration of IVs in three European countries 
involving four hospitals in UK, one hospital in Germany and one hospital in France. 
The observed error rates were 69% (n=185/273) in UK sites, 52% (n=262/425) at the 
site in Germany, and 34% (n=34/100) at the site in France. Table 1.5 includes more 
details about some large scale observational studies of IV doses. Therefore, despite the 
development of patient safety research, MAEs in hospitals remain. Error rates during 
the preparation and administration of IV doses may be higher than non IV doses. 
Timing errors, omissions, and wrong dosage were the most common types. 
 
A small number of the studies discussed above (Ho et al. 1997, Kopp et al. 2006) 
observed errors during both weekdays and weekends and covered all shifts (day, 
evening, and night) which made the results more reliable and representative. However, 
some studies observed administrations only on weekdays (Tissot et al. 1999, Van den 
Bemt et al. 2002, Tissot et al. 2003). Other researchers did not observe administration 
during evening or night shifts (Greengold et al. 2003, Tissot et al. 2003). Although the 
study of Ho et al. (1997) observed medication administration in one ward only, it has 
the advantage of comparing MAE rates between different periods i.e. weekdays vs. 
weekend, pharmacy open times vs. pharmacy closed times; first 48 hours after 
prescribing vs. remainder of course; first 48 hours after admission vs. remainder of stay. 
However, a number of studies did not clarify the observation times (morning, evening, 
or night) and whether the observations were performed during weekdays or weekends 
(Ridge et al. 1995). The reviewed studies also differed in the number of observation 
sites. Barker et al. (2002) used a large sample size (n=3,216 doses) from 36 institutions 
to identify the prevalence of medication errors. Such large samples may provide more 
representative findings (Barker et al. 2002). 
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Table 1.4. Large scale observational studies that reported on medication administration errors 
Study/ 
country 




Common types of MAEs Other findings 
Ho et al. 
(1997) 
UK 
Settings: one elderly 
care ward 
Sample size: 2,170 
OEs and 119 MAEs  
5.5% (119/2170) or 
0.3 errors / patient 
day 
Omissions (50.4%)  
Wrong dose (16%, 19)  
Wrong preparation technique (13%) 
Unauthorised dose (10.9%, 13). 
 MAE rate was significantly higher on 
weekdays (6.4%) than weekends (4.0%). 
 MAE rate was higher during pharmacy 
opening hours (7.8%) than during the 




Settings: 2 teaching 
hospitals. 
Sample size: 9,453 





Wrong administration technique 
(6.4%) 
Wrong dose preparation (1.4%) 
Omissions (0.9%) 
Wrong dosage (0.8%) 
Wrong route (0.6%) 
Wrong Intravenous rate (0.2%) 
 




Haematology  ward 
(22 beds) 
Sample size:  
1118 doses with 127 
analysed errors. 





Incorrect time (25.2%), 
Incorrect administration (16.3%)  
Unauthorized medicine errors 
(14.1%). 
 
 Severity of MAEs: Potentially life-
threatening (10.4%), probably clinically 
insignificant (35.5%), minimal clinical 
significance (21.5%), definitely clinically 
significant (32.6%). 
 IV routes (21.3%) were more likely to be 
associated with MAEs than oral (7.9%). 
Lisby et al. 
2005 
Denmark  
Settings: One medical 
and one surgical ward  
Sample size: 
2467 OEs in all stages 






Lack of identity control (36,4%, 150),  
Wrong time (4.4%, 18)  
Wrong delivery (2.9%, 12)  
Wrong administration technique 
(1.9%, 8) 
 Severity of MAEs: 
Fatal (1%, 2), serious (20%, 33), 
significant (32%, 53), non-significant 
(46%, 77). 
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Table 1.4. (Continued) Large scale observational studies that reported on medication administration errors 
Study/ 
country 
Settings and sample 
size 
Observed error rate Common types of MAEs Other findings 
Lisby et al. 
2005 
Denmark  
Settings: One medical 
and one surgical ward  
Sample size: 
2467 OEs in all stages 
and 1065 errors  
Ordering (39%, 167), 
transcribing (56%, 310), 
dispensing (4%, 17),  
administration (41%, 166).  
Lack of identity control (36,4%, 150),  
Wrong time (4.4%, 18)  
Wrong delivery (2.9%, 12)  
Wrong administration technique (1.9%, 8) 
 
 Severity of MAEs: 
Fatal (1%, 2), serious (20%, 
33), significant (32%, 53), 
non-significant (46%, 77). 




Settings: (10 paediatric 
wards) 
Sample size: 161 nurses 
and 2294 doses were 
observed. 
19.1% (429/2294) Wrong  preparation (20.7%, 89)  
Wrong administration rate  of IV(19.8%, 
85)  
Wrong  time (18.7%, 80)  
Left medicine by patient’s bedside without 
checking administration (10.0%, 43) 
Incorrect dose (9.3%, 40) 
Wrong  administration technique (5.4%, 
23) 
Omissions  (5.1%, 22). 
 Severity was not reported. 
Franklin et al. 
(2007) 
UK 
Settings: one surgical 
ward  
Sample size: 
1644 OEs (pre) 





 Pre: Omissions (4.1%, 68),   
fast administration of IV bolus (1.9%, 31), 
and wrong dose (1.8%, 29) 
 Post: Omissions (4.1%, 68), fast 
administration of IV bolus (0.4%, 5), and 
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Table 1.4. (Continued) Large scale observational studies that reported on medication administration errors 
Study/ 
country 
Settings and sample 
size 
Observed error rate Common types of errors Other findings 
(Dean et al. 
1995) 
UK and US 
Settings: 2 UK and US  
university hospitals  
Sample size: 







Omission (58%, 49) 
Wrong dose (14%, 12) 
Wrong formulation (10%, 8) 
Wrong medicine (7%, 6) 
USA: 
Omission (22%, 14) 
Wrong dose (30%, 19) 




Gonzalez et al. 
(2012) 
Spain 
Settings: two clinical 
units  in a tertiary 
teaching hospital 
Sample size: 2314 
administrations for 73 
patients were observed 
Total error rate: 22% 
(509/2314) 
13.4% (68) in 
preparation and 86.6% 
(441) in administration. 
 
Use of wrong administration techniques  
(13.9%, 321) 
Wrong reconstitution/dilution (1.7%, 40) 
Omission (1.4%, 32)  
Wrong infusion rate (1.2%, 27) 
Wrong dose (0.8%, 19). 
 Severity: No damage (95.7%), 
no damage but monitoring 
required (2.3%), and 
temporary damage (0.4%). 
Barker et al. 
2002 
US 
Settings: 18 hospitals 




With timing errors 
18.8% (605/3216)  
Without timing errors 
10.8% 
Timing errors (43%) 
Omission (30%) 
Wrong dose administration (17%) 
Unauthorized medicine (4%) 
 
 7% of errors were judge as 
potential ADEs. 
 The significant potential risk 
factors: Morning and evening 
shift, and IV administration. . 





Settings: 113 ICUs 
from 27 countries (17 
from the UK) 
Sample size: 1,328 
patients and 11,725 
administrations. 
 861 MAEs affected 
441 patients (33.2% of 
all patients observed). 
 74.5 events/100 
patient days. 
No, error/100 patient days:  
Wrong time (386) 
Missed medication (259) 
Wrong dose (118),   
Wrong medicine (61) 
 Impact of errors: 12 patients 
(0.9% of the study population) 
experienced permanent harm 
or died 
* Prospective cross-sectional study using multi-entry questionnaire 
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Some studies were conducted in a limited number of units or wards, and therefore 
results were not extrapolated to other settings (Ho et al. 1997, Taxis and Barber 2004, 
Chua et al. 2009). Furthermore, studies conducted in limited sites provided a small 
sample size such as the study by Chua et al. (2009) when only one haematology ward of 
a teaching hospital (22 beds) in Malasya was studied and only 127 errors were analysed. 
Additionally, the study of Tissot et al. (2003) in one university hospital observed only 
523 opportunities for error and only 78 MAEs were detected. 
 
In some observational studies, the observers compared the information collected from 
the observation with the original prescription to detect errors (Barker et al. 2002). 
However, other studies applied wider definitions of MAEs when also detected the 
variations from safe medication practices (Greengold et al. 2003, Chua et al. 2009) or 
recommendations of the manufacturers and the protocols of each unit (Tissot et al. 
2003). Furthermore, Van den Bemt et al. (2002) detected any deviation from written, 
printed, or verbal medication orders, the drug information sheets provided by the 
manufacturer, from the information in a handbook on injectable drugs, or from general 
nursing procedures used in the hospitals.  
 
1.5.4. Monitoring errors 
Medication monitoring is considered the last stage of the MUP. The aim of monitoring 
is to ensure the efficacy and safety of medication administered. Monitoring errors were 
defined as: 
 
“A monitoring error occurs when a prescribed medicine is not monitored in the way 
which would be considered acceptable in routine general practice.” (Alldred et al. 
2008, p318). 
 
Although studies have shown that inappropriate monitoring of patients can result in 
harm to patients, monitoring incidents, which are also known as ‘ameliorable incidents’ 
are not always included in the research of medication safety compared to other stages of 
MUP, particularly those occurring in hospitals (Bates et al. 1995, Lisby et al. 2005, 
Kopp et al. 2006). 
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ward and 1 
surgical ICU. 
22 nurses were 
observed. 




Overall rate (48%, 58/122) 
Preparation errors (19%, 
23/122) 
Administration errors (23%, 
28/122 )  
Both types of errors in (6%, 
7/122). 
Preparation errors: 
Errors in solvent/ diluents (20%, 24/122), wrong dose (2%, 
3/122), Omission (1%, 1/122), unauthorised medicine (2%, 
2/122) 
Administration errors: 
Fast bolus dose (2%, 3/122), incompatibilities (25%, 
31/122). 
Potentially minor 

























times of drug 
rounds.  
Error rate  (49%, 212/430) 
Preparation errors (7%, 
32/430) 
Administration errors (36%, 
155/430) 
Both types of errors (6%, 
25/430). 
Errors in multiple step preparations (14%, 50/345), ready for 
administration (0%), bolus dose injection (73%, 172/235),  
intermittent infusion (9%, 15/163) 
Errors details: 
Preparation errors: errors in solvent/diluents (8%, 36/430), 
wrong dose (3%, 12/430), and omission (3%, 12/430). 
Administration errors: fast bolus dose (peripheral line) 
(30%, 127/430), fast bolus dose (central line) (8%, 36/430), 





























Preparation errors: 22%, 
administration errors: 27% 
(TGP): 
Preparation errors: 23%, 
administration errors 49%  
(GSP): 
Preparation errors: 31% , 
administration errors 22% 
Common preparation errors 
TBP: wrong dose 3%, wrong dosage form 7%, omissions 
10%, and wrong prep. tech. 3% 
TGP: wrong dose 21%, omissions 1%, and wrong 
preparation tech. 1% 
GSP: wrong dose 5%, wrong dosage form 2%, omissions 
20%, wrong preparation tech. 1% 
Common administration  errors  
TBP: wrong rate 27%. 
TGP: wrong rate 37%, and compatibility errors 17% 
GSP: wrong rate 20%, and compatibility errors 2% 
 Potential minor 
outcome 27% 
 Moderate to 
severe clinical 
outcome 74% 
TBP = traditional British pharmacy service; TGP = traditional German pharmacy service; GSP = German satellite pharmacy service 
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Error rate Details of errors types Severity 

















Total of 824  
preparations 





administration error rates 
excluding labelling errors 
and omissions: 
UK 





UK: labelling error (43%), wrong diluents (1%), wrong rout 
(1%), wrong rate (48%), wrong time  (18%), wrong dose or 
infusion volume (0.5%) 
. 
Germany: labelling error (99%), wrong diluents (49%), 
wrong rate (21%), wrong time (2%), wrong dose or infusion 
volume (2%). 
 
France: labelling error (20%), wrong diluents (18%), wrong 






6 wards in 2 
teaching 
hospitals 
107 nurses and   
568 doses 
were observed 
in both sites 
 
 
Error rate 69.7% (396 of 568 
IV doses were associated with 





Procedural failures (Deviation from the procedure):73.9% 
of doses have at least one procedural failure. 
Clinical errors: wrong rate (73.3%), wrong volume 
(33.3%), wrong mix (5.8%), drug incompatibility (0.8%). 
Medicines associated with more errors: 
antiulcerant (93%), antiemetic (75%), anti-infective (67%), 
steroid (67%), narcotic  (67%), diuretic (50%). 
 25.5% of errors 
were rated as 
serious errors 
(23% of bolus 
















Preparation errors (8.5% , 
118 /1391) 
Administration errors  (5%, 
66/ 1315) 
Total rate: 6.7% (184/2709) 
 
Preparation errors: Hospital 1: omission (5.8%), wrong 
dose (90.9%). Hospital 2: omission (11%), wrong dose 
(2%). Hospital 3: wrong dose (7.4%), omission (2.9%). 
Administration errors: Hospital 1: wrong dose (1.3%), 
omission (0.8%), wrong patient( 0.1%). Hospital 2: wrong 
dose (2.2%), omission (1.1%), wrong patient (1.1%). 
Hospital 3: wrong dose (5.7%), omission (3.4%). 
Not provided  




The NPSA report (2007) showed that 3.8% (n=2424) of reported MIs in the hospitals 
were monitoring incidents. A study in six general medical practices found that less than 
a third of patients prescribed diuretic medicines had their blood electrolyte levels 
monitored (Clayton et al. 2006). In another study, less than half of 1,200 epileptic 
patients were adequately monitored for their anticonvulsive levels (Thapar et al. 2001). 
In the UK, Barber et al. (2009) evaluated MIs in 55 care homes and found 14.7% (n=32) 
of administered medicines that needed monitoring were associated with monitoring 
errors. In the US, Kuo et al. (2013) found that 14% (n=85/605) of inpatient MIs were 
related to monitoring. In a Japanese study, Morimoto et al. (2010) revealed that 17% 
(n=83) of preventable and potential errors occurred at the monitoring stage. 
 
1.6. Analysis of incidents causation 
Since the mid-1980s, several research studies have investigated the human and 
organizational factors affecting safety in healthcare. At the beginning, the focus was 
mainly around the work of anaesthetists and ICUs (Reason 1995). Later, the interest in 
the human factors spread wider in different health care settings and several medical 
specialties (Vincent et al. 1993, Vincent et al. 1998, Taylor-Adams and Vincent 2004, 
Vincent 2004, Cornish and Jones 2012). Furthermore, the collaboration between 
medical specialists and experts in human factors yielded more acceptances of accident 
causation models, which were developed for other domains such as nuclear power and 
were applied in healthcare settings. Reason’s model for organisational accidents, which 
was developed to help analysis of error causation and in developing error prevention 
methods in complex industrial systems, has been adapted for healthcare settings 
(Reason 1995). 
 
Analyses of accidents causation in medicine, and before in other fields such as aviation 
and nuclear power, have focused on the background of these accidents i.e. pre-existing 
factors related to the system which results in the conditions in which errors occur rather 
than the individuals who make errors (Reason 1990, Vincent et al. 1998). In MEs, the 
vast majority were found to be multifaceted and resulting from system failures in which 
clinicians work (Cohen and Shastay 2008). This concept that errors mainly result from 
the systems failure, not from individual negligence, became fundamental in new 
strategies to address safety in healthcare (Leape et al. 2002). 
 




1.6.1. Human contribution theory 
Reason’s organisational accidents model was developed mainly to detect the chain of 
actions that lead to an accident. This  considered the individuals’ actions, and then, most 
importantly, the background conditions in which individuals were working and 
investigate the organisational context where the accident occurred (Reason 1990). For a 
better understanding of human contribution in accidents, Reason’s model classified the 
human failure in two ways: active failures (or person approach) and latent failures (or 
system approach). This classification distinguishes failures which have immediate 
outcomes (active failures) from those which may take long time for their negative 
outcome to appear (latent failure). Each model has its model of causation and 
philosophies of error management (Reason 1990).   
 
Active failures are those unsafe actions committed by individuals’ in the front line i.e. 
in medicine, those who are in direct contact with patients, e.g., physicians, pharmacists, 
and nurses and therefore, their adverse outcomes are immediate. Active failures involve 
“errors” and “violations”. Based on the definition of error; “failure of planned actions to 
achieve their desired goal” (Reason 1995, p.81); Reason further classified errors into 
two categories based on the psychological way the failure occur: unintended and 
intended actions (Figure 1.4). Unintended actions occur when the plan itself is good but 
the failure was in the execution or action and involves slips and lapses. Slips relate to 
observable actions and are usually associated with attentional or skills based failures i.e. 
the person intended to do something but did something else by mistake, e.g. picking up 
the wrong syringe or medicine while lapses are related to memory based failure (Reason 
1995). 
 






Figure 1.4. Reason’s psychological classification of human errors (Reason 1990, 
p.207) 
 
Conversely, intended actions can be divided into mistakes and violations. Mistakes, also 
called ‘failures of intention’, involve good execution of an incorrect plan i.e. the actions 
may go as intended, but the plan itself or its bath is inappropriate to achieve the desired 
outcome. Mistakes can be rule based mistakes, where the error comes in different 
forms: misapplication of a good rule, or application of a bad rule i.e. error in judgement 
or knowledge based mistakes i.e. errors due to lack of knowledge. Therefore, in all error 
types (slips and lapses, and mistakes), there is a deviation. In slips and lapses, the 
deviation occurs at the level of action or execution, while with mistakes, the action may 
go as intended but the plan itself deviates from the appropriate pathway to achieve its 
objectives. In mistakes, the usually failure comes from higher levels in the organisation 
where planning and designing intentions are made. 
 
 




In contrast, violations involve any deliberated deviations from safe practices, 
procedures, standards, or rules i.e. the actions were intended. In comparison  with 
errors, which mainly result from informational problems (e.g. forgetting, inattention, 
lack of knowledge etc.), violations are more linked to motivational problems such as 
low morale, inadequate supervision, and lack of concern. Another difference between 
errors and violations is that errors can be treated by improving the quality and 
delivering the necessary information within the organization, while violations usually 
need motivational and organizational solutions (Reason 1995). 
 
Latent failures, the second perspective in Reason’s causation model, are usually those 
adverse outcomes resulting from decisions at higher organisational levels i.e. committed 
by people who are not directly involved in the workplace. They are seen as the origin of 
errors and can exist for a long time without any apparent adverse outcomes until they 
combine with local triggers when their consequences are disclosed (Reason 1995). In 
medicine, latent failures are mainly the liability of people in management and of senior 
clinicians who are responsible for taking decisions within the institution (Reason 1995, 
Vincent et al. 1998). These failures have consequences in workplace conditions in 
which errors occur e.g. heavy workload, distractions, and inadequate staffing. Thus, the 
two main differences between active and latent failures are firstly, the length of time 
that the adverse outcome requires to occur, and secondly, where the failure occurs in the 
organisation (Reason 1990).  
 
1.6.2. The ‘Swiss cheese’ model of system accidents 
In the systems approach, barriers, and safeguards are designed to act as defensive layers 
to protect the organisation, as well as the potential victim from local hazards. Although 
these defences could be effective, Reason’s Swiss cheese model (Reason 1990) 
explained these defences as like slices of Swiss cheese and both active failure and latent 
failures (through errors and violations producing conditions) can act as holes in the 
system defences for the error to pass and cause an adverse event (Figure 1.5). 
 





Figure 1.5. Reason's Swiss cheese error causation model (Reason 2000, p.393) 
  
 
1.6.3. Analysing and investigating clinical incidents 
Based on Reason’s model of organisational accidents, Vincent et al. (1998) developed a 
model (Figure 1.6) to provide better explanation and understanding of the anatomy and 
aetiology of organisational accidents and facilitate analysis of adverse incidents in 
medical organisations. As shown in Figure 1.6, the sequence of the accident begins 
when the latent failures (management or organisational factors) are created by 
organisational and management negative decisions. The latent failures then transmit 
through different organisational pathways until they reach the work place (e.g. the 
operating theatre, or wards) where the local climate of errors and violation conditions 
are created in the work-place e.g. understaffing, increased workload, poor supervision. 
To define the conditions of work and associated latent failures which promote the 
unsafe acts, Vincent et al. (1998) developed a framework to integrate the whole 
hierarchy of background conditions and factors that may contribute to the risk and 
unsafe practice for use as a tool to systematically analyse and monitor the safety 
performance of medical organisations. The framework involved the main features 
encountered in medicine such as factors related to work environment, organisation and 
management, individuals (staff), teams, tasks, and patient characteristics (Vincent et al. 
1998). 
  





Figure 1.6. Vincent's organisational accident model for clinical incidents (Vincent 
et al. 1998, p.1155) 
 
1.6.4. Medication incident detection methods 
Many MIs are undetected and many detected incidents are not reported (Smith 2004) 
(Figure 1.7). Detecting MIs is the initial step of reporting incidents and then using 
information in incident reports to avoid further recurrence and build a safe healthcare 
system. Alerts and reports about MIs are very important to increase the awareness of the 
risks of these incidents and to encourage healthcare organisations to improve their 
performance (Vincent et al. 2006). Different national healthcare systems and regulatory 
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), United States Pharmacopeia 
(USP), Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), 
European Medicines Agency (EMEA), Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF), 
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), and NPSA release 
these alerts and reports (Montesi and Lechi 2009). 
 
Different methods have been used to measure and study MIs and ADEs in healthcare 
settings. The reliability and validity of methods used is important not only to study MIs 
and ADE but also to measure the efficacy of applied strategies and interventions to 
reduce the rate of errors. The most commonly used techniques are observational 
methods, chart review, and incident reports, along with critical incident techniques, 
attending medical rounds, interviewing healthcare providers, and comparing medication 
administration records with physicians’ orders (Allan and Barker 1990, Flynn et al. 
2002, Thomas and Petersen 2003, Tully and Franklin 2015). Another less frequently 
used method includes urinalysis to check the presence and absence of medicines, and 




detecting omission errors using doses returned in the medication chart (Allan and 





Direct observation, chart review, and incident reports have been found to be the most 
common methods used for checking administration incidents (Allan and Barker 1990). 
Thomas and Petersen (2003) summarised the most common methods used to detect 
MEs and AEs and reviewed the advantages and disadvantages of each method (Table 
1.6). 
 
1.6.4.1. Direct observation 
Observation was found to be the most accurate method of detecting MIs, particularly 
administration incidents. The efficacy and reliability of observational methods in 
detecting MIs over other methods such as incident reporting and chart review has been 
demonstrated (Allan and Barker 1990, Barker et al. 2002). Flynn et al. (2002) compared 
three methods of detecting MIs in 36 US healthcare facilities. Among 2,556 doses, 
direct observation detected 300 MIs (11.7%), while record review detected 17 (0.7%), 
and incident report analysis detected only 1 (0.04%). However, the average cost of error 
detection with observation ($4.82) was much higher than the chart review ($0.63).  
 
 
Figure 1.7. The medication error iceberg (from Smith, 2004, p.22) 




One of the strengths of observational methods is the additional information and 
comments collected by the observer, which could be useful in identifying causes and 
contributing factors related to errors (Barker et al. 2002).  Moreover, the objectivity of 
observational method overcomes problems associated with reporting incidents, such as 
the willingness of the reporter to report, and remembering to report during high 
workload, which are considered to be the main causes of underreporting incidents 
(Allan and Barker 1990, Barker et al. 2002).  
 
The most concerning limitation of the observational method is the impact of the 
observer on the subject. However, to avoid the influence of the observation on the 
activity of the observed person, Alan and Barker (1990) suggested using the disguised 
observation technique developed by Barker and McConnell in 1962. Dean and Barber 
(2001) assessed the reliability of direct observation in studying MAEs and examined the 
potential effect of observation on MAE rate by comparing the percentage of omissions 
documentation between observation and non-observation periods. The study found no 
difference in the percentage of documented omissions between the observation and non-
observation periods. This study concluded that observing nurses during medication 
administration at a UK hospital did not significantly affect the rate of MAE.  
 
Another limitation that can occur in observational studies is that the data collected were 
limited to the observed days and shifts, and even during the observation shift, whereby 
observation usually did not cover all administered doses. As in most studies, more than 
one member of staff is administering medicines at the same time; however, there would 
usually be only one or two observers. Therefore, some administrations may have been 
unobserved. In addition, in such research only specific wards or units were studied and 
hence may not be representative of all wards and hospitals. In general, the direct 
observation method was found to be more reliable and objective, but also more 
expensive when compared with chart review and incident reports (Allan and Barker 
1990, Barker et al. 2002). 




Table 1.6. Advantages and disadvantages of methods used to measure errors and adverse events in health care (from Thomas and Petersen 
(2003, p.62)) 
Error measurement method Advantages Disadvantages 
Morbidity and mortality conferences 
and autopsy 
 Can suggest latent errors 
 Familiar to health care providers and required by 
accrediting groups 
 Hindsight bias 
 Reporting bias 
 Focused on diagnostic errors  
 Infrequently and non-randomly utilized 
Malpractice claims analysis  Provides multiple perspectives (patients, providers, 
lawyers) 
 Can detect latent errors 
 Hindsight bias 
 Reporting bias 
 Non-standardised source of data 
Error reporting systems  Can detect latent errors 
 Provide multiple perspectives over time 
 Can be a part of routine operations 
 Hindsight bias 
 Reporting bias 
 
Administrative data analysis  Utilizes readily available data 
 Inexpensive 
 May rely upon incomplete and inaccurate data 
 The data are divorced from clinical context 
Chart review  Utilizes readily available data 
 Commonly used 
 Judgements about adverse events not reliable 
 Expensive 
 Medical records are incomplete 
 Hindsight bias 
Electronic medical record  Inexpensive after initial investment 
 Monitors in real time 
 Integrates multiple data sources 
 Susceptible to programming and/or data entry errors 
 Expensive to implement 
 Not good for detecting latent errors 
Observation of patient care  Potentially accurate and precise 
 Provides data otherwise unavailable 
 Detects more active errors than other methods 
 Expensive 
 Difficult to train reliable observers 
 Potential Hawthorne effect 
 Potential concerns about confidentiality 
 Possible to be overwhelmed with information 
 Not good for detecting latent errors 
Clinical surveillance  Potentially accurate and precise for adverse events  Expensive 
 Not good for detecting latent errors 




1.6.4.2. Chart review 
Chart review is a retrospective method based on practice sources, such as medical 
charts, prescription data, and administrative records. The chart review method was 
found to be less accurate than direct observation in measuring the error rate (Flynn et al. 
2002, Montesi and Lechi 2009). However, it is useful in detecting prescribing errors. 
Chart review also has another limitation, which the incomplete documentation in the 
medical chart. Some incidents and ADEs may not be noted on charts and may thus be 
missed (Thomas and Petersen 2003). Bates et al. (1993) raised an additional issue 
regarding the reliability of data in chart review method when they acknowledged in 
their study that notes in some critical areas such as ICUs may be more detailed than on 
general wards resulting in detection bias. Most studies that have employed chart review 
have also used additional data collection methods. These additional methods included 
solicited reports from nurses and pharmacists, voluntary reports (Bates et al. 1993), 
reviews of medication sheets by a trained reviewer (Bates 1995a), and laboratories and 
incident reports (Morimoto et al. 2010). 
 
1.6.4.3. Incident reports 
Although the incident report method has the advantage of providing data from all 
hospital departments over a long period of time, compared with the observational 
method which provides data in a selected time period and from specific units, many 
studies discussed the limitations of underreporting. This makes this method inadequate 
for error detection (Allan and Barker 1990, Flynn et al. 2002, Thomas and Petersen 
2003). Flynn and colleagues (2002) have concluded that incidents reports are less 
accurate and effective than direct observation and chart review in detecting 
administration incidents. In a UK study, Olsen et al. (2007) compared three different 
methods to detect AEs on the same group of patients. Out of 288 patients’ discharges, a 
real-time record review found 67 MIs, pharmacy surveillance (proactive surveillance of 
inpatient prescriptions and medication administration) detected 30 MIs, and incident 
reporting detected 11 MIs (Olsen et al. 2007). In this study, only three MIs were 
detected by both record review and pharmacist surveillance, and only one MI was 
detected by both record review and incident reporting. The results of this comparison 
suggest that using more than one method to detect MIs, increase the validity of the 
results as each method detects different incidents.  




1.7. Harm classification of medication safety incidents 
Patient safety incidents are usually classified according to their actual or potential 
clinical significance (harm) caused to patients. However, determination of the clinical 
impact of incidents is subjective, depending on the experience and knowledge of the 
reporter. Therefore when patient safety incidents are reported to the NRLS, the system 
does not require grading the potential harm or recurrence but only require actual patient 
harm according to the NPSA categorisation of level of harm (Table 1.7) (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2004). 
 
Table 1.7. NPSA terms and definitions for grading the severity of patient harm 
(NPSA, 2007, p 54). 
Harm Definition 
No harm “Impact prevented: any patient safety incident that had the potential to 
cause harm but was prevented, resulting in no harm to the person(s) 
receiving NHS-funded care.” 
 
“Impact not prevented: any patient safety incident that ran to completion 
but no harm occurred to the person(s) receiving NHS-funded care.” 
  
Low  “Any patient safety incident that required extra observation or minor 
treatment, and caused minimal harm to the person(s) receiving NHS-funded 
care.” 
  
Moderate  “Any patient safety incident that resulted in a moderate increase in 
treatment, and which caused significant but not permanent harm to the 
person(s) receiving NHS-funded care.” 
  
Severe “Any patient safety incident that resulted in permanent harm to the 
person(s) receiving NHS-funded care.” 
  
Death  “Any patient safety incident that directly resulted in the death of the 
person(s) receiving NHS-funded care.” 
 
 
The NPSA developed a risk matrix to be used as guidance for consequence scoring of 
PSIs (National Patient Safety Agency 2008). Based on the clinical consequence caused 
by the incident and the likelihood of recurring, incidents are scored from 1 to 25 where 
the higher scores mean higher incident risk (Figure 1.8).  
 
Many other scales have been developed and used for severity classification of 
medication safety incidents. Dean and Barber (1999) developed a validated scale to 
assess the severity (potential harm) of MIs using a linear rating scale from zero (no 




patient effect) to 10 (death). This scale does not require the researcher or reporter to 
know the patients’ outcomes and is based on potential outcomes. This scale is not 
affected by the healthcare profession of the judges. The National Co-ordinating Council 
for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) (2001) developed an 
index of nine categories to grade the severity of MIs to ensure the consistency of MI 
reporting (Figure 1.9).  
 
1.8. Classifications of medication safety incidents 
Several methods of classification have been used to classify medication related 
incidents. In addition to the classification according to the stage of the MUP in which 
they occur, MIs classification can be contextual (according to the time, place, stage, or 
person involved), modal (the way in which the incident occurred such as omission, 
wrong dose, or medicine), or psychological classification, which focused on the 
psychological mechanism of the events rather than describing them (classification of 
incidents according to whether they are knowledge-, or rule-based, slips, or lapses, etc.) 
(Ferner and Aronson 2006). The psychological classification of Ferner and Aronson 
(2006) is based on Reason’s (1990) human error theory. It was suggested that such 
classification provides a better understanding of incidents, which help in suggesting 
strategies to avoid error. Table 1.8 includes examples for strategies for reducing 
incidents of different psychological classes of MEs. Morimoto et al. (2004) used 
numerous criteria to classify MIs, ADEs, potential ADEs, and MEs. They classified 
them according to stage (prescribing, transcribing, dispensing, administration, or 
monitoring), preventability (preventable or non-preventable ADEs), severity (section 
1.7), person responsible (e.g., nurse, pharmacist), and ameliorability (ameliorable or 
non-ameliorable ADE) (Figure 1.10). ADEs are classified as “ameliorable ADE”, when 
the severity or duration of injury can be reduced if an action is taken, and “non-
ameliorable ADE” when the severity or duration of injury cannot be controlled 
(Morimoto et al. 2004). 









    
 
Likelihood score  1 (Rare) 2 (Unlikely) 3 (Possible) 4 (Likely) 5 (Almost certain)  
Frequency  
How often might 
it/does it happen 
This will probably 
never happen/recur  
Do not expect it to 
happen/recur but it is 
possible it may do so 
Might happen or recur 
occasionally 
Will probably 
happen/recur but it is 







Not expected to occur 
for years 
Expected to occur at 
least annually 
Expected to occur at 
least monthly 
Expected to occur at 
least weekly 
Expected to occur at 
least daily 
Probability <0.1% 0.1 – 1% 1 – 10% 10 – 50% >50% 
 
Domains  1  (Negligible) 2  (Minor)  3 (Moderate)  4 (Major)  5 (Catastrophic)  
Impact on the safety of 
patients, staff or public 
(physical/psychological 
harm)  
Minimal injury requiring 
no/minimal intervention 
or treatment.  
 
No time off work 




Requiring time off work 
for >3 days  
 
Increase in length of 
hospital stay by 1-3 days  
Moderate injury  requiring 
professional intervention  
 
Requiring time off work 
for 4-14 days  
 
Increase in length of 
hospital stay by 4-15 days  
 
RIDDOR/agency 
reportable incident  
 
An event which impacts 
on a small number of 
patients  




Requiring time off work 
for >14 days  
 
Increase in length of 
hospital stay by >15 days  
 
Mismanagement of patient 
care with long-term 
effects  
Incident leading  to death  
 
Multiple permanent 
injuries or irreversible 
health effects 
  
An event which impacts 
on a large number of 
patients  
 
Likelihood score  1 (Rare) 2 (Unlikely) 3 (Possible) 4 (Likely) 5 (Almost certain)  
5 Catastrophic  5  10  15  20  25  
4 Major  4  8  12  16  20  
3 Moderate  3  6  9  12  15  
2 Minor  2  4  6  8  10  
1 Negligible  1  2  3  4  5  
1-3 1–3 Low risk      1-3 4–6 Moderate risk                8–12 High risk         1-3  15–25 Extreme risk 
 Figure 1.8. The National Patient Safety Agency matrix for classifying the risk of associated with patient safety incidents (from 
NPSA, 2008. p 6-10 





Figure 1.9. Index for categorising medication incidents (from NCC MERP, 2001, p.1)





    
Figure 1.10. Flow diagram to classify the incidence of adverse drug events (ADEs) and 
medication errors (from Morimoto et al. 2004, p 312) 
 
1.9. Nurses training on medicine administration and double checking 
Nurses and midwives in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland must register with the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) which is considered the regulator for nursing and 
midwifery practice in the UK. Degrees in nursing are offered by a large number of universities 
across the UK. Currently, 1000 programmes in 79 institutions are accredited by NMC across the 
UK (Nursing Midwifery Council 2016). These programmes must consist of at least three years and 
include at least 4,600 hours of contact time. NMC set training and education standards, 
requirements, and guidance for these institutions. These standards state the competences and outline 
the design and contents of education programmes (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2016, Nursing 
Midwifery Council 2016). NMC accredit education institutions and programmes and 
provide quality assurance of their approved programmes. When nurses and midwives successfully 
completed their courses, NMC is responsible for registration. 
 




Table 1.8. Examples for strategies for reducing incidents of different psychological classes of medication errors (Ferner and Aronson, 
2006, p.8-9) 
Potential strategy for 
avoiding error 
Stage of treatment process Examples 
Knowledge-based errors 
Improved teaching; computerised 
decision-support systems 
Deciding to treat 
Writing the prescription 
Dispensing the medicine 
Preparing for administration 
Administering the medicine 
Monitoring the treatment 
 
Adjusting or ceasing treatment 
Being unaware of value of sodium bicarbonate in amitriptyline poisoning 
Being unaware of the interaction between warfarin and azapropazone 
Failing to know that chloroform and chloroform water are different 
Not knowing that paraldehyde dissolves plastic syringes 
Being ignorant of the course of the sciatic nerve 
Taking blood for lithium concentration into a heparin tube, unaware that it contains lithium 
heparin  
Continuing after 2 weeks to give amiodarone at the loading dose 
   
Rule-based errors: misapplying a 
good rule 
Improved teaching; computerised 
decision-support systems 
Deciding to treat 
Writing the prescription 
Dispensing the medicine 
Preparing for administration 
Administering the medicine 
Monitoring the treatment 
Adjusting or ceasing treatment 
Instituting cardiac massage in a patient who has fainted 
Prescribing oral treatment in a patient with dysphagia  
Withholding necessary treatment while checks are made 
- 
Giving an intramuscular injection of diclofenac into the thigh 
Taking a blood sample at the time of trough lithium concentration 
Giving a short course of antibacterial treatment 
   
Rule-based errors: applying a bad 
rule or failing to apply a good rule 
Systematic examination of and 
improvement to rules 
Deciding to treat 
Writing the prescription 
Dispensing the medicine 
Preparing for administration 
Administering the medicine 
Monitoring the treatment 
Adjusting or ceasing treatment 
Prescribing amoxicillin for sore throats 
Printing drugs chart without space to record allergies 
Dispensing intravenous vincristine and intrathecal methotrexate together 
Using multidose vials 
Not taking alendronate tablets with water 
Monitoring for agranulocytosis when giving carbimazole 
Prolonging antibacterial treatment unnecessarily 
 




Table 1.8: (Continued) Examples for strategies for reducing incidents of different psychological classes of medication errors (Ferner 
and Aronson, 2006, p.8-9) 
Potential strategy for 
avoiding error 
Stage of treatment process Examples 
Action-based errors (slips) 
Increased checking systems to detect 
slips; increased ‘triangulation’ when 
drug, patient and condition are 
specified; increased use of unique  
identifiers or barcodes 
Deciding to treat 
Writing the prescription 
Dispensing the medicine 
Preparing for administration 
Administering the medicine 
 
Monitoring the treatment 
Adjusting or ceasing treatment 
- 
Distractedly writing chlorpropamide for chlorpromazine 
Dispensing 5mg vials of vincristine in place of 1mg vial 
Drawing up dopamine, not doxapram 
Injecting into an intravenous cannula a drug intended to be given by nasogastric tube 
Making a warfarin clinic appointment for 3 months, not 3weeks 
Stopping warfarin treatment after 3 months for recurrent deep vein thrombosis 
   
Technical slips 
Checklists; computerised reminders;  
 ‘fail-safe’ systems 
Deciding to treat 
Writing the prescription 
Dispensing the medicine 
Preparing for administration 
Administering the medicine 
Monitoring the treatment 
Adjusting or ceasing treatment 
- 
Writing illegibly, so that ‘Daonil®’ (glibenclamide) is dispensed for amoxicillin 
Dispensing the wrong strength or concentration of drug  
Failing to mix infusion to which potassium was added 
Giving intravenous injection extravascularly 
Failing to measure blood pressure correctly[55 
Failing to switch off an intravenous giving set 
   
 
Memory-based errors (lapses 
Increased skills training 
Deciding to treat 
Writing the prescription 
Dispensing the medicine 
Preparing for administration 
Administering the medicine 
Monitoring the treatment 
Adjusting or ceasing treatment 
Forgetting that the patient is allergic to penicillin 
Omitting a date on which to stop treatment 
Leaving a bottle of tablets on the counter when dispensing 
Forgetting to wipe the rubber septum of a drug vial 
Forgetting to check the allergy wristband 
Forgetting to arrange a warfarin clinic appointment 
Forgetting to stop clopidogrel treatment after 12 months 




Nursing students spend half their time in the classroom and half in clinical settings, 
where they can practice nursing and gain real experience of patient care including 
medicines administration (Nursing Times 2016). Nursing students training allows them 
to practice in a ‘real’ environment, to extend their skills in different clinical areas 
(Nursing Midwifery Council 2016). While in training, and in order to achieve 
registration standards, students are given opportunities to practice medication 
administration under direct supervision of a registered nurse/midwife, who will be held 
accountable for the student’s practice. Since April 2016, nurses and midwives are 
required to revalidate their registration every three years. This revalidation replaced the 
post-registration education and practice (PrEP) requirements which finished on 31 
March 2016 (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2016). 
 
NMC standards for nurses’ competence consider medicines management one of the five 
essential skills clusters that have to be reflected in nurses learning outcomes. As part of 
their competencies in safe practice, nurses must prove that they aware of the safe use 
and hazards of medicines calculation and administration including the required skills for 
medicines management, calculation, and monitoring for infants and children for 
children’s nurses. The program providers must ensure that pharmacology and medicines 
management is included in the content of nurses’ education programs and that the 
program content enables students to meet the essential skills in relation to medicines 
management (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2010). In addition, the standards 
emphasised that, by entering to the register, nurses understands and able to apply the 
knowledge of IV fluids and how they are administered within local policy of 
administration of medicines. Before entering the register, the newly qualified graduate 
nurse should demonstrate the skills of basic medicines calculations of all dosage forms 
including all types of injections and IV infusions together with specific requirements for 
children and other groups of patients (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2010). 
 
In addition, the standards ensure that nurses learn and work within legal and ethical 
frameworks with regard to safe and effective medicines administration in practice 
including statutory requirements for controlled drugs, mental health, mental capacity, 
children and young people. The standards also emphasis that nurses and before they 
entry to the register have a comprehensive knowledge of basic pharmacology, 
mechanism of action, drug-drug interaction and side effects of commonly administered 




medicines as well as knowledge on management of ADEs, ADRs, prescribing and 
administration errors in order to safely manage drug administration and monitors 
unwanted effects (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2010).  
After registration, some Trusts have approved training and competencies for medicines 
preparation and administration and nurses need to meet these approved competencies 
before administering medicines. In addition, specific training is required for some 
specific groups of medicines (e.g. IV doses, handling/administration of cytotoxic 
medicines) are also required (Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015).  
 
The standards of NMC indicate that IV doses should be checked by two registrants, one 
of whom should also be the registrant who then administers the medicine to the patient. 
Independent double checking is also required for some drug administration such as  the 
preparation and administration of controlled drugs, cytotoxic Chemotherapy, intrathecal 
medicines, and those requiring complex calculations (Nursing and Midwifery Council 
2010, Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015).  
 
1.10. Implications for the present research 
There is an inherent risk of harm associated with medicines and research has shown that 
medication-related incidents account for a large proportion of PSIs in hospitals (Thomas 
et al. 2002, Nuckols et al. 2007, Morimoto et al. 2010, National Patient Safety Agency 
2015). Incidents during the administration stage were also found to represent the 
majority compared with other stages of the MUP (Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, National 
Patient Safety Agency 2013). The administration stage is the last stage before the 
medicine reaches the patient thus incidents at this stage are least likely to be prevented 
before they reach the patient. Moreover, patients in hospitals receive more 
administrations than prescriptions, which results in more opportunities for unwanted 
actions (Cousins et al. 2012). In addition, MIs reports from the UK revealed that the 
majority of incidents associated with patient harm and deaths occurred during the 
administration stage (National Patient Safety Agency 2007). Therefore, such data 
suggest that more efforts are needed to improve the safety of medicine administration 
by reducing the incidents and harm that may result from such incidents. Understanding 
the errors is fundamental to achieving such an aim.  
 




1.11. Overall thesis aims  
This thesis aims to evaluate the nature and severity of incidents associated with 
medication administration and to establish the number of reported MAIs to the total 
number of occupied bed days (OBD), to accurately identify clinical directorates where 
reporting medication incidents was higher. The thesis also aimed to explore the 
perceptions of nurses and midwives at an NHS Foundation Trust of contributing factors 
leading to medication administration incidents and investigate the impact of nurses’ 
fatigue and sleepiness during long night shifts on the error rate and type of IV 



















Chapter 2. Assessing the Reporting of 
Medication Administration Incidents: 
Retrospective Analysis of Incident 
Reports Using Bed Occupancy 
 
  





2.1.1. Medication incidents monitoring 
Incident reporting is considered key to monitoring medication safety, which aims to 
improve patient safety. Failure to learn from mistakes would appear to be one of the 
barriers to improving patient safety in healthcare systems. Lack of experience exchange 
between individual health-care providers or health-care organizations is another aspect 
which can consequently cause the same mistakes to occur repeatedly. Incident reporting 
with appropriate incident review supports learning and can be used within organisations 
or across organisations through regional or national reporting systems. Such systems 
can improve learning from errors and promote sharing experience across a wider base. 
Therefore, effective reporting systems can be the cornerstone of safe healthcare practice 
by helping to identify risks, and measuring the progress in achieving a safe culture in 
healthcare organisations (Leape and Abookire 2005).  
 
The advantage of incidents reporting systems over other systems used for tracking 
quality and safety, such as audits, retrospective reviews of records, and litigation 
databases, is that reporting systems provide data directly obtained from healthcare 
providers close to the incident and usually at the time when the incident occurred 
(Simon et al. 2005). 
 
A draft guideline for AE reporting and learning systems was created by the WHO 
(2005) to facilitate the development / improvement of incident reporting systems. The 
guideline recommended that to be successful, reporting systems should be non-punitive; 
confidential; independent; expertly analysed; timely; systems-oriented; and responsive 
(Leape and Abookire 2005).  
 
2.1.2. Characteristics of successful reporting systems 
As mentioned by Hua and Gong (2011) in their review of the design of effective 
voluntary incident reporting systems, many factors can influence the acceptance and 
usage of effective systems. Factors such as legislation, leadership support, blame and 
punitive culture, clinician involvement, and system usability play a role in the quantity 
and quality of incident reporting systems data. The review also revealed that challenges 
in the design of reporting systems, such as voluntariness, terminology/taxonomy, 




availability of a blame free culture, a positive reporting culture, usability and utility 
concerns, and feedback provision have an impact on the quality of reports submitted to 
the system. 
 
The WHO guideline for AEs reporting and learning systems (2005) published the 
essential characteristics for any reporting system to be successful. These characteristics 
involved: non-punitive, confidential, expert analysis of reports, timely analysis and 
reporting, systems-oriented, and responsive in terms of disseminating and implementing 
recommendations. The same guideline added additional requirements that should be 
considered carefully before establishing a national reporting system. These were: 
 Clear objectives; 
 Clarity about who should report; 
 Clarity about what should be reported; 
 Mechanisms for receiving reports and managing data; 
 Expertise for analysis; 
 Capacity to respond to reports; 
 A method for classifying and making sense of reported events; 
 The capacity to disseminate findings; 
 Technical infrastructure and data security (Leape and Abookire 2005 p53). 
 
Four main components should be available in order to create an effective reporting 
system as identified by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
(2012). These include: a supportive environment in the institution which protects the 
privacy of the reporter, receiving reports from a broad range of departments and 
professions, regular dissemination of reported events summaries, and presence of 
structured plans to analyse reports and develop action plans. 
 
2.1.3. International reporting of medication incidents 
Different national reporting systems have been established to improve patient safety. 
These reporting systems vary in sponsorship, support, participation, and function. Some 
were developed by governmental agencies such as those in England and Wales, 
Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Sweden. Others such as the Australian Incident 
Monitoring System (AIMS) have been developed within the private or non-government 
sector (Leape and Abookire 2005). In the US, there is no governmental reporting 




system; however 21 of the 50 state governments have been operating mandatory 
reporting systems for decades. Reporting unexpected deaths is mandatory in all 21 
systems and reporting wrong-site surgery in many systems. Non-governmental national 
reporting systems include MedMARx, a database maintained by the U.S. Pharmacopeia, 
the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) and the Joint Commission (Leape 
and Abookire 2005). 
 
2.1.4. National reporting of medication incidents 
2.1.4.1. England and Wales 
Within the NHS, patient safety has become an important issue, particularly in the past 
15 years. This was because of the increased concerns about patient safety incidents 
which lead to preventable harm. Improving patient safety by learning from these 
incidents was also emphasised by the DoH in their report (2000) “An Organisation with 
a Memory” which highlighted a number of recommendations to facilitate and encourage 
different PSIs reporting. 
 
In 2001, DOH published the report, “Building a safer NHS”, which provided an action 
plan to implement specific patient safety recommendations in the UK. These 
recommendations included the establishment of the NPSA (Department of Health 
2001). The NPSA is a national independent system aiming to improve patient safety in 
NHS trusts in England and Wales (National Patient Safety Agency 2015). 
 
In 2003, NRLS was established by the NPSA to become a national database for PSIs. 
The aim of the NRLS is to collect and analyse reports from NHS organisations in 
England and Wales and also to produce recommendations to build safer systems and 
reduce risks to patients. Since the establishment of the NRLS, NHS healthcare staff 
have submitted more than 4 million patients safety related incidents (National Reporting 
and Learning System 2015). NHS staff can report any patient safety incident 
confidentially through their local reporting systems. Reporting incidents is 
recommended whether they result in harm to patients or not. In April 2010, reporting all 
serious incidents (including death and severe harm) became mandatory for NHS Trusts 
in England and became an essential for the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The 
reports are then submitted to the NRLS. Reports are analysed by clinicians and safety 
experts to identify the frequency, types, trends of incidents, underlying contributory 




factors, as well as identifying opportunities to improve patient safety. Healthcare 
organisations then receive feedback and guidance to improve patient safety (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2013). These can be: 
 
 Patient safety resources including regular alerts, guidance, data reports, and tools 
to build a strong safety culture.  
 National campaigns on specific topics (e.g. clean your hands, patient safety first).  
 Conducting global campaigns and initiatives through collaboration with 
international organisations to provide comparative incident data to organisations 




 January 2012, the NPSA patient safety key functions have transferred to the 
NHS Commissioning Board Special Health Authority (the Board Authority) to ensure 
developing patient safety improvement and address patient safety issues (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2015). The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA) is an agency which was established in 2003. Its role is to ensure a safe 
use of medicines and medical devices. MHRA operates a pharmacovigilance system to 
investigate and monitor ADRs. In order to enhance the quality of reporting and learning 
from medication incidents and ADRs, a partnership between NHS and the MHRA was 
started. As part of this strategic partnership, NRLS became responsible for MIs 
reporting while ADRs are reported to MHRA using the Yellow Card Scheme (Figure 
2.1) (NHS England 2014). 
 
2.1.4.2. Northern Ireland 
The Northern Ireland Medicines Governance Team was established in 2002 to improve 
medicines risk management across secondary care in Northern Ireland which then 
expanded in 2010 to also cover primary care. The aim is to support the delivery of the 
medicines safety agenda across Northern Ireland. The team is run by pharmacists 
(Medicines Governance Northern Ireland 2015). The website provides current safety 
policies, guidelines, newsletters and reports produced by the teams such as “Medication 
safety matters” to improve learning from reported incidents (Medicines Governance 
Northern Ireland 2015). 






Figure 2.1. NHRA and NHS model for the flow of information needed to improve 
medication incidents and DRRs reporting in the NHS (National Health Service 
England 2014, p.4) 
 
 
2.1.5. Advantages of reporting systems: 
The presence of an incident reporting system in hospitals is essential for patient safety 
monitoring. Although incidents may be underreported, for example due to staff 
reluctance to report or remembering to report during high workload (Flynn et al. 2002), 
voluntary reporting is considered a routine method of collecting medication incidents. 
This is because it is low cost and provides data for all hospital locations over an 
extended period of time when compared an observational method which has relatively 
higher cost and only provides data over a selected time period and from specific units 




(Allan and Barker 1990, Barker et al. 2002). Incident reporting also allows comparison 
of incidents between similar units or between sites (Allan and Barker 1990).  
 
Leape (1997) suggested it is essential to determine a baseline for improvement 
measurement and stated that one of the aims of such initial data is to act as “stable and 
producible measure of the problems” (Leape 1997 p 216) to evaluate the impact of any 
implemented interventions to improve patient safety. Therefore, analysing reported 
incidents and identifying their root causes can be used for learning purposes by 
providing insight into harmful incidents and help in designing and introducing effective 
actions, and evaluating the outcomes. Another benefit of incident reporting is the 
exchanged experiences between different healthcare teams (Vincent and De Mol 2000). 
 
2.1.6. Disadvantages of reporting systems: 
Many disadvantages of incident reporting methods have been identified. The main 
limitation of collecting data using this method is that some incidents may not be 
reported, resulting in underestimation of incidents (Allan and Barker 1990, Flynn et al. 
2002) especially of serious incidents (Shojania 2010). Therefore, the data obtained may 
not necessarily represent all incidents which occurred during the period studied. This 
under reporting will affect the quality of data collected and in consequence affect 
learning from incidents and the patient care improvement possible from such reports. 
Shojania (2010) suggested that the data obtained from reporting systems was more 
likely to reflect the changes in reporting patterns rather than changes in underlying risks 
and therefore, such data cannot track changes in safety. In a study conducted by Cullen 
et al. (1995)  showed that only 6% of 54 ADEs and only 2 of 26 serious/life threatening 
ADEs that occurred over 6 months were reported. 
 
Another UK study in two maternity units in London identified a serious underestimation 
of the level of reportable incidents. It was identified that of 196 adverse incidents 
identified in 500 deliveries, staff reported only 23% of these and another 22% were 
identified by risk managers. The remaining incidents (55%) were identified only by 
retrospective case-note review. Furthermore, staff reported only 48% of serious 
incidents, few of the moderately serious (24%) and minor incidents (15%) (Stanhope et 
al. 1999). Finally a systematic review of 37 studies from 12 countries to estimate the 
extent of under-reporting of ADRs, demonstrated that the median under-reporting rate 




across all studies was 94% (inter-quartile range 82–98%) with no significant difference 
between general practice and hospital-based studies (Hazell and Shakir 2006). 
 
Many reasons for underreporting are reported in the literature including the high 
workload in some locations preventing staff reporting incidents which have occurred, or 
variations in incident reporting culture among staff. However, the most common 
reported cause was the fear of any punitive action against the staff member who 
reported the incident (Allan and Barker 1990, Barker et al. 2002). In addition, 
discrimination at work place, legal consequences, unfamiliarity with the reporting 
process, and lack of clarity about reporting purposes could be other barriers to reporting 
(Mahajan 2010).  Evans and colleagues (2006) in a study of barriers for nurses to report 
PSIs identified that lack of feedback (61.8%), belief that misses did not need to be 
reported (49%), and forgetting to report due to the increased workload (48.1%) were the 
main barriers.  
 
2.1.7. Improving incidents reporting 
In March 2008, the NHS Confederation together with the NPSA released a statement of 
five key changes that could be made by organisations to improve patient safety 
reporting: 
 
Action 1: give feedback to staff 
It is important to show the staff that the effort made and the time consumed in reporting 
PSIs is valuable and used by the organisation to carry out changes to make services 
safer. Without feedback, reporting can be seen as a useless process, rather than a 
powerful mechanism for change. It is important to acknowledge the reports through 
regular feedback and it helps in engaging and motivating healthcare professionals to 
report. Regular feedback can be delivered through different mechanisms. For example: 
regular newsletters highlighting incidents which have prompted action; trend analysis, 
case study reports, providing feedback by central team visits or champions, and 
discussion of incidents in regular ward level meetings. 
Action 2: focus on learning 
The main aim of reporting incidents should be to understand and analyse the causes of 
incidents, learning from them and then take the suitable actions to minimise the hazards, 
rather than blaming the staff. Incidents reporting can be used to drive local safety 




improvements and is important to identify topics or themes which need to be reviewed 
in-depth. The impact of these changes on the practice and decisions of the organisation 
should be seen by senior staff and clinicians to sustain good levels of reporting. 
 
Action 3: engage frontline staff 
The statements states that high-reporting organisations scored above-average in safety 
culture rating in Healthcare Commission staff surveys. The survey showed that staff 
from these organisations knew how to report; felt supported by their organisation, and 
stated they were receiving feedback about what they reported. Therefore, sufficient 
training on the ‘what, how and why’ was identified as key to improve the reporting 
level and receiving meaningful and useful data that can be used to generate actions after 
analysis. 
 
Action 4: make it easy to report 
In many high-reporting organisations, the forms designed for reporting were as simple 
as possible. Using online reporting systems helped increase the consistency and 
efficiency throughout the reporting process, although paper forms may be still needed in 
some cases as in busy wards with limited access to computers. Moreover, some 
organisations also introduced new ways to encourage busy staff to report and save staff 
time e.g. using a short form on medication trolleys to report medication errors 
immediately, and providing links in the reporting system to download the patient and 
staff information details automatically from the central records. 
 
Action 5: make reporting matter 
In organisations with high reporting rates, the boards and senior managers illustrated 
strong and visible safety leadership. This was an indication of investment in a robust 
system and use of information obtained from reported incidents to support decision 
making at the highest level of the organisation (National Patient Safety Agency 2008). 
 
A survey conducted by the UK National Audit Office (2005) showed an increase in the 
annual reporting rate of incidents to trusts’ incident reporting systems. It was suggested 
that this change was because of the progress made by trusts in creating a reporting 
culture. From 2001-2002 until the report was published in 2004-2005, reporting 
increased by 24%. The survey also found that 78% of 256 trusts involved in the survey, 




found that their encouragement of staff to report PSIs resulted in a positive impact on 
the number of PSIs reported. However, trusts acknowledged that incidents were still 
under reported. It was estimated that 22% of incidents and 39% of near misses were 
underreported. Nonetheless, the underreporting of near missed was probably because of 
the differences between staff understanding of what was considered a near miss 
(National Audit Office 2005). 
 
2.1.8. Reporting of medication incidents 
The reported rates of MEs varied between studies which may result from different study 
settings, date, adopted definitions, and methods used to identify MEs. Moreover, 
different baseline and denominators have been used to calculate the rate of errors (Allan 
and Barker 1990, Keers et al. 2013, McLeod et al. 2013).  
 
In England and Wales, over six years (2005 to 2010) reported MIs accounted for 9.68% 
(n=526, 186) of all PSIs (Cousins et al. 2012). In 2011 and 2012, the proportion of MIs 
remained high and was the second most common type of incidents reported and 
accounted for 11.4 (n=149,409) and 11.1% (n=158,951) respectively. In 2013 it was the 
third highest PSIs, representing 11% of all reported incidents (n=175,406) (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2013). In the US, an analysis of 3,875 randomly selected incident 
reports from three voluntary reporting systems in two US hospitals showed that MIs 
were the most common reported incidents, accounting for 29% (n=1094) of all reports 
(Nuckols et al. 2007). In an Australian study, the incident reports collected by the AIMS 
showed that until 2002, MIs represented 26% (n=7,155/27,000) of all incidents reported 
in hospitals. In addition, a voluntary anonymous system which was established to 
collect incidents in general practice in Australia reported that 50.1% (n=1294) of 2582 
reports were medication-related (Runciman et al. 2003). 
 
2.1.9. Reporting of medication administration incidents  
Studies from the UK showed that MI reports during administration stage were higher 
than other stages of the MUP (Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, Alrwisan et al. 2011, Cousins 
et al. 2012). Studies that analysed medication related incidents reported by hospital staff 
showed that the proportion of administration incidents varied between 46.5% (Ashcroft 
and Cooke 2006) and 59.3% (National Patient Safety Agency 2007). Ashcroft and 
Cooke (2006) analysed MIs reported to an online reporting system in a large teaching 




hospital (1000 beds) and found that 46.5% of the 495 submitted incident reports were 
related to medication administration. In Cousins’s (2011) report of medication related 
incidents submitted to the NRLS between 2005 and 2010, administration incidents 
(50.0%, n=263,228) represented the majority of reports.  
 
In US studies, the proportion of reported incidents during administration stage was 
slightly lower than prescribing (Bates et al. 1995, Leape et al. 1995, Kopp et al. 2006). 
Using patients’ records in two hospitals, Leape and colleagues (1995) identified that 
39% (n=130) of 334 errors occurred during the prescribing stage, and 38% (n=126) in 
the administration stage. A retrospective analysis of incident reports conducted in a 
general hospital in Brazil revealed that 64.3% of 230 reported incidents occurred during 
the medication preparation and administration stage (Silva et al. 2011). As medication 
incidents are associated with all stages of medication use, all types of patients, and the 
majority of medicines, identifying incident types which are reported more frequently 
and cause greater harm is essential to improving the safe use of medication (McLeod et 
al. 2013).  
 
The denominator used in medication error studies is considered a potential problem in 
quantifying and comparing error rates. The denominator used is not stated in some 
studies, while some studies did not specify if more than one error can occur in one dose 
and therefore the percentage of error rate exceeded 100 (Tully and Franklin 2015). 
Different denominators have been used in ME studies to calculate the error rate. Studies 
of prescribing errors commonly reported errors rates per medication order, per 
admission (commonly per 100 admissions), or per patient day (commonly per 100 
patient day) (Lewis et al. 2009). A less commonly used denominator of prescribing 
errors is prescription chart (Bacic Vrca et al. 2005). In dispensing error studies, the 
number of items dispensed, number of prescriptions (Anacleto et al. 2007), or number 
of doses (Ambrose et al. 2002, James et al. 2009) were the most commonly used 
denominators. In studies of MAEs, direct observation is the most commonly used 
method and therefore the total number of observed doses was commonly used as a 
denominator. Most incident reports studies reported the overall number of incidents and 
have not used any denominator to compare the rate of reported incidents between 
different clinical areas (Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, Alrwisan et al. 2011, Cousins et al. 
2012). Although number of admissions is commonly used by the NPSA as a 




denominator to compare incidents reporting between different trusts, the NRLS updated 
the denominators used to calculate reporting rates and compare different organisations. 
Since April 2014 the NRLS started using the average daily overnight bed occupancy to 
calculate the incident rates which is believed to better reflect the individual’s exposure 
to risk.  
 
2.2. Aim and objectives 
2.2.1. Study aim 
The aim of this study was to analyse the types, drugs involved and severity of patient 
harm associated with MAIs and then use the data collected from the hospital reporting 
system to compare the number of reported MAIs to the total number of OBD to 
accurately identify clinical directorates where reporting was higher.  
 
2.2.2. Study objectives 
 The main objectives of this study were to: 
1. To identify the proportion of MAIs of the total number of reported incidents in 
all stages of the medication process. 
2. To identify the most common types of reported administration incidents. 
3. To analyse the reported severity of different types of administration incidents  
4. To identify the drugs involved in the administration incidents. 
5. To compare the reporting of MAIs to the total number of occupied bed days 
(reported incidents per 1000 patients days) in each clinical directorate to 
determining the areas where the MAIs reporting appears higher. 
  





2.3.1. Study design and settings 
This retrospective and quantitative study was undertaken using medication related 
incidents reported to the trust’s electronic incident reporting system (Datix®) in one 
large teaching acute trust. The Trust has an overall capacity of 1100 beds and provides 
secondary care and receives tertiary referrals for many medicine and surgery sub-
specialities including paediatrics, cardiothoracic, cancer, elective orthopaedic and adult 
and paediatric renal patients (Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust 2015). 
Medication administration incidents in the Trust reported to the trust’s electronic 
incident reporting system (Datix
®
) in the 12-month period from April 1, 2011 to March 
31, 2012 were identified and analysed.   
 
In addition to the MAIs in each clinical directorate, the total number of OBDs in each 
clinical directorate in the hospital during the study period was obtained from the 
hospital informatics department. This was to compare the number of MAIs reported per 
1000 patient days in different clinical directorate to accurately identify clinical 
directorates where reporting of MAIs was higher. 
 
2.3.2. Definitions 
This study used the NPSA definition of MEs. The NPSA defined medication errors as: 
 
“Any incident where there has been an error in the process of prescribing, dispensing, 
preparing, administering, monitoring or providing medicines advice, regardless of 
whether any harm occurred or was possible” (National Patient Safety Agency 2007 
p9). 
 
An occupied bed day for wards open overnight was defined as “one which is occupied 
at midnight on the day in question”.  For wards open during the day only, an occupied 
bed-day is defined as a “bed in which at least one day case has taken place during the 
day”.  
  




2.3.3. The incident reporting system 
Datix
® 
is web-based patient safety software for healthcare risk management application. 
It
 
is used in the study Trust to report all AEs occurring in any setting within the Trust. In 
the Trust, the predominant aim of the incident reporting system is to improve the safety 
of patients, staff, and visitors.   
 
Based on the Trust Adverse Incident Policy (Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 
2015), all observed MIs must be reported, whether or not they are likely to harm the 
patient. Any staff member can enter and use the system if he or she encounters an 
incident and the reporter can remain anonymous as provision of a name is not 
mandatory. If the incident type selected in the form is “medication”, the incident is then 
categorised as a MI. Once the incident is reported on the reporting system, the 
appropriate manager is notified. The relevant manager reviews the incidents. This is 
because involving the manager provides more concise and succinct entries and better 
judgment on the severity harm scale (Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015). 
 
2.3.4. Classification of medication incidents 
Medication incidents reported to Datix
® 
were classified into six main categories: 
prescribing incidents, incidents during preparation of medicines/dispensing in 
pharmacy, administration incidents, incidents relating to failure of systems for 
management of drugs, incidents during drug monitoring or follow up, and incidents 
occurred during advice (i.e. wrong or poor communication between clinical staff or 
clinical staff and patients). 
 
MAIs were categorised into fifteen types. Descriptions of some of these incidents can be 
found in Table 2.1. Dose omission and delayed administration were combined as one 
category as the distinction is only the duration of the delay. 
 
2.3.5. Ethical considerations 
This retrospective analysis did not require Research Ethics approval as it was 
considered an audit. The extracted data excluded any personal information or 
confidential patient data. Furthermore, there was no direct contact with patients. 
 




Table 2.1. Details of medication administration incidents categories 
Incident type Description 
Dose omission and delay An Omission was failure to administer the dose before the 
next dose is due. Delayed was administration more than two 




Wrong frequency The frequency of doses administered to the patient exceeded 
or lower that the prescribed. 
  





Documentation failure The medicine was given but not signed for, or 
documentation of doses administered in the patient notes 
made by nurses was inadequate (i.e., no documentation 
about whether medicine was given, whether the right 
medicine and was given, or whether the medicine was given 




Incorrect medication storage Medication incorrectly stored during drug administration 












Mismatch between patient 
and medicine 











E.g., prescription not signed or associated with incomplete 
information about the prescribed medication 
 
2.3.6. Inclusion and excluded criteria 
All medication-related incidents submitted to Datix
® 
during the 12 month study period 
(1
st
 April 2011 to 31
st
 March 2012) were included in this analysis regardless of age, 
speciality, or location. Reports related to self-administration incidents, incidents outside 
Trust settings (including outpatients) were excluded. ADRs that occurred when the drug 
was used as intended (not from error) were also excluded. 




2.3.7. Data collection and processing 
2.3.7.1. Data extraction 
Medication-related incidents reported in the period of the study were extracted from the 
reporting system by the medication safety consultant pharmacist in the study hospital 
and exported to Microsoft Excel® spreadsheet. For each medication incident, the data 
extracted included: the date of the incident, date of reporting, and stage of the MUP in 
which the incident occurred including administration or supply of a medicine, 
prescribing, preparation or dispensing in pharmacy, system for management of drugs, 
monitoring or follow up of medicine use, or advice. Medication incident type 
(subcategories of administration incidents only such as: omission or delay, wrong dose, 
or wrong frequency, etc.), the name of the drug involved, location or department in 
which the incidents occurred, the written description of the incident, investigation, and 
the level of harm as scored by the reporter were also extracted. Access to the extracted 
data was limited to the research team. Data on the Excel spreadsheet were then filtered 
and each incident category (prescribing incidents, dispensing, administration, etc.) 
exported to a separate spreadsheet. In the next stage, the category of administration 
incidents was filtered and each subcategory (omissions, wrong dose, wrong medicine, 
etc.) was extracted into a separate spreadsheet for analysis. 
 
2.3.7.2. Data cleansing 
Before analysing the data, the description of each MI was reviewed by the researcher 
and a medication safety consultant pharmacist to assure the quality and consistency of 
data. Reclassifying medication incident stage, type, or harm severity was performed if 
required, especially for MIs classified as “other”. Thirty-one reports under the category 
of “other medication administration incidents” were reviewed and reclassified into the 
relevant categories. In addition, reports not fulfilling the inclusion criteria were 
excluded.  
 
2.3.7.3. Data analysis 
Quantitative analysis was performed using Microsoft Excel 2007. All data were filtered 
by the stage of MUP using Excel filters. The total number and percentage of medication 
incidents at each stage of the MUP were calculated. MAIs were exported to a separate 
spreadsheet for further analysis. Excel filters were also used to count each type of MAIs 
(Datix
® 
categorise each incident into one of 24 incidents types e.g. omission, wrong 




dose, wrong time). Drugs involved in MAIs were categorised according to the British 
National Formulary (BNF) 2012 and then the percentage of each BNF class and 
individual drugs was calculated. The rate of MAIs per 1000 OBDs was determined in 
each clinical directorate using the data obtained from the hospital informatics 
department. The number of MAIs per 1000 patient days in each clinical directorate was 
calculated using the following equation: 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 1000 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠′ 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
=
number of MAIs reported in the clinical directorate  x 1000
total number of the occupied bed days of the clinical directorates
 
 
The level of patient harm of each MAI was determined by the person who reported the 
incident and according to the classification of the reporting system of the incident 
severity which is based on a national classification. The trust’s electronic incident 
reporting system categorises the level of harm as ‘no harm’ ‘low’ ‘moderate’ ‘severe’ or 
“death” (National Patient Safety Agency 2007). Table 2.2 describes the definition of 
each term. The Incident Reporting system provides information to help grade the extent 
of harm. In addition, the manger reviewing the incident is asked to verify this harm 
score. 
 
Table 2.2. NPSA definitions of degrees of harm (National Patient Safety Agency 
2007, p.54) 
Harm  Definition 
No harm Impact prevented: any patient safety incident that had the potential to 
cause harm but was prevented, resulting in no harm to the person(s) 
receiving NHS-funded care. 
Or: 
Impact not prevented: any patient safety incident that ran to completion 
but no harm occurred to the person(s) receiving NHS-funded care. 
Low  Any patient safety incident that required extra observation or minor 
treatment, and caused minimal harm to the person(s) receiving NHS-
funded care. 
Moderate  Any patient safety incident that resulted in a moderate increase in 
treatment, and which caused significant but not permanent harm to the 
person(s) receiving NHS-funded care. 
Severe Any patient safety incident that resulted in permanent harm to the 
person(s) receiving NHS-funded care. 
Death  Any patient safety incident that directly resulted in the death of the 
person(s) receiving NHS-funded care. 
 





Over the study period, 2,016 medication incidents were reported to the reporting 
system. Of these, 127 incidents were excluded leaving a total of 1889 reported 
medication incidents for inclusion in this study. Incidents excluded involved 32 
medication incidents occurring before 1
st
 of April 2011 but reported at a later date 
falling within the specified period, 42 incidents classified as an ADR, 25 medication 
incidents occurring outside the hospital setting, 27 medication self-administration 
incidents, and one incident was excluded as insufficient description was provided. 
During data cleaning, 25 MAIs were reclassified as prescribing, dispensing, or system 
failure incidents (Figure 2.2). 
 
2.4.1. Medication incidents in different stages of the medication use 
process 
Details of reported MIs in different stages can be found in Figure 2.2. Of the total 
number of medication incidents analysed, the most frequently reported stage was 
administration (49.6%, n=937/1889) followed by prescribing (27.8%, n=525/1889), and 
preparation in pharmacy or dispensing incidents (10.6%, n=200/1899). 
 
2.4.2. Medication process and level of harm 
The level of harm was reported in 98.2% (n=1855/1889) of all medication incidents. 
The majority of reported MIs in all stages (80.3%, n=1516/1889) did not cause any 
harm to the patient, and 16.9% (n=320/1889) were categorised as low harm (Table 2.3). 
Only 1% (n=19/1899) were associated with moderate harm. Incidents with moderate 
harm were associated with administration, prescribing, and dispensing incidents only. 
No incidents resulted in severe harm. 
  





Figure 2.2. The distribution of medication incidents in different stages 
Monitoring or follow up of medicine use (n=45) (2.4%) 
 
Involved medication incidents occurred from 01/04/2011 to 31/03/2012 
(N=1889) 
Preparation of medicines / dispensing in pharmacy (n=200) (10.6%) 
 
Prescribing incidents (n=525) (27.8%) 
Excluded incidents (N=127) 
 32 incidents occurred before 1st of April 2011 but reported within the study period 
 42 Adverse Reaction Incidents were excluded 
 25 Incidents occurred outside hospital setting  
 27 Self Administration Incidents  








Advice (n=5) (0.3%) 
Administration incidents (n=937) (49.6%) 
Medication incidents extracted from Datix
®
 from 01/04/2011 to 31/03/2012 
 (N=2016) 
System for management of drugs (n=177) (9.4%) 
Reclassified incidents (N=25) 
 3 Incidents have been moved from administration to prescribing incidents 
 17 Incidents have been moved from administration to dispensing Incidents 













Table 2.3. Medication Incidents in Different Stages and Level of Harm (N=1889) 
a
 
 Stage of Medication Use 







N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Administration of a medicine 937 (49.6) 694(74.1) 202 (21.6) 10 (1.1) 31 (3.3) 
Prescribing process 525  (27.8) 440 (83.8) 77 (14.7) 6 (1.1) 2 (0.4) 
Dispensing/ preparation in 
pharmacy 
200 (10.6) 177 (88.5) 20 (10) 3 (1.5) 0 
System for management of 
drugs 
177 (9.4) 168 (94.9) 8 (4.5) 0 1 (0.6) 
Monitoring or follow up of 
medicine use 
45 (2.4) 33(73.3) 12 (26.7) 0 0 
Incidents occurring during 
advice 
b 
5 (0.3) 4 (80) 1 (20) 0 0 
Total 1889 (100) 1516 (80.3) 320 (16.9) 19 (1) 34 (1.8) 
 
 
2.4.3. Reported administration incidents 
Among reported MAIs, the level of harm was reported in 96.7% (n=906/ 937). Almost 
three-quarters of reported incidents occurred during the administration stage with 
severity reported caused no harm (74.1%, n=694/965); followed by incidents resulted in 
low harm with 21.6% (n=202/937). Ten incidents were associated with moderate harm 
(1.1%, n=10/937) which accounts about half (52%, n=10/19) of incidents with moderate 
harm reported in all stages. Details of these incidents can be found in Table 2.4.  These 
incidents were omissions (n=5), wrong dose administration (n=2), wrong infusion rate 
(n=2), and wrong frequency (n=1). The drug class most commonly involved in 
administration incident reports with moderate harm was anticoagulants and were 
involved in four out of 10 incidents (enoxaparin, n=3, and heparin, n=1).  Enoxaparin 
was the most common single drug involved in incidents with moderate harm as it was 





No incidents caused severe harm or death 
b 
These incidents included wrong or poor communication between staff. 
 












Enoxaparin was signed for but not actually given in the evening and 




Prescribed I.V. fluids (sodium chloride with 40 mmol of potassium 
chloride) was not given to patient overnight. 
Normal Saline 
Patient was very confused since the start of the night shift. Patient 
found out that his blood test showed avery low sodium level. Upon 
inspection on the drug chart at 04:00 apparently IV fluid was 
prescribed, dated ----- but not given by the day staff. 
Tazocin 
IVTazocin morning dose not given miscommunication during 
handover from night to day staff. Drug was not available on the ward 
at time of due dose. When drug arrived on the ward it was not given 
immediately due to miscommunication. 
Cyclophosphamide 
Cyclophosphamide oral dose (as part of CVD) was “assumption-
dispensed” within the pharmacy chemotherapy unit on ----. Dose due 
(next day) for Cycle 10 Day 1. The Cycle 10 Day 1 IV doses and 





The nurse administered 140 mg of clexane instead of 100mg. The 
nurse mixed the syringe up and made an error by seeing the 0.8 ml 
on 120 mg syringe and adding a further 20mg. 
Noradrenaline 
At 08.45 the noradrenaline pump started to alarm therefore double 
pumping commenced and the patient was cardiovascularly stable for 
approx 10 minutes after this. Then approximately ten minutes later 
the patient became hypotensive with a blood pressure of 60/40. The 
infusion was increased and the syringes checked. The new syringe 
was found to be labelled as having 4mg/50ml instead of 16mg/50ml. 
The patient was stabilised and the noradrenaline weaned back to 
previous dose. It was unclear whether the label was wrong as the 
patient remained stable however as another syringe 16mg/50ml was 
being made up the dobutamine syringe started to alarm. I then 
stopped to draw up this infusion and changed it. The patient then 
became hypotensive again. The noradrenaline was increased and the 
doctors were called, gelofusine was given and the noradrenaline 
infusion was then changed to a 16mg/50ml infusion and the patients 
blood pressure increased. Once the patient was stable the 





Patient came back at 18.00 from Recovery as handed over.Clexane 
dose for 18.00 was then given when it supposed to be given at least 6 
hours post op.  Day staff signature noted but thought it was from 
yesterday (box). Clexane 40 mg was then given then patient 






Patient receiving IV heparin during day shift -----. APTT result was 
high at 3.5 and according to protocol IV heparin should have been 
stopped for 30 min and then restarted at a reduced rate, but was not 
done. The patient had a small haematoma to L groin existing. The IV 
heparin was stopped later in the day when the haematoma was found 
to have increased significantly and patient Hb dropped to 6.2g/dl. 
Syntocinon 
Wrong doses given of syntocinon augmentation. Commenced 
infusion at 3 ml/h at 00:50, increased at 01:20 to 6 ml/h and at 02:00 
at 12ml/h. Bbradycardia at 02:13. Baby delivered in good condition 








2.4.4. Types of reported administration incidents 
Reported MAIs were categorised into fifteen types (Table 2.5). The most common MAI 
type was dose omission and delay (33.5%, n=314/937). The next most common 
categories were administering ‘wrong dose (11.4%, n=107/937), wrong frequency 
(9.4%, n=88/937), and wrong infusion rate’ (9%, n=84/937). These types were followed 
by administering the wrong medicine, (8.6%, n=81/937), and documentation failure 
(7.5%, n=70/937).  
 
Other types of MAIs, much less commonly reported, included incorrect medication 
storage (3.6%, n=34/937), wrong administration route (e.g. central vs. peripheral line) 
(3.4%, n=32/937), labelling errors (3.2%, n=30/937). Mismatch between patient and 
medicine (3%, n=28/937); wrong method of preparation (2.8%, n=26/937); wrong 
formulation (1.7%, n=16/937); medication administered without completed prescription 
(1.4%, n=13/937); and discontinued medication administered (1.1%, n=10/937) were 
also reported. 
 
2.4.5. Drugs involved in administration incidents 
The drugs involved in MAIs were specified in 96.9% (n=908/937) of reports. Table 2.6 
shows the BNF classification of drugs involved in administration incidents. 
Approximately 4% (n=34/937) of all MAIs involved multiple drug classes (i.e. more 
than one drug class involved in the same incident). Central nervous system (CNS) 
agents (30.9%, n=290/937) was the most common drug class involved in reported 
MAIs, particularly opioid analgesics, which were involved in 17.4% (n=163/937) of all 
MAIs. The second most common drug class involved was cardiovascular drugs (17.2%, 
n=161/937) particularly anticoagulants (10.1%, n=95/937) and then anti-infective 
agents (14.8%, n=139/937). Most anti-infective agent reports involved antibiotics 
(13.4%, n=126/937).  
 
2.4.5.1. Individual drugs 
Morphine was the most common individual drug involved, reported in 9.1% (n=85/937) 
of all MAIs, followed by enoxaparin (4.9%, n=46/037), insulin (4.6%, n=43/937), 
paracetamol and fentanyl (4.5%, n=42/937). Details of the most common drugs 
involved in administration incidents are presented in Table 2.7. 
 




Table 2.5. Types of medication administration incidents and level of harm(N=937) 
Type of Medication 
Administration Incident 







N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Medicine omitted or delayed
 
 314 (33.5) 200 (63.7) 108 (34.5) 5 (1.6) 1 (0.03) 
Wrong dose 107 (11.4) 76 (71) 25 (23.4) 2 (1.9) 4 (3.7) 
Wrong frequency 
 88 (9.4) 68 (77.3) 14 (15.9) 1 (1.1) 5 (5.7) 
Wrong infusion rate 84 (9.0) 61 (72.6) 18 (21.4) 2 (2.4) 3 (3.6) 
Wrong medicine  81 (8.6) 66 (81.5) 13 (16) 0 2 (2.5) 
Documentation failure  70 (7.5) 59 (84.3) 7 (10) 0 4 (5.7) 
Medication incorrectly stored 
 34 (3.6) 32 (94.1) 0 0 2 (5.9) 
Wrong route of 
administration  
32 (3.4) 23 (75) 5 (13.9) 0 4 (11.1) 
      
Wrong label  30 (3.2) 26 (86.7) 1 (3.3) 0 3 (10) 
Mismatch between patient 
and medicine 
 
28 (3) 24 (85.7) 4 (14.3) 0 0 
      
Wrong method of preparation 
 26 (2.8) 21 (80.8) 3 (11.5) 0 2 (7.7) 




13 (1.4) 11 (84.6) 1 (7.7) 0 1 (7.7) 
      
Discontinued medication 
administered  
10 (1.1) 8 (80) 2 (20) 0 0 
Other MAIs * 4 (0.4) 4 (100) 0 0 0 
Total 937 (100) 694 (74.1) 202 (21.6) 10 (1.1) 31 (3.3) 










Table 2.6. Analysis of Most Common Drug Classes Involved in MAIs 
Drug classes N % 
Central nervous system agents 290 30.9 
Cardiovascular system agents 161 17.2 
Anti-infective agents 139 14.8 
Nutrition and blood agents 94 10 
Endocrine system agents 69 7 
Malignant disease and immunosuppressant 24 2.6 
Gastro-intestinal system agents 22 2.3 
Anaesthesia 15 1.6 
Musculoskeletal and join diseases agents 8 0.9 
Respiratory system agents 8 0.9 
Immunological products and vaccines 7 0.7 
Obstetrics, gynaecology, and urinary-tract disorders 
agents 
6 0.6 
Multiple classes 34 3.6 








The drug name was not reported for the remaining incidents (n=29). 
 
Table 2.7. Most Common Drugs Involved in Administration Incidents 
Drug Name N  % 
Morphine  85 9.1 
Enoxaparin 46 4.9 
Insulin   43 4.6 
Paracetamol 42 4.5 
Fentanyl  42 4.5 
Heparin 36 3.8 
Co-amoxiclav 26 2.8 
Gentamicin 26 2.8 
Oxycodone 23 2.5 
Vancomycin 17 1.8 
Midazolam  15 1.6 
Warfarin  14 1.5 
Cefuroxime  13 1.4 




2.4.6. Locations of medication administration incidents 
In addition to quantifying the overall number of reported administration incidents, the 
rate to OBDs for each clinical area was calculated (Table 2.8). The total number of 
submitted reports was greatest in Children’s Services where 22.9% (n=215/937) of 
incidents occurred followed by Acute Medicine (18.4%, n=172/937); Surgery (13.7%, 
n=128/937); and Perioperative, Critical Care and Pain (13.3%, n=125/937). The ratio of 
reported administration incidents to OBDs was highest in Perioperative, Critical Care 
and Pain directorate (16.9 MAIs reports per 1000 patient days), and relatively similar 
among Children’s Services (3.9 per 1000 patient days) and Surgery (3.8 per 1000 
patient days). 
 









Children's Services 215 (22.9) 55074 3.9 
Acute Medicine 172 (18.4) 81792 2.1 
Surgery 
 
128 (13.7) 33586 3.8 
Perioperative, Critical Care and Pain 125 (13.3) 7402 16.9 
Women's Services 88 (9.4) 31462 2.8 
Oncology and Haematology 65 (6.9) 31521 2.1 
Cardiovascular Services 62 (6.6) 43023 1.4 
Abdominal Medicine and Renal 
Transplant 
59 (6.3) 55108 1.1 
GRIDA  4 (0.4) 4453 0.9 
GRIDA: Genetics, Rheumatology, Infection, Dermatology, and Allergy  
 
2.5. Discussion 
In this study, MAIs were found to represent 49.6% (n=965 of 1899) of all MIs 
submitted to the Trust reporting system over this 12-month period. This is in agreement 
with previous studies’ findings using retrospective incident reporting data which also 
identified that the administration stage was associated with a higher proportion of 
incident reports than all other stages of the medication process (Hicks et al. 2004, 




Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, Alrwisan et al. 2011). In the UK, Ashcroft and Cooke’s 
(2006) retrospective analysis of MI reports over a 26-month period to in a large teaching 
hospital (1000 beds) found that 46.5% of 495 submitted incidents were related to 
medication administration. Furthermore, the UK NRLS identified that reporting MAIs 
was higher (50.9%) nationally than other stages of medication use (National Patient 
Safety Agency 2013). In the US, a retrospective study of 42-months in a teaching 
hospital analysed reported MEs in elderly patients and identified that 54% of 861 errors 
reported to the hospital’s reporting system were administration errors (Picone et al. 
2008).  
 
The reporting rates of MIs may vary between studies which may result from the 
different hospital prescribing and administration systems, settings, dates, definitions and 
methods used to detect MIs. Moreover, different denominators such as patient days and 
admissions have been used to calculate the reporting rate of MIs. Therefore, 
comparisons between different studies of MIs may be limited (Allan and Barker 1990, 
Ferner 2009, McLeod et al. 2013). In addition, classification of medication incidents 
into different stages of the medication process varies. Some studies, such as Bates et al. 
(1993), classified the process into only three main stages: prescribing, dispensing, and 
administration while other studies (e.g. Bates et al. 1995, Hicks et al. 2004, Lisby et al. 
2005, Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, Morimoto et al. 2010, Cousins et al. 2012) classified 
incidents of monitoring or transcription into separate categories. 
 
2.5.1. Locations of medication administration incidents 
Clinical directorates where MAIs reported from were determined in this study. Twenty 
three percent (n=215) of reported incidents were from Children's Services (neonatology, 
paediatric surgery, paediatric intensive care, and other paediatric wards) as the most 
frequently reporting area, followed by Acute Medicine with 18.4% of incidents 
(n=172).   
 
Most MI studies which used voluntary incident reporting have used overall reporting 
numbers and have not compared this to the capacity and bed occupancy (Cousins et al. 
2012). This is a limitation as clinical directorates with high numbers of patients and 
therefore high total bed occupancy during the study period might be assumed to be 
associated with a higher reporting rate of incidents. Conversely, locations with fewer 




patient admissions may be incorrectly assumed to be associated with a lower reporting 
rate of incidents. Hence, weighting by OBDs in each directorate is a useful measure 
because it corrects for large directorates with high occupancy. It is easily obtained in the 
UK as all NHS UK hospitals collect their associated OBDs, however few NHS hospitals 
currently have electronic prescribing and administration, so, data on medication doses 
administered is not readily accessible. 
 
When the number of reported MAIs to the total number of OBDs was calculated, some 
directorates which reported fewer incidents appeared to have a higher reporting rate 
than those reporting greater numbers of incidents. In the current study, Perioperative, 
Critical Care and Pain directorate was fourth in term of the number of submitted reports, 
however, when the number of incident reports was compared to the total number of 
OBDs, Perioperative, Critical Care and Pain became the clinical area with the highest 
reporting rate of MAIs (16.9 MAI/1000 OBDs) (Table 2.8).  Perioperative, Critical Care 
and Pain had lower capacity and occupancy than other directorates including children 
services. Again when the number of incidents reported was weighted by total OBDs, 
Acute Medicine, the second highest reporting directorate (18.4%), became fifth most 
high reporter. Reported MAIs in Acute Medicine was almost three times higher than in 
Oncology and Haematology but when weighted by OBDs, the rate of MAIs reported in 
these clinical directorates was the same (2.1/1000 patients day). 
 
An American cohort study compared ADEs per 1000 patient-days in medical ICUs, 
surgical ICUs, medical general wards, and surgical general wards and found higher rates 
of ADEs in medical ICUs (19.4 ADEs/1000 patient-day) compared with other wards 
(8.9-10.6 ADEs/1000 patient-day) (Bates et al. 1995), indicating a greater medication 
risk in medical ICUs which is consistent with the current study. This US study 
determined an incident rate similar to the reporting rate of MAIs in the current study 
with 19.4 ADEs per 1000 patient-days in ICUs (Bates et al. 1995). However, ADEs 
exclude incidents which do not cause harm to patients thus rates cannot be compared to 
our findings where no harm medication incidents dominate. Similar findings were 
identified in Japan by the Japanese Adverse Drug Events (JADE) study. In this 
prospective cohort study which involved 3,459 adults admitted to a medical, and 
surgical wards and three intensive care units in three tertiary care hospitals over 6 




months, the identified incidence of MEs in ICU was 17.0 MEs per 1,000 patient-days 
which was higher than medical and surgery wards (Morimoto et al. 2010).  
 
Many factors may contribute to the increased number of MAIs reported in critical care: 
with higher patient acuity, more medications are administered  (Bates et al. 1995, 
Kiekkas et al. 2011), and medications used differs as many require calculations during 
administration especially injections and continuous infusions (Kiekkas et al. 2011). 
 
The routine use of OBD is to be recommended to provide additional information about 
MAI reporting. The MAI data identified in Table 2.8 can be discussed at clinical 
directorate and hospital level in order that interventions of proven benefit can be 
applied. Managers can use weighted medication reporting rate to better understand 
where risks exist and inform and prioritise allocation of overall patient safety resources. 
Use of OBD also facilitates comparison between clinical directorates as well. The 
NRLS in England and Wales uses the incident reporting rate per 100 admissions to 
compare trusts (National Patient Safety Agency 2013). Weighting by OBD provides 
additional information to the rate per 100 admissions as weighting by patient 
admissions is affected by the organisation’s length of patient stay which varies over 
time and between hospitals (National Audit Office 2012). 
 
2.5.2. Types of medication administration incidents 
The most common types of reported MAIs were, ‘Omitted or delayed doses’ and 
represented around one third of all MAIs (33.5%, n=314) (Table 2.5) followed by 
‘wrong dose/frequency’ (20.8%, n=195). These two types of MAI caused higher levels 
of harm (8 out of 10 incidents with moderate harm were from these two types). 
Incorrect frequency occurred when an extra dose was administered to the patient (i.e. 
the total administered doses exceeded the prescribed daily dose); therefore, wrong 
frequency and wrong dose were combined as all result in an incorrect dose over 24 
hours. 
 
These findings are similar to UK national data and previous studies. Omitted medicine 
(13%) and wrong dose, strength, or frequency incidents (23%) are commonly reported 
to UK NPSA (2009). The same NPSA report also showed that 33% of incidents that 
reported death or severe harm relate to the wrong dose/frequency as the most common 




type of incidents associated with severe harm or death (National Patient Safety Agency, 
2009). In Ashcroft and Cooke study (2006), incidents of ‘wrong dose administration’ 
(36.6%, n=78) and ‘omission and wrong timing’ (21.6%, n=46) were the two most 
common reported incidents during administration stage. In Picone et al (2008) analysis 
for reported MEs in elderly patients in a teaching hospital in the US, omissions and 
delay (56.1%, n=483) was reported more frequently than other types followed by wrong 
dose (16.3%, n=140) and wrong drug (10.1%, n=87). In the US also, a descriptive, 
retrospective secondary analysis of the USP MEDMARX database of MAEs over 5 
years identified that 36% of 1305 MEs made by nurse students were omission or wrong 
timing, and 17.2% were wrong dose administration (Wolf et al. 2006). Barker et al. 
(2002) also determined in their US observational study on administration errors that 
omissions and wrong timing represented more than two thirds of observed errors (30% 
and 43%, respectively,) followed by wrong dose (17%).  
 
The international systematic review of Keers et al. (2013) for observational studies of 
the prevalence and nature of MAEs also found that wrong time, omissions and wrong 
dose were the most common MAIs (Keers et al. 2013). Administering the wrong 
medicine into the patient, which was the fifth most common types of reported incidents 
after ‘omission and delay’, ‘wrong dose’, ‘wrong frequency’, and ‘wrong infusion rate’ 
was also reported in previous studies as the most common type after omissions, delays, 
and wrong dose administration (Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, Wolf et al. 2006, Picone et 
al. 2008, National Patient Safety Agency 2009) 
 
2.5.3. Drugs involved in administration incidents 
Central nervous system agents were the most frequent drug class reported for all 
administration incidents in the present study (30.9%, n=290/937). The second class, 
with a much lower frequency, was cardiovascular agents (17.2%, n=161/937) followed 
by anti-infective agents (mainly antibiotics) with 14.8% (n=139/937). The UK 
retrospective study by Ashcroft and Cooke (2006) also found that cardiovascular 
(27.4%, n=63), CNS (22.6%, n=52), and anti-infective agents (14.8%, n=34) were the 
most common therapeutic categories associated with MAIs. The medicines involved in 
reported incidents in the current study are also comparable to those in other 
observational studies. An international review by Keers et al. (2013) for 91 
observational studies for MAEs found that medications in categories of CNS, 




cardiovascular system, infections, nutrition and blood, and gastrointestinal system were 
observed as the five most medication types associated with MAEs. In intensive care 
units, the groups of cardiovascular, antibiotics, sedatives/analgesics, and electrolytes 
were the classes most associated with errors as reported in a review of direct 
observation evidence of MAEs in critically ill patients (Kiekkas et al. 2011). 
 
However, in the retrospective studies, it is not possible to calculate the error ratio of 
individual drugs or classes to the number of administered doses unless the total number 
of administered doses or prescriptions is available. Therefore, the high number of 
reports of some drugs or classes may be referred to their high prescribing rate (Keers et 
al. 2013). In addition, incidents for some drugs (such as controlled drugs) may be 
reported more frequently because documentation requirements enhance incident 
detection. 
 
2.5.4. Severity of medication administration incidents 
In the UK, 80% of all MIs reported to NRLS were associated with no harm, 16% low 
harm, 4% moderate harm, 0.001% severe harm, and only 0.0005% resulted in death as 
reported by the NPSA (2009). This is comparable to the current study where 74.1% of 
reported MAIs resulted in no harm, 21.6% resulted in low harm, 1.1% resulted in 
moderate harm, and none were associated with severe harm or death (Table 2.3). An 
international systematic review of observational studies of MAIs showed that incidents 
resulting in no harm or not requiring intervention were most common in studies using 
the American NCC MERP Index harm categorisation (Keers et al. 2013). However, 
comparison of severity of harm between studies is difficult because different criteria 
have been used to describe the extent of harm (Keers et al. 2013). Therefore, to allow 
comparison across different systems, standardising harm classification is needed.  
 
In the current study, the level of patient harm was determined by the person who 
reported the incident and according to the classification of the reporting system of the 
incident severity which is based on a national classification (National Patient Safety 
Agency 2009) (Table 2.2). Although the Incident Reporting System provides 
information to help grade the extent of harm through a risk matrix which is used to rate 
incidents reported to NRLS, rating the level of harm will be based on the individual 
perception and medical background.  




Williams and Ashcroft (2009) evaluated the reliability of the MEs severity rating scale 
used by the NPSA in England and Wales and the differences among healthcare 
professionals in the severity ratings. Healthcare professionals involved in the study were 
given nine scenarios for medication errors on two separate occasions and were asked to 
use the NRLS severity rating scale to rate the severity of each incident. The study 
revealed marked variations in the ratings for MIs against the NRLS severity criteria 
between different health professionals and even within the same individual at different 
time points. 
 
2.5.5. Quality of information in medication incident reports 
One of the issues in incidents reporting systems is the quality of information in the 
submitted reports which may affect using and analysing the data. This can be influenced 
by several challenges related to the design and adoption of reporting systems (Hua and 
Gong 2011, Cousins et al. 2012). A previous research identified the issue of poor 
information provided in incident reports and showed that reports obtained from existing 
systems do not even provide the minimum required information to analyse the causes 
and recovery actions of these incidents. In a study to assess the Australian health care 
incident reporting systems utility and usage, Thomas et al (2011) found that only 10.7% 
(n=52) of submitted incidents have sufficient details to classify the aetiology of the 
incidents and only 59% (n=288) of reports involved sufficient information to classify 
the recovery actions of the incidents. Furthermore, in England, a report revealed that 
poor quality of data and non-availability of sufficient details was common in MI reports 
submitted to NRLS (n=12,355) (National Health Service England 2014). 
 
In the current study, some reports were submitted with poor quality either due to 
insufficient or incorrect information provided, or due to incorrect classification of 
incidents into the correct category. For example, 31 (3.3%) MAI reports were submitted 
without scoring the level of harm, and a further 54 (5.8%) reports were submitted 
without reporting the drug involved. In addition, the incident type of a number of 
incidents was inappropriately classified. Although some of these data were obtained by 
the research team from the description of these incidents, not all descriptions involved 
sufficient details which left 29 incidents without reporting the involved drug name. This 
may result from the fact that some field in the reporting system Datix
®
 are not 
mandatory thus making such essential data mandatory will improve the quality of 




information of submitted reports. Therefore, it is important that existing reporting 
systems are developed to provide high quality information with all essential details to 
ensure the maximum benefit from submitted reports. 
  
2.5.6. Limitations of the study  
With voluntary reporting, an increased frequency of incident reporting does not 
necessarily reflect a higher rate of incidents but may reflect better detection of incidents, 
time available to complete reports, ease of reporting, or stronger culture of reporting 
incidents detected (Hutchinson et al. 2009). Drug administration is the last stage in the 
MUP, thus some MAIs  may not be detected and therefore not reported (Allan and 
Barker 1990). Countering this, the study hospital has robust mechanisms to detect 
MAIs, such as monitoring the use of reversal drugs and close physiological monitoring 
of patients. Moreover, the study hospital is highest reporter of MIs of all NHS acute 
teaching trusts at 20% more reports than next best acute teaching Trust and double the 
median number of incident reports of acute teaching Trust when weighted per 100 
admissions (National Patient Safety Agency 2013). 
 
In addition, in voluntary incident reporting, individuals’ scoring of patient harm may 
vary. However, clear guidance was available on the electronic incident reporting system 
and also in supporting documents electronically available. Furthermore, the incident 
manager verified the harm score, and the Hospital Assurance Department also aims to 
review all incidents reports. The calculation of OBDs was based on midnight census 
which may underestimate the actual number of patients especially with rapid patient 
turnover, however, this is less relevant to MAIs as at every time medications are due to 
be administered there can only be one patient in the bed at that time. 
 
2.5.7. Future work 
In studies using incident report data, it is not possible to determine the denominator i.e. 
the number of prescriptions, or the number of administered doses in order to calculate 
the incident rate to the number of opportunities for incident. For most commonly 
involved drugs also, it has been suggested that the high number of administration 
incidents with some drugs or classes may be linked to their higher prescribing rate or 
dose frequency. For more reliable and valid comparison, identifying the incidence of 




incidents associated with specific drugs or groups of medication using “the number of 
opportunities for incidents for this drug” may provide greater insight (Kiekkas et al. 
2011). When electronic prescribing and medication administration are more widely 
available in the UK, facilitating capture of data on drugs prescribed and doses 
administered, future work could use number of prescriptions or doses administered as a 
denominator, to provide greater insight into the risk associated with specific drugs or 
classes (Kiekkas et al. 2011).  
 
Dose omissions are reported frequently in the current study and many of the drugs 
reported in this study are considered time sensitive (National Patient Safety Agency 
2010, Institute for Safe Medication Practices 2011). Hospitals are required to reduce 
medication omission and delays. This should be the subject of future research in order 
to improve patient safety.  Finally, determining the main causes and contributing factors 




Medication administration incidents represented around half the MIs reported in an 
acute teaching hospital, consistent with UK and USA voluntary reporting studies. The 
medicines involved were consistent with previous studies. Whether extent of harm or 
frequency of incident reporting is considered, omitted or delayed dose, and wrong dose, 
frequency, or infusion rate were the most common MAI types. These data identify the 
important role of registered nurses in the safe use of medicines. Paediatric locations 
reported many MAIs in total but critical care had the highest reporting rate per OBDs.  
Use of the total number of MAIs reported in each location appears simplistic, and 
weighting reported MAIs rates by beds occupancy may be a better method of 
prioritising efforts for improvement. 













Chapter 3. An Exploratory Study to 
Investigate Nurses’ and Midwives’ Views of 
the Contributing Factors and Causes of 








3.1.  Introduction 
3.1.1. Nurses and medication administration 
Patient safety is a major part of nurses’ clinical practice (Elliott and Liu 2010). Drug 
administration is an essential part of the nurse’s role and correct administration of 
medication is one of their responsibilities. Up to one third of a nurse’s time is spent on 
activities related to medications (Keers et al. 2013) and it has been suggested that 
administering medicines is the riskiest job a nurse undertakes (Anderson and Webster 
2001). Furthermore, the nurse is the last person before a drug is administered that can 
ensure the medication is correctly prescribed and dispensed (Davey et al. 2008). 
Therefore, nurses play an essential role in patient safety in preventing harmful errors 
from affecting the patient (Rothschild et al. 2006). In the absence of effective 
safeguards to prevent medication administration errors (MAEs), nurses and patients can 
be at a high risk during the medication administration stage (Elliott and Liu 2010). 
Therefore, understanding the nature and causes of MAEs is essential to develop more 
efficient defensive barriers and strategies in order to prevent errors during the 
administering stage (Ozkan et al. 2011, Keers et al. 2013). 
 
3.1.2. Problems of medication administration 
Medication-related incidents were reported to be more frequent during the 
administration stage compared to other stages of the medication process. In the UK, the 
proportion of MAEs among all reported errors from all stages ranged from 46.5% to 
58% (Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, Picone et al. 2008, Alrwisan et al. 2011, National 
Patient Safety Agency 2013). In addition, other observational studies on MAEs in 
healthcare settings have shown high rates of errors during administration. In the UK, 
observational studies have reported MAIs occurred in 3.5% to 38% of doses 
administered, if wrong timing incidents were included (Franklin et al. 2007, Kelly et al. 
2011). Internationally, the incidence of MAEs varied between 2.6% to 60.5% of all 
doses administered by nurses (Ridge et al. 1995, McNally et al. 1997, Barker et al. 
2002, Tissot et al. 2003, Van Gijssel-Wiersma et al. 2005, Reifsteck et al. 2006, 
Franklin et al. 2007, Maricle et al. 2007, Bertsche et al. 2008, Climent et al. 2008, Biron 
2009, Chua et al. 2009, Jimenez Munioz et al. 2010, Poon et al. 2010, Gokhman et al. 
2012, Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al. 2012). In an international systematic review of MAEs 
in inpatient settings, the observed median error rate was 19.6% of the total number of 




administered doses, if wrong time errors were included. When timing errors were 
excluded from the total, the error rate was 8.0% (Keers et al. 2013).  
 
A higher rate of error was observed during the preparation and administration of 
intravenous (IV) doses, especially with doses requiring multiple step preparations. The 
observed error rate in IV doses ranged from 7% (n=32/249) (Taxis and Barber 2003) to 
31% (42/134) (Wirtz et al. 2003) during the IV preparation process and ranged from 8% 
(118/1391) (Anselmi et al. 2007) to 49% (53/109) during administration process (Wirtz 
et al. 2003). The overall rate of error in preparation and administration ranged from 25% 
(Bruce and Wong 2001) in a UK-based study to 69.7% in Australia and the UK 
(Cousins et al. 2005, Westbrook et al. 2011).  
 
In paediatric patients, the worldwide incidence of MAEs found in observational studies 
ranged from 1.2% to 49% of all administered doses (Schneider et al. 1998, Prot et al. 
2005, Conroy et al. 2007, Taylor et al. 2008, Raja Lope et al. 2009, Chua et al. 2010, 
Ozkan et al. 2011, Chedoe et al. 2012). In the UK, a study in five hospitals assessed the 
incidence and nature of MAEs in paediatric inpatients (Ghaleb et al. (2010). The 
investigators observed a total of 429 preparation and administration errors (19.1%) in 
2249 opportunities for error over a period of twenty weeks. Drug preparation errors 
(20.7%) were the most common, followed by wrong administration rates of intravenous 
doses (19.8%), and wrong time (18.7%).  
 
In terms of the most common types of these errors, in studies in which timing errors 
were reported, timing errors usually turned out to be the most common type of reported 
or observed errors. Omissions and wrong dosage errors were also among the three most 
common error types. In studies not including timing errors, the three most common 
errors were omission, wrong dosage, and unauthorized drug administration (Berdot et 
al. 2013, Keers et al. 2013, Kongkaew et al. 2013). 
 
In errors associated with IV doses, the two most common types of IV preparation errors 
were use of the wrong solvent/diluent and preparation of the wrong dose. The most 
common types of errors associated with IV dose administrations included administering 
bolus doses faster than the recommended rate, wrong infusion rates, and incompatible 




administrations (Taxis et al. 1999, Taxis and Barber 2003, Wirtz et al. 2003, Taxis and 
Barber 2004, McDowell et al. 2010, Westbrook et al. 2011).  
 
3.1.3. Medication administration policy 
The aim of medicine administration is to make sure that the correct medicine and 
formulation is administered in the correct dose, at the correct time, by the correct route, 
and to the correct patient (Gill et al. 2012, Nursing Midwifery Council 2012). In the 
UK, all NHS trusts are required to have a Medicines Policy which must include 
medication administration procedures, in line with the NMC code of conduct standards 
for medicines administration (Nursing Midwifery Council 2012). The national NMC is 
considered the regulator for nursing and midwifery in the UK and the study Trust 
follows the Council’s guidance for the administration of medicines (Nursing Midwifery 
Council 2012, Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015).  
 
3.1.3.1. Authority to administer medicines 
Healthcare professionals who are involved in preparing and administering medicines in 
the study Trust (registered nurses/midwives, bank nursing and midwifery staff, and 
Agency nursing/midwifery staff) must have undertaken the essential training and have 
met Trust approved competencies for medicines. In addition, specific training is 
required for some specific groups of medicines (e.g. IV doses, handling/administration 
of cytotoxic medicines) (Table 3.1) (Nursing Midwifery Council 2012, Trust Drug and 
Therapeutics Committee 2015). In the US, the task of medication administration is 
performed by registered nurses (RNs) and Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs) who are 
only authorised to administer oral medicines and pre-mixed IV antibiotics when they 










Table 3.1. Authority to administer medicines in USA and UK (Boston Medical 
Centre 2010, Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015) 
USA UK 
 Only RNs may administer IV push/bolus 
medications, either manually or via IV 
infusion pumps.  
 
 LPNs can administer pre-mixed IV 
antibiotics when they have demonstrated 
competency in this area. 
 
 Student nurses may administer 
medications under the direct supervision 
of a nursing instructor. 
 
 Senior nursing students affiliating for 
independent learning experiences may 
administer medications (with the 
exception of IV push medications) under 
the direct supervision of the RN 
preceptor.  
 
 Paramedic students may administer 
medications under the direct supervision 




 Once registered with the NMC, nurses 
can administer medicines, ensuring their 
own competence and adherence to the 26 
standards set out by the NMC  
 In the study trust, registered 
nurses/midwives and Bank staff are 
required to pass a written medicines 
management test before joining the 
Trust. In addition, at the time of this 
work nurses must have completed a Trust 
medicines management competency 
assessment document. 
 All conditions of the Medicines Policy 
are also applicable to bank nursing and 
midwifery staff who are considered Trust 
employees. 
 Student nurses/midwives are given the 
opportunity to practice the medicines 
administration under supervision of a 
registered nurse/midwife, who will be 
held accountable for the student’s 
practice. Student staff cannot administer 
IV medication.  
 Patients and carers may administer 
medicines when appropriate. However, 
their ability for safe medicine 
administration must be assessed within 
the Trust before undertaking self/carer 
administration (with the responsibility on 
the nurse to ensure that the medicine has 
been taken as prescribed and also to 
continue assessing the patient’s ability 
and competency for self-administering) 
 
3.1.3.2. Standards for practice of administration of medicines 
The Trust’s standards and process for oral and IV medicines administration follows the 
national guidelines for the administration of medicines (Box 1.1) (Nursing Midwifery 
Council 2012, Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015). Medicines must only be 
given against clear, valid written directions or prescriptions by an authorised prescriber, 
and must include a completed allergy statement. Medicines may be administered to 
patients following a verbal direction in exceptional circumstances and after a 
confirmation and documentation of the prescription in the patient notes by two 
registered nurses or midwives.  
 




Box 1.1: The Trust’s standards and process for oral and IV medicine administrations 
(Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015) 
Before administering medicines, nurses and midwives must: 
 Ensure the patient’s identity and allergy status. 
 Know the therapeutic uses of the medicine and its dosage information, as well as 
precautions and side effects. 
 Be aware of the patient’s plan of care.  
 Check the legibility of the prescription or the label of medicine dispensed and that is 
clearly written and unambiguous. 
 Check the expiry date of the medicine being administered. 
 Consider the correct drug, dosage, method, route, time of administration and patient’s 
weight where appropriate. 
 Checking the medicine has been stored appropriately e.g. in the refrigerator.  
 Accurately and instantly document all medicine administered, or withheld or refused by 
the patient, reporting the reason for any withheld or not administered doses. Any 
administered medicine including ‘as required’, variable dose and once only doses must 
be documented in the prescription or the appropriate section of the in-patient drug chart. 
For non-regular doses, the dose administered, time and the date given may additionally 
need to be recorded. 
 Independent double checking is required for the preparation and administration of 
controlled drugs, cytotoxic Chemotherapy, intrathecal medicines, complex calculation, 
and IV preparations.  
 
3.1.4. Studies on the causes and contributing factors of medication 
administration errors 
Many causes and contributing factors to MAEs have been reported in the literature. 
These related to work environment, medication administration task, patients, working 
team, individual nurses, and organisations. 
 
3.1.4.1. Environmental factors 
The majority of studies reported heavy workload and interruptions and distractions as 
an important contributory factors to errors (Gladstone 1995, Hand and Barber 2000, 
Tissot et al. 2003, Balas et al. 2004, Mayo and Duncan 2004, Deans 2005, Jones and 
Treiber 2010, Ozkan et al. 2011, Gill et al. 2012). Studies which used interviews or 
conversations (with or without observation) or surveys with open-ended questions were 
more able to give more detailed data about the sources and nature of these distractions 
which included ward rounds (Taxis and Barber 2003), and conversations with 
colleagues or patients (Jones and Treiber 2010, Reid-Searl et al. 2010). Some studies 
reported that interruptions were associated with increased workload (Taxis and Barber 
2003) and/or poor supervision (Reid-Searl et al. 2010). Workload was also found to 




combine with patient acuity, shortage of staff, inexperience or local working practice to 
lead to other errors (Balas et al. 2004, Nichols et al. 2008, Jones and Treiber 2010). 
 
Insufficient staffing was identified by many research studies as a cause of MAEs (Hand 
and Barber 2000, Balas et al. 2004, Deans 2005, Jones and Treiber 2010, Treiber and 
Jones 2010). Balas et al. (2004) identified that inadequate staffing prohibited nurses 
from complying with procedures properly, giving medicines on time, and assessing new 
patients correctly. Skill mix was also reported by some studies: Hand and Barber (2000) 
stated that lack of trained and qualified nurses contributed to errors while others 
reported working with inexperience or new nurses may contribute to errors (Deans 
2005, Tang et al. 2007). 
 
Additional factors related to the physical work environment involved the busyness of 
the area (Taxis and Barber 2003, Balas et al. 2004, McBride-Henry and Foureur 2007, 
Jones and Treiber 2010, Kim et al. 2011, Gill et al. 2012), noise and lightening (Deans 
2005, Gill et al. 2012), and a chaotic environment (Balas et al. 2004, Jones and Treiber 
2010). Studies involving open-ended surveys offered more details and related factors to 
inadequate staffing level, heavy patient load and acuity and poor supervision (Jones and 
Treiber 2010). Problems with drug charts were also identified and involved absence or 
misplacement of drug charts especially with distracting and noisy environments 
(Hartley and Dhillon 1998, Chua et al. 2009, Reid-Searl et al. 2010). 
 
3.1.4.2. Task factors 
Many task related factors were identified by different studies. Inappropriate checking 
(involving both basic checks such as patient name, drug name, dose, route, and time and 
also preparations and administrations which require double checking) and inadequate 
compliance with administration protocols were frequently reported (Tang et al. 2007, 
Ulanimo et al. 2007, Chua et al. 2009, Dickinson et al. 2010, Jones and Treiber 2010, 
Reid-Searl et al. 2010, Gill et al. 2012). Although in most cases this faulty checking was 
considered personal neglect and constituted violation, nurses in one study mentioned 
that unclear responsibility of the second checker was a contributing factor to MAEs 
(Sanghera et al. 2007). Small number of studies discussed the causes and circumstances 
behind this practice and suggested that it may lie in the reliance between staff, 
workload, and nurses’ familiarity with the drug or patient.  




A recent study by Alper et al. (2012) to assess violations among nurses during 
medication administration found that violations were highest when checking patient ID, 
checking medication against the patient record, and documenting  medication 
administration. The study found that being in an emergency situation and familiarity 
with the patient contributed to these violations. In addition, Jones and Treiber (2010) 
found that nurses’ feeling of being newly registered was related to violations in 
performing some required safety checks as they felt that they were under pressure to 
complete the round within the time. Similar findings were reported by Gill et al. (2012) 
who examined the compliance of nurses with the medication administration and 
checking protocol using questionnaire and focus groups. Gill and colleagues found that 
inappropriate checking of patient identity and double checking were common and that 
the local culture, drug type, familiarity with drug or patient, and workload all affected 
the compliance with appropriate checking. 
 
Quality of prescriptions was also mentioned as a cause of errors. Illegible or incomplete, 
unclear or unreadable prescriptions which lead to misreading the orders were found to 
contribute to MAEs (Hand and Barber 2000, Mayo and Duncan 2004, Deans 2005, 
Tang et al. 2007, Jones and Treiber 2010, Treiber and Jones 2010) although nurses in 
one study cited that they feel that it is their responsibility to be sure about the 
prescription before administering the drug  if they were unsure about what had been 
prescribed (Hand and Barber 2000). In addition, errors of transcribing prescriptions by 
nurses were reported to contribute to MAE by two studies in countries where nurses are 
expected to transcribe the original orders written by physicians (Taxis and Barber 2004, 
Kim et al. 2011). 
 
In terms of medicines supply and availability of medicines, two studies found that the 
delayed deliveries of medicines by pharmacy contributed to delay in administration 
(Kim et al. 2011, Ozkan et al. 2011) and two studies referred omissions and wrong 
timing errors to the non-availability of drug in the ward at the time of administration 
(Bruce and Wong 2001, Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al. 2012). 
 
Some factors related to the local working culture (i.e. due to bad practice) were also 
reported as causes of MAEs. Administering medicines without a completed prescription 
and trusting other colleagues led to errors in four studies (Taxis and Barber 2003, Taxis 




and Barber 2004, Sanghera et al. 2007, Reid-Searl et al. 2010). Some MAEs (e.g. 
omission and extra dose errors) were found to be caused by documentation errors during 
prescribing and administration (e.g. failure to document the administration) (Chua et al. 
2009, Jones and Treiber 2010, Treiber and Jones 2010, Gill et al. 2012). 
 
Few studies reported factors related to policies and protocols and involved failure to 
follow the standards and protocols of medication administration (Gladstone 1995, Balas 
et al. 2004, Gill et al. 2012) and insufficient or unclear protocols (Ozkan et al. 2011). 
However, in cases of not following protocols, it was not clear whether it was deliberate 
and therefore violation or not. Confusion with medications that look or sound alike as 
well as medications with similar packaging was also identified by some studies to be a 
contributor for errors (Deans 2005, Tang et al. 2007, Jones and Treiber 2010, Reid-Searl 
et al. 2010, Treiber and Jones 2010). 
 
3.1.4.3. Team factors 
Poor or lack of supervision of students and agency nurses was found to play a role in 
MAE causation (Taxis and Barber 2003, Jones and Treiber 2010, Reid-Searl et al. 2010, 
Treiber and Jones 2010). This affected medication administration in many ways 
involving pressuring junior nurses to prepare and give the drug more quickly, lack of 
assistance and support, and lack of clear instructions. Two studies linked that to the 
overconfidence in or from other staff when communicating instructions (Jones and 
Treiber 2010, Treiber and Jones 2010). In contrast, other studies showed that 
appropriate supervision and communication between staff has improved patient safety 
by preventing errors before they reach the patient (Balas et al. 2004, Reid-Searl et al. 
2010). Poor verbal and written communication between nurses and with other teams is 
an issue reported by many studies although these papers did not provide much details 
about the nature of this communication (Balas et al. 2004, Deans 2005, Sanghera et al. 
2007, Nichols et al. 2008, Jones and Treiber 2010). 
 
3.1.4.4. Personal factors 
Lack of experience, knowledge and/or training either with medications or being ‘new’ 
or an agency nurse was reported by the majority of studies as a factor contributing to 
errors and in some studies which used human errors theory this was directly linked to 
knowledge-based mistakes (Gladstone 1995, Taxis and Barber 2003, Sanghera et al. 




2007, Tang et al. 2007, Chua et al. 2009, Jones and Treiber 2010, Treiber and Jones 
2010, Ozkan et al. 2011). Inadequate knowledge was expanded back by one review to 
inadequate teaching of clinical pharmacology in universities (Brady et al. 2009). 
Limited nurses’ knowledge about high-risk’ medications such as cardiovascular and 
electrolytes was also identified to be associated with MAEs (Lu et al. 2013).  
 
Errors due to calculation failures were also reported and were mainly associated with 
wrong dose preparation and administration. Although some studies did not determine 
whether these were due to inadequate calculation skills of nurses or not (Deans 2005, 
Chua et al. 2009), others revealed that poor calculation skills contribute to an increased 
risk of nurse error especially in areas where more complex calculations are required 
during medicines administration, such as paediatrics (Gladstone 1995, O'Shea 1999, 
Armitage and Knapman 2003, Dickinson et al. 2010). 
 
Staff feeling of fatigue/tiredness or lack of sleep were reported by many studies as a 
contributor to medication error (Mayo and Duncan 2004, Deans 2005, Ulanimo et al. 
2007, Nichols et al. 2008, Jones and Treiber 2010, Treiber and Jones 2010). More 
details were provided by three interview and open ended questionnaires studies (Tang et 
al. 2007, Jones and Treiber 2010, Reid-Searl et al. 2010) which linked fatigue to some 
specific shifts such as long shifts, and night shifts, and also to lack of breaks.  
 
Poor physical and mental condition was reported as common contributor to MAEs 
although limited examples of these conditions were provided. Reported physical status 
involved physical discomfort (Tang et al. 2007) and being unwell (Gladstone 1995). 
Mental state of nurses during error occurrence was also reported; stress which was 
always due to increased workload was found to lead to errors (Gladstone 1995, Deans 
2005, Nichols et al. 2008, Jones and Treiber 2010). Other less common individual 
factors such as lack of confidence/assertiveness was identified by Gladstone (1995). 
 
3.1.4.5. Patient- related factors 
A number of studies reported contributing factors for MAEs related to patient 
characteristics. Patient clinical condition (acuity) and/or unfamiliarity with the patient 
condition were reported by six studies (Balas et al. 2004, Tang et al. 2007, Nichols et al. 
2008, Jones and Treiber 2010, Treiber and Jones 2010, Ozkan et al. 2011). Absent or 




sleeping patients at the time of drug administration was also a common problem 
resulting in errors of omissions or delays which in two studies constituted a violation as 
nurses were aware of the omission (Hand and Barber 2000, Bruce and Wong 2001, 
Balas et al. 2004, Ozkan et al. 2011). Less common patient factors related to patient 
behaviours involved non-cooperation by the patient during drug administration and 
refusing to take the drug (Hand and Barber 2000, Taxis and Barber 2003). Finally, two 
studies reported that unfamiliarity with the patient condition contributed to errors (Tang 
et al. 2007, Nichols et al. 2008).  
 
3.1.4.6. Organisational factors 
Not many studies reported factors related to the organisations and high level decisions. 
Sanghera et al. (2007) considered lack of feedback on errors important factor to error 
repetition and limited learning from mistakes. Similarly, Deans (2005) and Reid-Searl et 
al. (2010) found that providing regular feedback about errors had a positive impact on 
nursing practice. Using open-ended responses, Jones and Treiber (2010) highlighted the 
importance of involving nurses in organisational strategies to minimise errors. Finally, 
one study linked the confusion with medications that look or sound alike to hospital 
management and pharmaceutical industry (Taxis and Barber 2003). 
 
3.1.4.7. Causes for intravenous medication errors  
Few research studies examined the causes of errors in preparation and administration of 
IV doses. Two studies (Taxis and Barber 2003, Taxis and Barber 2004) concerned 
mainly with causes of IV doses errors in UK and German hospitals respectively, while 
other studies considered this issue after describing error prevalence and type during 
preparation and administration of IV doses (Hartley and Dhillon 1998, Bruce and Wong 
2001, Wirtz et al. 2003). All these studies used direct observation to investigate IV drug 
errors. Taxis and Barber (2003) and (2004) collected additional data from informal talks 
with observed nurses, then applied human error theory as a framework to analyse and 
classify incidents. 
 
Many factors related to the task of preparation and administrations of IV doses were 
reported. Problems of intravenous access such as lack of or limited intravenous access 
were common, causing various error types including wrong route administration, 
compatibility errors (Wirtz et al. 2003), wrong timing, medication deterioration (Bruce 




and Wong 2001), omission (Hartley and Dhillon 1998), and were not linked to a 
specific type of error in one study (Taxis and Barber 2003). Difficulties with using drug 
administration equipment such as syringe drivers and pumps contributed to incorrect 
administration rate (Hartley and Dhillon 1998, Taxis and Barber 2003, Taxis and Barber 
2004). Problems associated with infusion pumps were also reported by a few non IV 
route studies and included un-calibrated pumps leading to incorrect administration 
(Chua et al. 2009), and different pumps properties leading to non-applicability of the 
pump to some drugs and therefore omissions (Ozkan et al. 2011). One UK study (Taxis 
and Barber 2003) reported complex or unclear design of technology such as unclear or 
complicated presentation of vials, and preparation procedures. Other less common 
factors found to contribute to MAEs in IV doses involved incomplete labelling, which 
led to deteriorated drug errors (Bruce and Wong 2001), calculation errors (Bruce and 
Wong 2001), documentation errors, non-availability of blood tests (Hartley and Dhillon 
1998), and unclear  prescriptions (Taxis and Barber 2003, Taxis and Barber 2004). 
 
Lack of knowledge about preparation or administration of IV doses including how to 
use infusion equipment, wrong administration technique (e.g. co-administering 
incompatible infusions), and unclear and ambiguous procedures, guidelines and 
manufacturer leaflets were common causes of IV errors (Taxis and Barber 2003, Taxis 
and Barber 2004). Taxis and Barber (2004) reported that in Germany, nurses do not 
have adequate knowledge for safe preparing and administering IV medications and that 
nurses were not assessed appropriately for IV drug administrations. In their UK study, 
violations, which were mainly deliberate administering of doses faster than 
recommended, also caused by lack of knowledge as most nurses were not aware about 
the potential risk of such a practice (Taxis and Barber 2003).  
 
In terms of working environment, skill mix and lack of qualified nurses, poor 
communication between nurses, and workload, which was combined with multitasking 
and interruption, were found to lead to errors in IV administration (Bruce and Wong 
2001, Taxis and Barber 2003, Taxis and Barber 2004).  
 
3.1.5. Comments on the methods used and limitations of studies 
Numerous research methods were used to collect data on the causes of MAEs including 
qualitative and quantitative self-reported surveys and questionnaires, qualitative 




interviews, focus groups, and direct observation (Osborne et al. 1999, Ulanimo et al. 
2007, Cohen and Shastay 2008, Jones and Treiber 2010). Less commonly, staff used 
daily log books (Balas et al. 2004). Some studies used mixed methods, such as Tang et 
al. (2007) who used a focus group followed by semi-structured questionnaires and 
Gladstone (1995) who collected data using three different sources: medication error 
reports, questionnaires to nurses, and face-to-face interviews with nurses that had been 
involved in medication errors. Some research papers reported data matching Reason’s 
classification of active failures to determine the primary cause attributing to MAEs 
(Taxis and Barber 2003, Taxis and Barber 2004, Ozkan et al. 2011). These studies 
primarily reported slips, lapses, mistakes and violations.  
 
Although there were inconsistencies between studies in term of the methods used, the 
most common causes and contributing factors identified from the studies were similar. 
Nonetheless, studies differed in the level of details provided. For example, studies 
which relied on interviews or conversations (with or without observation), focus groups 
or self-reporting methods with free text responses were able to provide detailed 
information about the variety of MAE causes. In some cases, they linked the causal 
factors to specific MAEs (e.g., incorrect frequency) unlike those that relied on 
structured methods, such as short answer surveys/questionnaires (Tang et al. 2007, 
Jones and Treiber 2010) or those that used direct observation methods alone (Tissot et 
al. 2003); these  provided a lower level of  details.  
 
The critical incident technique (CIT) (Flanagan 1954) was used as a method to 
investigate and analyse causes of adverse events. This qualitative and retrospective 
method requires collection of data about AEs from the people involved in these events 
by use of questionnaires, interviews, and, occasionally written statements. This CIT was 
considered a valid method to collect and analyse data on clinical incidents (Vincent 
2003). However, the main limitation of this approach is that the collected information 
relies on participants’ memories, which can be affected by hindsight bias (Flanagan 
1954). Another limitation of this approach, which is a limitation of self-reporting 
methods in general, is that obtaining data from persons directly involved in incidents 
may be affected by the individuals’ opinions and awareness more than their experiences 
of specific errors, which may not reveal the real causes behind errors (Keers et al. 
2013). In contrast, the observational method used by Tissot et al. (2003) may be a more 




reliable method to collect data about causes of MEs because it is divorced from the 
opinions of persons directly involved in the errors, assuming, however, that it is not 
affected by observer opinion as well (Keers et al. 2013). Moreover, with an 
observational approach, the observer can identify deviations from policy that the staff 
do not notice. However, a limitation of studies employing direct observation alone, such 
as that of Tissot et al. (2003), is that the observer may be unable to investigate the 
processes that underpinned a staff error. 
 
Therefore, some studies have combined observational methods with interviews (Chua et 
al. 2009, Ozkan et al. 2011) or informal conversations with staff involved (Taxis and 
Barber 2003, Taxis and Barber 2004) to determine error causality. The main advantage 
of such methods is that collecting data using this method can bridge the gap between 
causes of errors that the observer would be unable to discover alone and those errors 
that would not be recognised by the person committing an error (Mays and Pope 1995, 
Keers et al. 2013). In addition, this approach can overcome discrepancies between 
actions that the participants state they have undertaken and those that they actually do in 
practice (Keers et al. 2013).  
 
In studies that used surveys/questionnaires, although some included open-ended 
questions (e.g., Jones and Treiber 2010), others only used a prepared list of contributory 
factors from which participants chose (Deans 2005, Tang et al. 2007). Such pre-
prepared lists can be considered a limitation because list of causes and contributing 
factors to MAEs presented to nurses might not have been comprehensive nor included 
all possible causes. Findings of studies conducted at only one site or one unit may not 
be generalisable to other settings (Fry and Dacey 2007, Sanghera et al. 2007, Ulanimo 
et al. 2007).  
 
Finally, in some studies considering only the IV administration route (Hartley and 
Dhillon 1998, Bruce and Wong 2001, Wirtz et al. 2003), the main focus was 
predominantly on the prevalence and nature of administration errors. Therefore, these 
studies did not obtain any data from persons involved in the errors. This was considered 
a limitation even by the authors themselves as they could not identify some important 
personal causes. 
 




In conclusion, many studies have investigated the causes of medication errors in 
general, with few focused on MAEs. Different methods were employed by these studies 
to collect data. Although these studies varied in their methods, study hospital drug 
distribution systems, settings, and the nature of errors investigated, factors like 
interruption and distraction, workload, length and type of shift, quality of prescriptions, 
and lack of nurse knowledge and training were found in almost all studies. Some 
contributing factors varied depending on the systems used in the hospitals and study 
settings.  
 
A few studies, particularly from the UK, focused on the causes and contributing factors 
of MAEs and considered the perception and views of nurses using qualitative interviews 
to gain insight into nurses’ ideas. Furthermore, no such work has been conducted on 
causes and factors that contribute to MAEs in the study trust, although several recent 
changes have been introduced into the study trust. Changes include changing the shift 
lengths to twelve hours and introducing automated dispensing cupboards to wards. In 
addition, the study Trust recently recruited many nurses, especially within critical care 
units, thus there are now a lot of junior and inexperienced nurses working in the trust. 
These changes in environment and staffing may have an impact on medication safety, 
particularly in medication administration. 
 
3.2. Aim and objectives 
3.2.1. Study aim 
The aim of the study is to describe the perceptions of nurses and midwives regarding the 
contributing factors leading to medication administration incidents. 
 
3.2.2. Study objectives 
 To identify the causes and contributing factors leading to MAIs, from the 
nurses’ and midwives’ perspectives.  
 To identify nurses’ and midwives’ views and opinions about why these causes 
and factors are present. 
 





3.3.1. Study design 
Since the 1990s, qualitative research approaches have gained an increased importance in 
health services and pharmacy practice research (Smith 1998), as well as in nursing 
research (Brookes 2007). Qualitative methods are considered appropriate for 
investigating new topics or topics about which little is known, as well as complex or 
sensitive topics. Such methods are used to provide insight and  in-depth information on 
complex matters (Bowling 2009). Qualitative research methods are considered the 
methods of choice for the questions about “how?” and “why?’’ phenomena occur. Data 
gathered from qualitative research is able to explore and understand the ways and 
patterns in which people think and behave. Unlike quantitative methods, which follow 
the researcher’s viewpoint and are based on a standardised approach, qualitative 
methods are more flexible and receptive to respondents’ viewpoints (Smith 1998). 
 
The most frequent methods used in qualitative research include observations, individual 
interviews, focus groups, open-ended questionnaires, and document analysis (Al-
Busaidi 2008, Bowling 2009).  Individual interviews are most commonly used and 
found to be a functional way to investigate individuals’ perceptions and understand how 
they make sense of their own world (Bowling 2009). Furthermore, qualitative 
interviews are the most commonly used qualitative approach in research of health 
services and pharmacy practice (Smith 1998). Interviews are also considered an 
interactive method which allow for rich data to be gathered through the interaction 
between the researcher and interviewee. The researcher is able to use prompts and 
probes to obtain detailed answers about the topic discussed (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). 
Although focus group is more time efficient as many people can be interviewed at the 
same time, this qualitative approach documents the views of public rather than 
individuals and some participants may do not interview well in group situations (Al-
Busaidi 2008).  
 
There are three types of interviews: structured, semi-structured and unstructured or in-
depth interviews. The semi-structured interview is the more frequently used qualitative 
method in health care research, such interviews are based on a flexible topic guide and 
consists of open ended questions on the topic investigated, to explore participants’ 




experiences and thoughts and to elicit their own views (Al-Busaidi 2008). Semi 
structured interviews can be considered half-way between gaining information about the 
issues of interests to the researcher and providing the opportunities to the respondents to 
express their views (Smith 1998). Therefore, it was decided to carry out interview-based 
research using a semi-structured interviews approach to address the objectives of the 
current research. This method allowed understanding and gaining insight to nurses’ and 
midwives’ perceptions and views about causes and contributing factors of MAIs. 
 
3.3.2. Study settings 
The study was conducted at a large central London teaching NHS Foundation Trust. At 
the time of the research, the Trust was one of the largest NHS teaching trusts. It is 
comprised of an acute site including paediatrics, a specialist site approximately 2 miles 
away and other adult and children’s community services in the local area. It has a total 
capacity of 1100 beds. The Trust provides a full range of hospital services for the local 
community and also provides tertiary referrals (specialist services) for many medical 
and surgery specialities including cancer, cardiothoracic, women's and children's 
services, kidney care and orthopaedics. The Trust has one of the largest critical care 
services in the UK. 
 
During the study period, some departments had an electronic Prescribing and Medicines 
Administration system “ePMA” in place, however, in other areas, ePMA had not yet 
been implemented and paper drug charts were used for prescribing and recording 
medication administration. The medication distribution system is typical for the UK and 
includes ward stock, where each ward stores a limited range of commonly used 
medications. Less frequently used medications which are not ward stock are ordered for 
individual patients from the pharmacy. On the ward, medications are stored either in the 
ward medication stock room or in the patient’s bed side locker. Registered nurses are 
responsible for preparing most medicines before administering them to patients. 
However, pharmacy prepares some high risk drugs such as chemotherapy which are 
available as “ready to use” from the pharmacy.  
 




3.3.3. Development of data collection tools 
3.3.3.1. Career questionnaire 
A career questionnaire (Appendix 1) was developed to identify and select eligible 
participants according to the eligibility criteria and sampling strategy described below. 
Questions assessed participant eligibility to participate. This career questionnaire 
consisted of three sections: the first section requested information about the 
participant’s current job including years of practice in the current trust, employment 
status, working shifts, current job title and grade, and area where the participant worked. 
The second section involved information about their experience as registered nurses or 
midwives, and the final section of the questionnaire involved the contact details of the 
participant.  
 
3.3.3.2. Participant information leaflet 
A participant information leaflet was developed to provide detailed information about 
the study to participants (Appendix 2). Information provided in this leaflet included the 
study background, aims, eligible participants for the study, the participant recruitment 
process, potential benefits from the research, any possible risks, participant’s rights (see 
section 3.3.6.3 for details), anonymity and confidentiality of participation, plans for 
publication, and contact details of the research team in case the participant required any 
further information about the study. 
 
3.3.3.3. Study invitation letter 
The invitation letter (Appendix 3) was attached with the study invitation email and also 
provided information about the study including the aim, background, what participation 
involves, and what to do if they are willing to take part. The contact details of the 
research team members were provided in both the invitation email and letter in case 
participants required any further information.  
 
3.3.3.4. Consent form 
A consent form was developed to be read and signed by the participants before 
conducting the interview (Appendix 4). Receiving the signed form was essential before 
conducting the interview. The consent form consisted of questions requiring a yes or no 
answer about the participant’s agreement to participate, recording the interview using 
audio tape, and anonymously using interview data in presentation of the research. At the 




end of the form, contacts details of the research team were provided in case the 
participant required any further information about the study. 
 
3.3.3.5.  Interview schedule 
The interview schedule (Appendix 5) used to guide the interview, was developed to 
collect key details about contributing factors and causes behind medication 
administration incidents based on the framework of factors influencing clinical practice 
developed by Vincent et al. (2000). This framework was developed for analysing risk 
and safety in clinical practice and classified error-producing conditions into task, 
environmental, team, patients, organisational, or individual factors that affect 
performance.  
 
The schedule was divided into four main sections. In the first section, participants were 
asked to give brief background information about their daily practices in administering 
medicines and were asked to describe the steps they take when administering medicine. 
The second section focused on the perception of the participant of different causes and 
contributing factors to medication administration incidents, based on the classification 
of error-producing conditions by Vincent et al. (2000) and Dean et al. (2002), consisting 
of environmental, task, team, patients, organisational, and individual factors. The third 
section consisted of one general question about factors which specifically increase the 
risk of incidents during preparation and administration of IV doses and how, in practice, 
participants avoid these factors. Under each section, prompt questions were used to ask 
for more clarification and explanations if required. In addition, issues raised by the 
participant were discussed and participants asked for any clarification required. 
Interviews were audio recorded for a verbatim transcription and written notes were 
taken by the interviewer as well. 
 
3.3.4.  Research permissions 
Initially, ethical approval from the Biomedical Sciences, Dentistry, Medicine and 
Natural & Mathematical Sciences (BDM) Research Ethics Subcommittee (RESC) at 
King’s College London (KCL) was acquired for this study on 9th May 2013 
(BDM/12/13-72). Following the pilot interviews, a modification request form was 
submitted to approve the amendments to the career questionnaire and study poster. 
Approval was gained for the requested modifications on 19
th
 December 2013. The 




research was also approved by the Research and Development department at the study 
Trust on 6
th
 September 2013 and allocated a Trust R&D registration 
number RJ113/N228. 
 
3.3.5. Piloting of data collection tools 
Both the career questionnaire and interview schedule were piloted by two nurses 
between August and October 2013. First, these two nurses were asked to complete the 
career questionnaire used to select eligible participants, and then they were interviewed. 
The pilot aimed to assess the clarity and validity of questions in the career questionnaire 
and interview schedule and to ensure that key details were collected clearly without any 
potential for confusion. This pilot resulted in the amendment of two questions in the 
career questionnaire in order to improve participants’ understanding of the questions. 
The amended questions were question 2.1 about the length of participant’s registration 
as a nurse or midwife which was changed from  “For how long have you been 
registered as nurse?” to becom “For how long have you been registered as nurse or 
midwife?” and question 2.2 about the eligibility of the participant to administer IV 
medicines to patients which was changed from “Are you eligible to administer 
parenteral (injectable) medicines to patients?” to become “Are you eligible to 
administer intravenous (IV) medicines to patients?” 
 
In the interview schedule, the layout of the schedule, as well as the order of some 
questions, were amended to enable better follow up by and interaction with the 
interviewer. The pilot interviews also allowed the interviewer to practice and develop 
his interviewing skills while asking questions and interacting with participants. The 
amended documents were then piloted by interviewing another two nurses to ensure 
their appropriateness for data collection.  
 
3.3.6. Study participants 
3.3.6.1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
All registered nurses and midwives involved in drug administration in all study 
directorates were invited to participate. Nurses or midwives who were practicing in 
settings outside study directorates and any nurse who did not administer medication for 




any reason were excluded. Nurses or midwives who did not respond to the reminder 
letter within seven days, according to recruitment process were also excluded. 
 
3.3.6.2. Sampling 
The anticipated sample size was twenty-five nurses or midwives selected to represent a 
range of Trust directorates, professional backgrounds and experience. The minimum 
sample sizes required to achieve saturation in interview based research is twelve 
interviews and therefore, it was assumed that the determined sample size would be 
appropriate to generate relevant codes and themes about the topic (Dean et al. 2002, 
Guest et al. 2013). 
 
Nurses and midwives were selected based on their experience, grade, and directorate or 
department where they worked. Directorates included in this study were Children's 
Services, Acute Medicine, Surgery, Perioperative, Critical Care and Pain, Women's 
Services, Oncology and Haematology, Cardiovascular Services, and Abdominal 
Medicine and Surgery. In each directorate, nurses or midwives with different levels of 
experience (newly qualified nurses to 10 + years of practice) and different 
grade/seniority (from Band 5 to senior nurses or ward manager) were invited and 
selected to participate to reflect the diversity of nurses and midwives’ backgrounds. 
Moreover, the number of nurses or midwives invited from each directorate was based 
on the number of registered nurses and midwives working in each directorate (Table 
3.2). 
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3.3.6.3. Participant rights 
Participation in interviews was entirely voluntary and participants were able to 
withdraw from the study at any point up to the date of the research report, which was 
specified as 9
th
 January 2015, without giving any reason. During the interview, no 
sensitive, embarrassing or upsetting topics were raised or discussed. In addition, 
participants were free to refuse to answer any question they were asked during the 
interview. Therefore, it was unlikely that any participant would suffer any undue 
distress, harm or injury.  Furthermore, the interviews were confidential and all 
identifiable information disclosed during the course of the research was anonymised by 
the researcher. The researcher explained to participants that information from the 
research would not be linked back to participants. Finally, the contact details of research 
team members were provided in all study documents and research communication 
(emails) in case participants had any question or needed any further information. 
 
3.3.7. Participant identification and recruitment process 
All Trust nurses and midwives were informed about the study and invited to participate 
at least seven days before the start of recruitment to increase awareness about the study 
and also to provide the opportunity to ask if they have any questions or wanted further 
information about the study. This was done using a poster (Appendix 6) displayed in 
prominent nurses’ and midwives areas at all study wards (Figure 3.1). Copies of the 
career questionnaire (Appendix 1), and the participant’s information letter (Appendix 2) 
were also provided with the poster. Moreover, information about the study was sent via 
group emails for nurses, matrons and ward managers, to all Trust nurses and midwives 
to inform them about the study and to invite them to participate. This invitation email 
provided brief information about the study involving the aim, approvals obtained, 
eligible participants, what the participation involve, and what to do if they were willing 
to take part. Furthermore, a copy of the invitation letter, career questionnaire, and 
participant information letter were attached to the email.  
 
Staffs interested in participating were asked to complete and return the career 
questionnaire either by internal mail or by email to the researcher. Following receipt of 
the career questionnaires from nurses or midwives willing to participate (first stage data 
collection), twenty-five eligible participants, selected according to the sampling 
strategy, were invited for interview.  




This staffs were sent an email with a personalised interview invitation letter for the 
interview, copies of the participant information leaflet and consent form. Two copies of 
the consent form were provided; one for return to the research team, and the other to be 
retained by the participant. Selected participants were given one week to consider the 
invitation letter and if required to contact the research team to discuss any aspect of the 
study. Non-responders were sent a reminder letter (Appendix 7) after seven days. Any 
participant selected who did not subsequently respond to the reminder letter within 
seven days was excluded from the study and an alternative eligible nurse selected from 
the career questionnaire respondents was contacted and invited to participate. When the 
acceptance for interview (consent form) had been received, participants were contacted 
to arrange the time and location for the interview (second stage data collection). 
Respondents not eligible to participate and those not selected for interviews received a 
letter from the research team to thank them for their willingness to participate.  
 
3.3.8. Data collection and processing 
3.3.8.1. Conducting the interview 
Interviews with nurses or midwives were conducted between February and August 
2014. All interviews took place in a quiet room on the ward where the participant 
worked or in the pharmacy department in the study trusts. At the beginning of each 
interview, the researcher provided general brief information about the study and the 
nature of the questions. The participant was asked to verbally confirm that they had read 
the information leaflet and that they had read and signed the consent form. 
 
3.3.8.2. Data storage 
To ensure confidentiality and data security of all study information, electronic data files 
were saved on a password protected and encrypted USB drive. All study data including 
career questionnaires, final interview transcripts, consent forms, and all USB drives 
which were used to store electronic files were stored in a locked filing cabinet. Audio-
tape recordings were destroyed at the end of the study. Each participant was given a 
reference number which was used throughout the study and stored separately from their 
















































Figure 3.1. A flow diagram of participant recruitment and data collection process 
 
Send personalised invitation letter for interview, participant 
information leaflet and consent form (n=25). 
 
Career questionnaire respondents (n=60) 
Twenty-five interview samples according to the sampling 
strategy were selected 
 
Arrange time and place and conduct the interviews (n=25) 
 
Send reminder letter (n=10) 
 
 
 If no response within 7 days 
Nurses (or midwives) interested in the study will be asked to 
complete the career questionnaire and send it via internal 
mail to the researcher 
 
Inform potential participants about the study using both: 
Identify a new participant from the 
questionnaire respondents (n=2) 
 
If no response within 7 days 
 Poster advertisement in prominent 
nurses’ areas at all study sites with 
copies of: 
 Participant information letter  
 Career questionnaire  
Group email to hospital nurses and 
midwives accompanied by: 
 Copy of the invitation letter 
 Participant information letter 
 Career questionnaire 
 And 
Stage 1 data 
collection 
 









3.3.8.3. Data analysis 
All anonymised interviews were subjected to framework analysis method, which sits 
within a qualitative analysis method named “thematic analysis” (Gale et al. 2013, 
Vaismoradi et al. 2013). Thematic analysis is a qualitative descriptive approach for data 
analysis which is used frequently as analysis method for qualitative studies in nursing 
research (Vaismoradi et al. 2013). The use of such qualitative descriptive analysis is 
considered suitable for research which require a relatively low level of interpretation, in 
contrast to grounded theory where higher level of interpretive complexity is needed 
(Vaismoradi et al. 2013). It was described as “a method for identifying, analysing and 
reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke 2006, p79). The Framework 
Method is commonly used to thematically analyse semi-structured interview transcripts 
(Gale et al. 2013). The following processes were followed to analyse the data as 
described by (Vaismoradi et al. 2013): 
 
 Transcribing the data:  
The anonymised audio recordings were transcribed verbatim and cross checked against 
the recording and the researcher’s written notes. All transcripts were then read and cross 
checked against the recordings by one of the supervisors (CW) who made any required 
changes to the written transcripts to assure that all recordings were accurately 
transcribed.  
 
 Familiarisation with data: 
Familiarisation with the data was achieved by listening and re-listening to the audio 
recording and reading the transcripts and any written notes, and generating initial ideas. 
Re-listening to the interviews and re-reading the transcripts several times were 
performed if required.  
 
 Generating initial codes 
Initially, transcripts of the first few interviews were coded into different codes and each 
section of the text was assigned to the relevant code. These codes were refined by 
analysing the rest of the interviews. To avoid ignoring any data, we added an ‘other’ 
code under each theme for any data that did not fit with any code. 
 
 




 Searching for themes and developing a working analytical framework 
Generated codes were gathered together into themes and a coding framework was 
developed which summarised emerging themes. This coding framework was further 
refined by analysing the rest of the interviews. 
 
 Reviewing themes 
Generated themes were checked to assess whether they were appropriate in relation to 
the coded texts and also the whole dataset. The developed framework or thematic map 
was refined if necessary by either merging or gathering codes. 
 
 Defining and naming themes 
At this stage of analysis, the specifics of each theme were refined and each theme was 
defined and named.  
 
 Producing the report 
Reporting the results of all previous stages was the final stage of data analysis. This 
stage was considered as “the final opportunity of data analysis in thematic analysis” 
(Vaismoradi et al. 2013p402) where the extracted data from the interviews was 
interpreted and related back to the research objectives and literature. 
 
The computer software NVIVO (version 10) was used during analysis. The pilot 
interviews were not included in the analysis. Before producing the report, the analysis 
was validated by a supervisor (CW) in order to check the main researcher's coding and 
verify the outcomes and any disagreements were discussed and resolved. 
 
3.4. Results  
3.4.1. Study participants 
Following the study advertisement and the invitation email to all Trust nurses, a total of 
60 selection questionnaires were returned from nine directorates; of which 32 were 
collected from the ward by the researcher, 18 questionnaires were received via Trust 
internal mail, two were sent by email, and eight were given to the ward pharmacist, who 
in turn delivered them to the research team. Five of the received questionnaires were 




excluded, either because of insufficient contact details provided (n=4), or because the 
respondent was not eligible to participate (n=1), leaving 55 completed questionnaires 
from eligible participants. Non-eligible questionnaire was received from Genetics, 
Rheumatology, Infection, Dermatology, and Allergy (GRIDA) directorate, which was 
not included in the study. 
 
Initially, a total of 25 interview invitations were sent to 25 selected questionnaire 
respondents, according to the sampling strategy (Table 3.2). There was a response to 
fifteen invitations, and then interview times and venues were agreed. Non-respondents 
were then sent a reminder letter seven days after the first invitation letter. Two nurses 
responded to the reminder letter and eight nurses did not. Therefore eight alternative 
participants were selected from the questionnaire respondents and invited to interview 
until 25 interviews were completed. Interviews were conducted either in the small 
seminar room in the pharmacy department (n=8) or in the ward where the participant 
worked either in a nurses’ offices or in an unoccupied room on the ward (n=17). The 
average time of the interview was 41min 17sec (range 67min 07sec – 27min 29sec).  
 
Of interviewed nurses, seventeen were from the acute site while eight nurses were from 
the specialist site. Nurses were from Children's Services (n=5), Acute Medicine (n=3), 
Surgery (n=3), Perioperative, Critical Care and Pain (n=5), Women's Services (n=3), 
Oncology and Haematology (n=2), Cardiovascular Services (n=2), and Abdominal 
Medicine and Surgery (n=2). Nurses from grade 5 (n=10), 6 (n=6), and grade 7 (n=9) 
were interviewed. The length of time since registration ranged from less than two years 
to more than 30 years. All participants were eligible to administer intravenous doses. 
Their experience in IV administration ranged from one month to more than 30 years. 
Most nurses were employed full time (n=23/25), while some were working part time 
(n=1/25) or were temporary (i.e. agency, or bank) (n=1/25). Details of participants’ 
characteristics can be found in Table 3.3. 
 
3.4.2.  Interview results 
Analysis yielded seven main themes and 58 codes or sub-codes from the interviews 
topic guide about causes and factors contributing to MAIs. The main themes identified 
were environmental factors, task factors, patient related factors, team factors, 
management factors, personal or individual factors, and factors associated with IV. The 




environmental factors theme included interruption and distraction, workload, staffing 
levels and staff skills mix, shift patterns, and physical environment. The theme of task 
factors consisted of 8 codes involving factors such as inappropriate checking or double 
checking, non-availability of test results or procedures, design and clarity of the task, 
and also the individual drugs related factors (i.e. medicines which increase the risk of 
incidents). The third theme was patient factors, which involved 5 codes about patient 
related factors and also involved the groups of patients who were believed to be at 
higher risk of errors. The fourth theme consisted of 4 codes and 4 sub-codes and 
focused on team factors such as support, communication, and supervision. The fifth 
theme, which was comprised of 5 codes about management or organisational factors, 
related to higher levels such as training and education provided to staff. The sixth theme 
was the staff individual factors which may contribute to MAIs such as the fatigue and 
tiredness of nurses, and lack of knowledge or skills. This theme involved 8 codes. The 
seventh theme consisted of 4 codes and 4 sub-codes and in this theme, nurses described 
factors contributing to errors associated with IV doses. Table 3.4 presents the identified 
codes and created themes.  
 
3.4.3. Environmental factors 
Different factors related to the working environment revealed by interviewees were 
mainly distraction and interruption during medication administration, workload, 
understaffing and skill mix, shift patterns and the noise of the ward.   
 
3.4.3.1.  Interruption and distraction 
The majority of nurses from all directorates mentioned that interruptions and 
distractions was an important factor affecting their attention levels during the 
preparation and administration of medicines and in consequence, could lead to errors.   
 
“I think the interruptions as well, is a big problem. You can be on a drug round 
and be interrupted 10 times, and then you can lose track.” (N19 Surgery) 
 
“I think the only thing I would think of is concentration because if there is noise 
everywhere and everybody coming to distract you, definitely there will be an 
error especially if the person is a newly qualified nurse.” (N24 Abdominal 
Medicine and Surgery) 




Table 3.3. Demographics of the participants (N=25) 
Participants’  characters N (%) 
Site 
 Acute 17 (68%) 
Specialist 8 (32%) 
Directorate 
 Children's Services 5 (20%) 
Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain  5 (20%) 
Acute Medicine 3 (12%) 
Surgery 3 (12%) 
Women's Services 3 (12%) 
Abdominal Medicine and Surgery 2 (8%) 
Cardiovascular Services 2 (8%) 
Oncology and Haematology 2 (8%) 
Eligible to administer IVS? 
 Yes  25 (100%) 
No  0 
Years of working at the study trust 
 2 years or less 9 (36%) 
>2 – 5 years 3 (12%) 
>5 – 10 years 8 (32%) 
>10 – 15 years 2 (8%) 
>15 – 20 years 1 (4%) 
>20 years 2 (8%) 
Employment status 
 Full time 23 (92%) 
Part time 1 (4%) 
Temporary (agency or bank) 1 (4%) 
Type of shifts worked 
 Day shift 5 (20%) 
Evening shift         0 
Night shift 1 (4%) 
Multiple shift 19 (75%) 
Job title 
 Ward manager 4 (16%) 
Deputy ward manager 3 (12%) 
Ward sister 2 (8%) 
Practice development nurse 1 (4%) 
Staff nurse 14 (56%) 
Midwife 1 (4%) 
Band  
 5 10 (40%) 
6 6 (24%) 
7 9 (36%) 
Years since registration as nurse 
 Less than two years 7 (28%) 
2 – 5 years 4 (16%) 
>5 – 10 years 4 (16%) 
>10 – 15 years 1 (4%) 
More than 15 years 9 (36%) 
Gender 
 Male  5 (20%) 
Female  20 (80%) 




Table 3.4. The identified codes and created themes 
Codes Themes 
Area layout or geography 
        Environmental factors 
Business of the area 
Cluttered medicines area 
Interruption and distraction 
Non-availability and access to essential equipment and supplies 
Physical environment 
Shift patterns and duration of the shift 
Staffing level and skill mix 
Unfamiliarity with the area 
Workload 
  
Design of drug chart 
 
          Task factors 
Inappropriate checking 
Medicines with high risk of incidents 
Non-availability of test results or procedures 
Timing of medicines 
Quality of prescribing 
Relying on doctors and pharmacists 
Other task factors   
  
Communication barriers and language 
          Patient factors 
Lack of patients' medication history 
Patients' non compliance 
Clinical condition and acuity 
Patients’ personality and cooperation 
  
Lack of nurses support 
          Team factors Communication between nurses 
Communication with doctors 
The supervision 
  
Clarity and applicability of policies and guidelines 
        Organisational factors 
Inadequate training from the management 
Lack of communication with the staff 
Lack of feedback about errors 
Lack of updates to nurses 
  
Fatigue 
        Personal factors 
Lack of knowledge, skills and experience of nurses 
Lack or over confidence 
Old ways of doing things or habits-short cuts 
Physical health (being tired, hungry, unwell) 
Poor calculations skills 
Family issues 
Unfamiliarity with the task 
  
Confusion with different administration routes 
    Factors to do with IVs                Lack of training and experience on IV medications 
Complexity of the preparation of IVs 
Problems with cannulation and setting the infusion rate 
 
 










Although the interviews revealed that interruptions can occur at any time and in all 
areas, some nurses explained that in busy areas and during busy times such as early in 
the morning, interruptions and distractions are more likely to happen. 
 
“You’re more likely to be interrupted in the morning around 8 o’clock because 
that's … the busiest time the doctors are coming in for ward around and things. 
So you're more likely to be interrupted there.” (N13 Cardiovascular Services) 
 
Different sources of distractions were reported. However, the main source of 
interruption as mentioned by most nurses was patients, who may ask questions in the 
middle of their own drug rounds or request help. 
 
“I mean the patients often will not realize how important what you're doing 
is and might, uh, ask for help or, uhm, ask for ..., sometimes the patient 
you're administering drugs to, you know might ask something in the middle 
of their own drug rounds, so that's also something.” (N11 Cardiovascular 
Service) 
 
Other sources of distraction stated by nurses involved other nurses asking questions or 
requesting double checking, other health care professionals, primarily doctors during 
ward rounds, telephone calls, and patients’ relatives or parents, especially in paediatric 
wards.  
“Interruption from patient, interruption from your colleague because you 
might be doing medication and somebody will come up and say, "Oh, I'm 
looking for this tablet and I cannot find it.  Can you help me? Sometimes it's 
the doctors.  You’re doing medication, they will come and maybe they ... 
they ... they ... they come and tell you, "Are you the one looking after that 
patient?” (N24 Abdominal Medicine and Surgery) 
 
“Uhm…so other nurses asking me questions, for example.  Patients uhm 
either asking you questions or being slightly disruptive, can’t think of a 
better word, you know, the…wiggling around the bed…putting themselves at 
risk, uhm so you have to stop halfway through; uhm if you have to take a 
phone call halfway through, if the doctors come and speak to you halfway 




through.  Uhm…that what I was seeing…that was my distractions.” (N17 
Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
The continuous interruptive nature of the intensive care units was also mentioned by 
some nurses working in this environment. 
 
“The continuous distraction of the monitor and the patient’s movements, 
deterioration, themselves. Uhm, phones going off, ward rounds arriving, 
other people asking questions and the nature of critical care work being 




The terms “rush”, “busy”, “stress”, and “pressure” were all used by nurses to describe 
their workload. Most of the nurses commented that high workload was an important 
contributor to MAIs. Many nurses mentioned that the heavy workload lead them to do 
medication tasks in a rush and in consequence, cause them to make errors easily.  
 
“The work load and pressure, you're looking at the time, you know that 
medication you have to give in certain time ... and you want to finish on that 
period of time. You're in rush. You can easily make mistake or errors. That can 
be one of the reasons.” (N18 Surgery) 
 
“We had situations where you had two nurses giving the drugs for the entire 
unit, which was completely unmanageable with the amount of drugs have been 
given, and then more likely to making error because of the vast quantities that 
they've given.” (N26 Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
Excessive workload was linked to short staffing by a number of nurses, although one 
nurse related this to the patient’s acuity rather than staffing levels. 
 
“It’s quite busy ward. It’s very fast paced so I think if you’re short staffed and 
you’re rushing perhaps uhm, you don’t read something properly, uhm, or you 
misread a time and you give it too you quickly when you shouldn’t have given 




it, uhm, I think that’s probably the biggest thing is people rushing.” (N20 
Women's Services) 
 
“The obvious one, really, is when it's extremely busy. Uhm, and sometimes ... I 
mean, you can be fully staffed on the ward, and officially you've got enough 
staff, but it's really, well, heavy, we would say because you've got patients who 
need lots of attention, patients who're sick and should be transferred, and you 
could be struggling even when you're fully staffed.” (N11 Cardiovascular 
Service) 
 
Workload was often combined with challenging time management, particularly in busy 
times during the day (e.g. in the morning and between 6 and 8 in the evening as well, as 
at the end of shifts). Increased workload, multitasking of nurses (i.e. tasks assigned for 
nurses besides drug administration), and compressed time for drug administration; were 
reported as making it difficult sometimes to give all drugs on time, thus causing timing 
issues. In addition, with time pressure caused by excessive workload, nurses explained 
they were more likely to change their usual practice and take shortcuts to save time. 
 
“if you've got a busy workload, if you've got maybe four or five patients to look 
after, you're trying to do the medications for those four or five patients, your 
conscious of the time, you know that you've got to try and get these medications 
done within the ... especially if they're intravenous medications and things like 
that. It's about, you know, the time constraints, whether you have got enough 
time and you're trying to think one job ahead the whole time, that's when 
errors happen” (D2 Children's Services) 
 
“Your time pressure is massive. You really struggle with time management and 
the medications are a big part of time management, so there's a lot of pressure, 
uhm, to rush through things.” (N11 Cardiovascular Service) 
 
“If somebody has a lot of tasks that is multiple tasks to carry out at a 
particular point in time, it's about ... it will affect medication errors.” (D22 
Abdominal Medicine and Surgery) 
 




3.4.3.3. Shift patterns 
Large number of nurses suggested that shift patterns were a major contributing factor to 
MAIs. Different shift patterns were indicated by nurses to be more error prone, mainly 
night shifts and long shifts (12.5 hour shifts), although a few nurses also reported the 
day shift, as well as irregular shifts was an issue.  
 
Many nurses from different directorates indicated that long shifts in particular were 
associated with exhaustion and tiredness, especially at the end of such shifts, which 
might affect their vigilance and concentration when they administered medicine. A 
number of nurses also linked exhaustion and tiredness associated with long shifts to a 
lack of or inadequate breaks being taken. 
 
“But I think in terms of medication you probably are tired by the evening 
and you … you … you might be more likely to make mistakes because 
you’ve been on … been on shift for 10 hours and you’re tired and you’re 
hungry and thirsty. So yeah … I mean yeah possibly more likely.” (N25 
Surgery) 
 
 “Uhm…so we…we always work long shifts.  We do 12 and half-hour 
shifts, mixture of days and nights.  Uhm you know as the shift goes on, 
you get more tired towards the end of the shift and you’re less…your 
concentration is diminished, uhm especially if you’ve had a very busy 
shift and you’ve not necessarily had your breaks as well as you could 
have done so you haven’t rehydrated and eaten and things.  Uhm I’d say 
that the later you get to in a 12 and half-hour shift, the more likely you 
would be to make a mistake while giving medicine because you… like I 
say, your focus is diminished.” (N17 Perioperative, Critical Care & 
Pain) 
 
Many issues specific to night shifts were identified. The main issue was about 
the responsibility of night shift nurses to administer the 6 o' clock intravenous 
doses before handover to the morning staff. At this point, night nurses 
explained they were at the end of their 12 hours shift and were more likely to 
be tired. 




“When we looked at the shift patterns, uhm, and I'm looking again back 
into once upon a time we used to dispense medication 6 o' clock in the 
morning and it used to be our night staff that would do it. So at the end 
of the night shift, we thought, yeah, it could be a rise and increase of 
medication errors as a result of people were tired at six in the morning.“ 
(N13 Cardiovascular Service)  
 
“Night shifts for me are a nightmare.  I’m not good on night shifts.  Some 
people are really good.  Some people aren’t.  I’m sort of aware of that, 
so at 6:00 am when you do your big round of morning drugs because 
that’s when most of them are administered, I have to concentrate really, 
really, really, really hard because I’m so tired by that point.  I 
would…I’m frightened of making a mistake at that point because I know 
that I’m tired, so the risks are higher “ (D17 Perioperative, Critical 
Care & Pain) 
 
Some nurses also explained that during the night and weekends, they did not receive the 
same support from other healthcare teams as they receive during the day shift (i.e. from 
9am to 5pm). 
 
“I think night shifts can be a bit less supportive because obviously you’ve 
got one pharmacist covering the whole hospital. So it’s … it’s a bit more 
challenging on night shift” (N23 Children's Services) 
 
“skill mix, generally speaking, during the week, uh, sort of on a Monday 
to Friday basis, we've got, uhm, clinical support nurses who come 
around and work with people. And there’s a lot more staff on the unit so 
you can get people to watch your patient while you can go out and get 
stuff. On night shifts and on weekends, it’s a bit trickier, and they tend to 
be less well staffed.” (N26 Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
In terms of the factors associated with the day shift, a few nurses thought that the day 
shift was associated with an increased workload as many tasks were done during the 
day shift compared to other shifts.  




“I always find the medication rounds take longer in the morning, uhm, 
because there’s things that they have once daily that they have in the 
morning. Uhm, so you’re more likely I think to be rushing your drugs 




Staffing level was raised by many nurses from all directorates as an influential factor 
leading to errors. Staffing issues included inadequate number of staff, and thus 
increased workload, and skill mix in staff present on each shift. 
 
“The only one I can look at is staffing ratio.  If the staffing ratio is not right, 
it affects medication administration because the moment staffing ratio is 
bad; staff is bound to work under pressure.  I was there working, it's terrible 
effect; goes down and it affects both quality of care and also judgments and 
then rushed decisions and then you’ll see people making mistakes.’ (N22 
Abdominal Medicine and Surgery) 
 
The interviewees explained that issue of the skill mix was mainly due to newly qualified 
nurses, agency, and bank nurses who worked on a temporary basis and most of them 
were either unqualified to administer medicines or needed to be supervised and 
supported by a senior nurse. The nurses cited that on many occasions they have to take 
over the responsibility for patients, as well as their patients, resulting in a higher 
workload for them. In addition, some senior nurses identified that this can delay the 
medication if junior nurses cannot find someone to check with them.   
 
“I think to start off with it is quite difficult on the team and such because 
uhm sometimes getting double the medication round because your 
colleague is too junior to do it by themselves. So there’s a lot of pressure 
on the senior nurses to do that or you’re having to double check 
everything with the junior nurses. So I think that phase is quite a difficult 
phase.” (N7 Acute Medicine) 
 




“Certainly, when I was on xxxxx Ward, most shifts would have a bank or 
agency nurse on, at least one. They'd sometimes be on the bay on their 
own, although they’d generally be with another qualified member of 
staff. So...there’s then I did pressure with my qualified member of staff to 
have to do more medications than just their own patient. Uhm If the bank 
or agency nurse or newly qualified nurse, who can't check at that point, 
can't find someone to check with them, then it can delay the medication. 
They might not get it on time uhm and then making it difficult for... to be 
able to catch up later on.” (N1 Children's Services) 
 
Less common factors related to the work environment mentioned by nurses included the 
non-availability of essential equipment and supplies required for medication 
administration. These were mainly medicines not being stocked in the wards which 
needed to be requested from the pharmacy. They suggested this became more of an 
issue outside pharmacy working hours and during the weekend. 
 
“Another ... Another factor of supplies is even the medication itself 
because every ward, for instance our own ward here we have got ward 
stock, which is on the list. Now, if a medication that is not covered on the 
ward stock, is not there on the ward…yeah and it is outside even during 
the working ... during the working hours, it takes a longer time for it to 
come from the pharmacy back to the ward from the time of ordering. It 
becomes worse out of hours when pharmacy for instance here is closed 
and then you have to source medication from St. Thomas's” (N22 
Abdominal Medicine and Surgery) 
 
Other factors indicated by a few nurses included the layout and geography of the ward 
and related to the size or location of the drug room within the ward, as well as the small 
bed spaces, particularly in intensive care units. The physical environments of the ward, 
for example the ward temperature (especially during the summer), light, and the noise 
of the ward, and the familiarity of nurses with the working area were also reported.   
 




3.4.4. Task factors 
Several task related factors were thought by the interviewees to contribute to errors. 
These mainly involved failures in the checking processes and non-availability of test 
results required for some medicines. Less common factors involved the design of the 
drug chart, poor prescribing quality, and medication timing including those doses 
prescribed at busy times or those doses which are prescribed outside common times. 
 
3.4.4.1. Inappropriate checking 
Inappropriate checking was stated by most of the nurses interviewed as common 
practice and an important contributing factor for incidents. One of the things nurses they 
explained were easily missed was checking for allergies. Picking up the wrong chart and 
failure to check information the doctors ‘had updated on the drug chart is also identified 
as common.  
 
“I strongly feel if you don’t adhere to…. checking the process that is in place, 
then you’re going to cause … then you’re going to have an error.” (N23 
Children's Services) 
 
“That's one of the major factors. Yeah. Checking process this year, one of the 
things that is very much responsible for medication errors” (N22 Abdominal 
Medicine and Surgery) 
 
“Allergies is easily forgotten because unless it has been flagged up to them as 
something significant, it seems to be not unusual to forget to go back to the 
beginning of the chart and check that” (N21 Perioperative, Critical Care & 
Pain) 
 
Different causes were revealed by the nurses to explain why they do not go through all 
the checking processes. A common cause was performing the medication task under 
pressure due to the heavy workload. Complacency among senior nurses and their 
reliance on their knowledge, experience and skills was also identified by the nurses as 
another common reason. Complacency was also identified by the nurses in cases when 
they looked after patients for a long period of time. 
 




“I think a lot of the senior nurses kind of get into the, maybe there’s a bit of 
complacency that, that things are all right and they are doing okay and they 
are not having any problems. Uhm, so they don’t take as much care with what 
they are doing, or they are operating faster and they having to, you know, 
they…they know they got the knowledge and skills to kind of move real quick 
and do things a bit faster and maybe it encourages you to kind of cut corners 
and find work around if, you know, if the system doesn’t work, you’ll find a 
way around it” (N26 Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
“Sometimes if a child been on a medicine for a long time people get a bit more 
complacent in checking that the right dose is being administered” (N15 
Children's Services) 
 
A senior nurse stated that a lack of knowledge of newly qualified nurses had been 
noticed in both the checking processes and what should be checked. 
 
“The checking process is either that the staff is in a hurry, to administer the 
medication then they rush the checking or sometimes some do not know 
what they are looking for. Some do not know what they're looking for and 
especially when the person is sometimes newly qualified and then the person 
starts medication very early doesn’t know what he’s looking for then that’s 
could also affect medication administration.” (N22 Abdominal Medicine 
and Surgery) 
 
Reliance on technology was also considered to make some nurses lazy regarding 
necessary checks of medication. Electronic drug cabinets was suggested an example of 
this as when nurses dispense their medicines using it, they assume that the correct drug 
was always dispensed and that the drug was within the expiry date.   
 
“When you go into (the electronic) dispensing system, the expiry drugs 
shouldn't happen because the machine's supposed to, uhm.... automatically 
alert that it's going to expire. However, this is probably, well it is relying on 
humans to tell when you put them in about expiry dates and things. So, you, 
we wouldn't expect to take drugs out there which were expired, uh, and 




sometimes when you don't expect it, uhm, people do not check.” (N13 
Cardiovascular Service) 
 
In contract, some nurses believed that reliance on doctors and pharmacists could also 
contribute to checking failures. It was explained that some nurses might think that once 
the dose was prescribed by the doctor and dispensed by the pharmacist, then they could 
just give the medicine without checking whether the correct drug and dose was 
prescribed and dispensed.   
 
“Sometimes people just think that…you know the consultant wrote this they 
must be right even though it's actually outside of the normal range.”  (N15 
Children's Services) 
 
In doses which require double checking, mainly IVs and controlled drugs, the nurses 
often mentioned that appropriate independent double checking did not take place. The 
interviews identified that the nurses do not independently double check each step of the 
preparation and administration process. Common practice described by the interviewees 
was that the nurse prepared the drug and took it just before administration to the patient 
to another nurse (the second checker) and then the second person just signs but does not 
check it appropriately. Even if they check the preparation process together, the second 
nurse usually does not walk with the first nurse and watch him/her giving the drug to 
the patient. These were the most common practices for double checking as identified by 
the nurses. 
 
“It’s because uh for example I am busy and you would say, “Oh can you 
check with me. I’m just be putting it in front of you. I’ve mixed it.” It is 
basically does this other nurse have the time to stand there with me while 
I’m preparing it to actually check if I’m doing it correctly because that is 
supposed to be the principle of double checking. You are there the whole 
way until you go to the patient itself and give it to them with both of you, but 
do we have that luxury? No. What you’re going to do is you’re going to 
prepare it, mix it up. You have your ampoules of the water. You have the 
medication ampoule there or vial. You have your syringes and then you 
have your drug chart and you’re going to go to the nurse and say, “Can you 




check this with me?” and that’s the double check which is actually not the 
principle of double checking.” (N8 Acute Medicine) 
 
“Yes. So definitely the double signature thing. You know, you check 
everything yourself. You sign it and then take it to someone else. They check 
everything and they sign it but a lot of times you take it to them and they just 
sign it. They don’t check it.” (N12 Acute Medicine) 
 
“And one of the other problems with this system of checking is what you 
find that happens is that they'll check it for you, and we're quite good at 
thoroughly checking everything on the drug chart... and expiry dates and 
doses and all that kind of stuff. Uhm they will very rarely watch you walk 
over to the patient and give it to them. So, you know, you could take it to 
someone else, give to the wrong patient. And then they'd signed it, that you 
checked. And I have to say that's the normal practice” (N11 
Cardiovascular Services) 
 
Short staffing, workload, and time pressure were common issues identified as barriers 
for double checking. Nurses explained it was sometimes found it difficult to find 
another nurse to undertake the double check, especially in the busy working 
environment. Other reasons for such practices were related by the interviewees to the 
local working culture and the relationship between nurses and overconfidence between 
nurses, especially when a junior nurse checks for a senior nurse. Some interviewees 
identified that junior nurses might felt embarrassing to challenge other senior nurses. 
One nurse described the problem as a cultural aspect as it has become acceptable not to 
apply the principles of double checking.  
 
“People don't want to question the other person. You know like they just 
accept that what the person said is ...I think it's a bit like the double 
checking you know, they just go along with whatever the person saying 
because they don't like to upset or because they don't want to challenge 
somebody or they think that person knows more than they do. Of those sort 
of things.” (N2 Children's Services) 
 




A senior nurse explained the national policy for double checking was unclear as the 
responsibilities of the second checker were not specified. 
 
“Another factor is now, uh, staffing as part... as team, you were talking of 
team.  When staffing is poor, medications that require double checking you 
always have problem with that.  You always have problem with that because 
you will not always get a second person to double check with you and that 
affects ... affects the, you know, medication administration” (N22 
Abdominal Medicine and Surgery) 
 
3.4.4.2. Non availability of test results 
Non availability of test results required for some drugs was stated by some nurses as a 
cause for delay in some directorates. Misreading and misinterpreting the results e.g. 
reading the result of the previous day or looking in the wrong patient’s file was also 
reported by a few nurses. In contrast, some nurses thought that this was not an issue for 
administration errors. Causes for delays in receiving some blood levels were identified 
as not taking the blood samples at the right time, delays in sending the blood samples to 
the central lab, and central lab delay problems. 
 
“We’ve had a lot of incidents with, uhm, drug results availability, things like 
that. Uhm, INRs [International Normalised Ratio] for heparin, uhm, and 
titrating doses, uhm, medication … so like … things like gentamicin and 
vancomycin levels, uhm, being delayed in labs or not being sent by the 
nightshift when they do their bloods” (N26 Perioperative, Critical Care & 
Pain) 
 
3.4.4.3. Medicines which increase the risk of administration incidents 
When nurses were asked about the medicines which may increase the risk of 
administration incidents, different drugs were identified by nurses. However, heparin 
followed by insulin administered as a sliding scale and doses that required blood levels 
before they could be administered were mentioned most often. The interviewees 
explained that the problem with heparin was that there were several protocols for its 
administration which sometimes caused confusion.  
 




“When you’re administering … Uhm, heparin is a massive one on ICU, uh, 
that is administered in different ways to different patients. So, the ability to 
understand the context that you’re using it in for that patient is quite 
significant. So, there are different policies for it protocols for it.” (N21 
Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
Preparing small doses and those doses which required complex calculations, particularly 
those working in paediatric wards, were also stated by some nurses as being associated 
with higher risk of error.  
 
“We have very small patients here, so sometimes the medication doesn't 
come in something that is easily usable for a paediatric patient. So if you 
have to dilute something before you can use it, if you have to give very 
small volumes, then I think they're all things that help to contribute to drug 
errors.” (N2 Children's Services) 
 
Additional uncommon task factors identified by interviewees involved the design of the 
drug chart, and poor prescribing quality. These factors might lead to missing some 
doses or misreading the prescription details and therefore leading to wrong frequency or 
wrong dosage errors. Timing of medicines was another factor and included either those 
doses which are due at busy times (e.g. 8:00 o’clock in the morning) when handover 
take place and therefore became prone to administration delay due to the business of the 
nurse at these times, or those doses which are prescribed outside common times e.g. 
8pm. Doses prescribed outside common times were likely to be omitted because nurses 
automatically go to the drug charts at the times printed in prescription charts which are 
8am, 12pm, 6pm and 10pm. 
 
“I think only thing that comes to mind is the time of day. Uhm. Not talking 
about shifts and such. But uhm a lot of our medication missed-doses happen 
at 2pm. And that's because the ward becomes very busy with visitors. It's the 
middle of the day, and, it's, because our prescription charts state printed 
8am, 12pm, 6pm and 10pm. The nurses automatically go to the drug charts at 
those time.” (E1 Oncology and Haematology) 
 




3.4.5. Patient related factors 
3.4.5.1. Patients’ acuity and clinical condition 
Several patient-specific factors were identified by the interviewees as possible causes of 
MAIs. The complexity of the clinical condition (acuity) of patients was the most 
common factor mentioned. Patients on multiple drugs, as well as confused, unconscious 
patients were also thought to be at higher risk of medication incidents.  
 
Patients on multiple drugs were thought by the interviewees to place more stress on 
nurses and put them under excessive pressure, even if staffing level was adequate.  
Another problem identified by a few of interviewees was drugs charts, which can be 
messy due to the high number of prescribed medicines and sometimes mislead the 
nurse.  
“Sometimes we’ll say that it’s to do with the ‘heaviness’ of the patient so if 
you’re … if you have patients that are on a lot of medications and they’re 
quite unwell and you have 5 patients to see, you’re rushing because you 
know it’s taking you ages to do one… lot of medication for one patient and 
you still have however many else to do. So you’re rushing because your 
patients are ‘heavier’ not just because there’s not enough staff” (N20 
Women's Services) 
 
Additionally, the interviewees explained that confused and unconscious patients were 
usually unresponsive and therefore communication with such patients was difficult. 
This was thought to affect the ability of nurses to carry out some of the required checks 
such as patient’s name and date of birth. 
 
“Great of risk of incidents during preparation … I think all of our patients 
are at risk … by definition of being critically unwell. Uhm, a large 
majority of them are either sedated or in some way either unconscious or 
not … Even if they’re not unconscious, they may be delirious or confused. 
So, in terms of being able to utilize that patient in the checking process 
and asking them questions about their previous allergies, their name; you 
don’t have that facility, so you have to rely on your documentation and 
your name bands” (N21 Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 




“Some other times we have patients who are admitted who have dementia. 
… who cannot even discuss their medication history with you. We also use 
trend of this and we make mistakes sometime.” (N22 Abdominal 
Medicine and Surgery)  
 
In contrast, a few interviewees suggested that nurses would be more conscious and alert 
if they were looking after very sick patients and therefore those patients could be at 
lower risk of errors. 
 
“So if a patient's not very well, I think nurses are a bit more .... hyper-
alert, and in that sense, I think you're probably less likely to make an 
error, because you're very... you know, you're worried about this person, 
and you're questioning everything ... uhm, what should they have and what 
are they not having that they should be, and you know ...” (N11 
Cardiovascular Service) 
 
3.4.5.2. Communication and language barriers 
Language was mentioned as a barrier to communicating with patients by some nurses, 
causing difficulties in obtaining an accurate medication history for some patients, 
noncompliance by other patients sometimes when patients did not understand what 
nurses tried to explain to them about their medications. However, some of the 
interviewees thought that language did not contribute directly to drug errors, especially 
if an accurate drug history had been obtained.  
 
“Yeah, it ...a lot. Uhm, language is an issue. I mean, we have plenty patients 
all the time who don't speak English very well, and some that have a 
minimum level of English.... which can be worse, sometimes because people 
assume they've understood when they haven't, and they say, "Yes," when 
they ... You know, they're embarrassed to, to say” (N11 Cardiovascular 
Service) 
 
“Obviously patients … if there’s a language barrier and English isn’t thier 
first language its sometimes difficult if you’re asking questions about when 
was the last time you took this or how, you know, generally just getting a 




history and how long they’ve been on these tablets and things its difficult” 
(N25 Surgery) 
 
Other communication barriers with patients identified by interviewees involved those 
patients who did not like to declare their own medications to the nurses, and pediatric 
patients who were sometimes too young to communicate with the nurse and provide 
accurate information about their drug history.   
 
“Sometimes there is language problems or sometimes there are 
communication ... either because the child is too small to communicate, they 
don't have the communication skills, or there's a language difficulty in.... 
But The errors that seem to happen there is when they tell you the 
medication is, say they've already been on medication when they come in to 
the hospital, and then it's usually a transcribing problem. So they say that 
they have five milligrams or five mL you know three times a day, whatever 
and actually it's not five mL, it's five milligrams (N2 Children's Services).  
 
3.4.5.3. Other patient related factors 
Other factors related to the patients were reported by some interviewees. These were 
lack of patient’s medication history, patients’ personality, for example agitated or chatty 
patients who interrupt nurses during tasks, and noncompliance of patients with their 
medications. Patients’ noncompliance was either because the patient refused to take the 
medication or forgot to take it. In addition, patients being absent from the ward was 
mentioned as cause for many omissions and delays to administration of medication. 
 
“They may be off the area at the time of the drug, and then the nurse doesn't 
get back to, when they come back because the 12 o'clock round is gone, they 
haven't been there for it, and sometimes they've forgotten it's not until the 
dinner 6 o'clock when they realise actually we should've given it at 1 o'clock 
when he came back and we've forgotten it” (N13 Cardiovascular Service) 
 
“If a child has been transferred over from another hospital sometimes uhm or 
from a ward, trying to work out, uhm because especially other hospitals have 
different uhm paperwork and things, you're trying to work out when they last 




had their medicines, uhm so sometimes that can be a contributing factor. “ 
(N15 Children's Services) 
 
3.4.6. Team factors 
Team factors affecting the risk of administration errors were also discussed and most 
involved communication within the nursing team and with other teams, supervision, and 
less commonly inadequate support. 
 
3.4.6.1. Lack of communication or miscommunication between nurses 
An absence of communication or poor communication between nurses was stated by the 
interviewees as a contributing factor to administration incidents. Causes mainly 
included the absence of documentation on the drug chart to indicate that the dose was 
given or justification for not giving the medication, or lack of documentation of the 
actual time the drug was administered. Inadequate handover was also identified as 
another cause for miscommunication between nurses. 
 
“I think sometimes if somebody is giving something and hasn’t signed for 
it and then you come on the next shift uhm, and you think has this been 
given or hasn’t it uhm, that for sure, definitely.” (N20 Women's Services) 
 
“Yeah and the instruction is not read out or is not handed over to the next 
shift. There is a miscommunication in that.  There is something missing in 
the communication and we go ahead and give the medication.” (N24 
Abdominal Medicine and Surgery) 
 
3.4.6.2. Lack of communication or miscommunication with doctors 
A lack of communication or miscommunication with doctors was identified by the 
interviewees to occur in different ways. The most common cause as stated the 
interviewees was miscommunication that occurred within the drug chart and patient’s 
notes when doctors prescribed something without informing the nurse, or when they 
gave verbal instructions without writing these down. This was identified as common 
practice by many interviewees. Another less common cause identified was the inability 
by a nurse to find the prescribing doctor when needed, poor hand writing and 
misplacing the drug chart by prescribing doctors or other nurses. 




“If the doctor or you know pain team or whoever don’t communicate with 
us and they … they sometimes write things in the notes but they don’t 
verbalise it, if we’re busy we … we can't always check back in the notes. 
So its som- again some things might be missed.” (N25 Surgery) 
 
“One more thing is communication between the doctors and the nurses 
itself. Because when a doctor says that I need to give, prescribed some stat 
medications they don’t say that…they don’t tell us that. They go around, 
see the patient. They prescribe stat medications. They think that we as 
nurses will be there to know that they actually prescribed that. It’s only 
until later when they actually go for the next drug round that they actually 
see that they have prescribed stat medications.”  (N8 Acute Medicine) 
 
3.4.6.3.  Supervision 
Inadequate supervision by senior nurses was reported by some interviewees, especially 
after completing the medicines management assessment test, and also in wards where 
inadequate senior nurses were available. In contrast, other interviewees considered that 
they did receive the supervision that they needed from senior nurses and also from 
practice developing nurses. 
 
“I think we’re in the birth centre, you know…you are very much left to 
do your own work. So, potentially, if you would …if you would You are 
very much left dealing with it and it’s up to you to ask for help and 
support and clarification if you feel you need it” (N9 Women's 
Services) 
 
“We get that a lot especially, uhm, if you’re a junior role with your 
newly qualified then you work with uhm people for period of time, uhm, 
and there’s always at least two senior member staffs on the ward espe… 
on the day shift anyways is to oversee junior member staff and to help 
other team members so I’d say we’re quite supported and supervised. 
Yeah.” (N10 Children's Services) 
 




3.4.7. Personal factors 
Personal factors were mentioned by the interviewees as being influential in 
administration errors. Factors identified included nurse’s fatigue, a lack of knowledge, 
skills and experience of nurses, external issues or stress at home, and nurse’ lack of 
confidence or over confidence when prepare or administer medicines to patients which 
may lead to non-adherence to all checking process. 
 
3.4.7.1. Fatigue 
The majority of interviewees explained that fatigue and tiredness were important 
contributing factors, leading to lose of concentration and then MAIs. Most of the 
interviewees also linked fatigue to night shifts, especially when fatigue is associated 
with inadequate sleep. The interviewees also identified that they become more fatigued 
at the end of long shifts. Many nurses also associated fatigue with hunger. 
 
“Maybe just the tiredness. So I’m like going back to maybe been to having 
four days and if you’re tired that could influence you making a drug error, 
uhm, yeah.” (N10 Children's Services) 
 
“Likewise for night shifts, if you've not had any sleep you get  to the end of 
the night shift, excuse me you going to be a little bit more slack with the 
checking process and with what needs to be done, when and what you 
doing as well, so definitely has a factor.” (N1 Children's Services) 
 
“I think fatigue is a big issue probably in most nursing settings and, you 
know, night shift’s the obvious time to suggest as an issue.” (N21 
Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
3.4.7.2. Lack of knowledge, skills, and experience of nurses 
Limited knowledge and experience about medications among particularly junior and 
bank agencies nurses was well recognised by the interviewees as a contributing factor 
for MAIs. Few of the interviewee extended lack of knowledge back to inadequate 
teaching of pharmacology in the universities. However, many interviewees also linked 
that to the inadequate training and assessment provided by the Trust for nurses 
especially when they join the Trust (i.e. competency test). 




“We’ve got a quite high bank agencies, which is another, uhm, issue, and 
the bank staff usually are our staff are usually the work on 
the…permanently anyway so they get caught with the programs with the 
agency staff for completely separate. And I don't think we’ve got a specific 
sort of training program in place for them before they can come and work 
for the trust, they just turn up, do a shift and then disappear. And you 
know, it could just be one shift and then you’d never see them again.” 
(N26 Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
“I think the newly-qualified nurses, those ... that, that's quite a 
vulnerable ... if that's the right terminology ... They're a quite vulnerable 
group of nurses in terms of making medication errors. Because your 
training's a bit lacking” (N11 Cardiovascular Service) 
 
3.4.7.3. Lack or over confidence of nurses 
The interviewees revealed that both complacency and lack of confidence might 
influence the occurrence of errors because complacent and over confident nurses were 
considered not to take much care when they perform medication tasks which may lead 
to errors. Lack of confidence among junior nurses was also reported as potential 
contributor to errors when they felt embarrassed or scared to ask or seek advice. 
 
“I think a lot of the senior nurses kind of get into the, maybe there’s a bit 
of complacency that, that things are all right and they are doing okay and 
they are not having any problems. Uhm, so they don’t take as much care 
with what they are doing.” (N26 Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
“I think sometimes people get to a point where they’re too embarrassed to 
come and ask and they don’t know where to look for.  So I guess that could 
cause error.” (N17 Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
3.4.7.4. Physical health 
Physical health, tiredness or insufficient sleep, hungry, and sickness were reported by 
interviewees as contributory factors to errors especially when associated with 
inadequate breaks during shifts.  




“You know being tired, hungry, missed your break. They're all factors that 
make you less able to concentrate at particular times but...” (N2 Children's 
Services) 
 
3.4.7.5. Other personal factors 
Other personal factors mentioned by the interviewees in connection with administration 
errors included bad habits during performing medication preparation and administration 
tasks, non-adherence to the preparation and administration process, poor calculation 
skills, unfamiliarity with the task, unfamiliarity with the ward the nurses work in, and 
external issues or stress at home which may affect the nurses’ concentration. 
 
“You could argue that some of the junior staff are more thorough than some 
of the senior staff. Some of the senior staff, I think have slipped to bad 
habits, or perhaps were never taught in a structured methodical way in the 
first place, so they never adhered to what we would expect now.” (N21 
Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
“If you're not familiar with that medication or it's something that, you know, 
is alien to the area that you normally work in, you know, sometimes you get 
patients that are...that have different conditions that get transferred to your 
ward and they have medications that you're not familiar with. I think they 
are factors.” (N2 Children's Services) 
 
3.4.8. Management factors 
The two main organisational factors identified by the interviewees involved inadequate 
training and education provided to the nurses, and lack of feedback to nurses themselves 
about medication errors. 
 
Some interviewees considered that the education and also practical training provided by 
the Trust was inadequate including the training that the nurses undertake for the 
medicines management assessment test and also the continuous training once this has 
been completed. Nurses stated that apart from the medicines management assessment 
and calculation test which was taken when they joined the trust, nurses do not receive 
any sort of further training on medicines. 




 “I think it’s just about training so it’s … people do their medication course 
when they qualify but then there’s no update. So nurses that maybe go off in 
maternity they come back, they forget things. There isn’t generally any other 
training that you do and you obviously do your calculation test at the 
beginning when you first qualify and you don’t do anything after that. So 
sometimes if you’re out of practice or you know you work in a clinical area 
where you’re not administering much medication then you move jobs that’s 
where the mistakes happen.” (N25 Surgery) 
 
“To be honest it’s not really continuous because after you do your book you 
… you do … you do the medications and I know that in other hospitals you 
know they watch you do it and then you have to be signed off, uhm, you have 
be signed off while they watch you do it whereas on here it’s not like that 
you go through the papers and then that’s it. They don’t watch you, uhm, do 
it. They just taught you and then that’s it so, and then after that you do it 
yourself. You don’t really …That definitely can, uhm, yeah contribute to 
drug error.” (N10 Children's Services) 
 
Another organisational factor identified by the interviewees was the lack of feedback 
provided to nurses about medication errors. A number of the interviewees felt that there 
was lack of feedback on reported errors and because of this they did not learn from 
previous errors. However, lack of feedback factor looks ward base factor as some 
interviewees from some wards (e.g. Abdominal, and surgery) mentioned that they 
regularly received such feedback either in the weekly meeting or during handover. 
Senior nurses interviewed from these directorates also explained that they always try to 
deliver information about reported errors to their staff on a regular base. Most of the 
nurses interviewed considered feedback important and felt that more feedback on errors 
would be helpful 
 
“We don't hear much on this ward, but uh, in other wards I've worked on in 
St. Thomas' I know they have uh regular target meetings, and I've attended 
some of these where, uhm, you know the heads of nursing will receive uhm, 
able to receive you know graphs and things that show them exactly the 




incidences and near misses that happened. And I think they're really useful” 
(N14 Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
“We do get emails if there’s been drug errors like things get highlighted to 
try and obviously stop something similar happening again. So I think they’re 
quite good about bringing things to your attention. Uhm, yeah” (N20 
Women's Services) 
 
Another organisational factor, reported less often by the interviews involved lack of 
updates about changes in medicines policies or products, the clarity and applicability of 
some policies and guidelines related to medication administration, and also lack of 
direct communication with people in the management as one of the senior nurses stated: 
. 
“If the management in the organization needs to be approachable and open 
to the staff’s suggestions and you know the staff’s concerns. So if they are not 
listening and they are not open towards the staff, that can increase the risk” 
(N9 Women's Services) 
 
3.4.9. Factors associated with intravenouse medications 
In addition to inadequate training provided by the Trust on IVs including the 
competency test nurses need to do that was mentioned before, two main factors 
associated with IVs doses were identified by the interviewees. One was the complexity 
of the IV preparation. The interviews identified that nurses struggle more with doses 
which required calculations such as paediatric doses, and/or doses which required 
further dilution. Interviewees from the intensive care units also reported that the 
confusion with different routes of administration might also lead to errors.  
 
“The fact that the large majority of our medications are intravenous, so 
you’ve got central lines, Venflons [peripheral IV catheter], and in fact, that 
fact that you’ve got Venflons [peripheral IV catheter] and central lines is, it 
is a potential cause of problems because there are different routes of 
administration for different concentrations of potent drugs.” (N21 
Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 




“I think it’s the preparation of… because you sort of prepare an IV in a 
certain amount of fluids or over a certain amount of time uhm… which isn’t 
the same with oral and NGs because you just give them and they swallow 
them.  Uhm, so, I’d say yeah it’s the preparation, making sure it’s the right 
solution and it ends up at the right concentration.  That would be the ones for 
IV.” (N17 Perioperative, Critical Care & Pain) 
 
Some doses are slightly more complicated uhm in what you have to…uhm 
how much you have to dilute it to, so and what you have to dilute it in and, 
uhm so that can…that can cause error” (N15 Children's Services) 
 
Another factor also discussed during the interviews was the lack of sufficient 
knowledge and training on how to prepare and administer IVs. The interviewees 
explained they had only basic information to help them safely mix and administer 
intravenous medications. Some of the interviewees considered that their intravenous 
drug administration skills were not appropriately assessed when they allowed preparing 
and administering IVs. 
 
“I mean I suppose the IV course you have doesn't really do much with the 




Twenty-five nurses and midwives from one large Trust participated in this qualitative 
interview-based study to describe the perceptions of nurses and midwives regarding the 
contributing factors leading to MAIs in hospitals. The nurses interviewed in this study 
were responsible for preparing and administering medication to patients and were 
selected to represent all Trust directorates at all seniority levels. Although previous 
studies have been conducted on the causes of medication errors, most of these studies 
did not investigate the causes of errors as the main aim, or investigated the causes of 
documented/reported or observed errors, or used self-reported/questionnaires which 
provided limited details about the topic. 
 




The interviews identified a number of recurrent factors reported as contributing to 
incidents. The collected data were divided into seven main themes and factors related to 
the environment, task, patient, team, individual nurses, and management, all of which 
were identified as contributing factors to MAIs. In addition, some factors associated 
with IV doses were also identified. These factors were shown as areas to be addressed.  
 
3.5.1. Work environment factors 
The primary problems mentioned by the interviewees in relation to the work 
environment were heavy workload, interruption and distraction, staffing levels and staff 
skill mix, shift patterns, and physical environment, these have also been also identified 
by other studies.   
 
3.5.1.1. Interruption and distraction 
Interruption and distraction, which were reported by the majority of interviewees, have 
been previously reported in many studies as issues which affect the focus of nurses and 
as contributors to MEs (Pape 2001, Pape et al. 2005, Tang et al. 2007, Brady et al. 
2009). Mayo and Duncan (2004) surveyed American registered nurses (n=983) to 
investigate their perceptions of MEs, and nurses believed that distractions were one of 
the top three causes of medication errors.  
  
Although many studies reported interruption and distraction as main factors for MAEs, 
limited details about the rate, characteristics, and sources of interruptions as well as the 
relationship between interruptions and error in practice were provided (Raban and 
Westbrook 2014). In a review of twenty-three studies of the rate and characteristics of 
interruption in nurses’ work environment and their potential contribution to MAEs, 
Biron et al. (2009) identified interruption rates estimated at 6.7 work interruptions per 
hour during a shift. The review also showed that nurses themselves were the most 
common source of interruptions, though some interruptions resulted from system 
failures such as missing medication. However, nurses in the current study identified that 
patients were a primary source, in addition to other sources reported, such as other 
nurses and other health care professionals. 
 
Most previous studies which reported the contribution of interruption and distraction to 
errors were either qualitative studies or based on secondary analysis of incident reports, 




which may constitute a limitation of underreporting. Furthermore, the interruption 
measures and frequencies were absent in most of the studies. However, a recent 
controlled study using direct observation was performed to determine the impact of 
interruption and distraction on MAEs in hospitals. Westbrook et al. (2010) used a 
sample of 98 Australian nurses preparing and administering 4,271 medications and 
showed a significant association between the rate and severity of MAEs and 
interruptions to nurses during MA. The study revealed that interruptions were present in 
53% of administrations and that each interruption was associated with a 12.7% increase 
in errors. The rate of error increased from 25.3% in administrations with no 
interruptions to 38.9% in administrations with 3 interruptions. The severity of errors 
also increased with increased number of interruptions. Using the same method and a 
sample of 39 participants, Scott-Cawiezell et al. (2007) collected data on both work 
interruptions and rate of MAEs and identified a significant positive relationship between 
interruptions and MAE rate when wrong time errors were excluded (p = 0.01). 
Interestingly, when wrong time errors were included, the relationship was also 
significant but was reversed. 
 
Although several interventions have been employed by different studies to minimise 
interruptions during the preparation and administration of medications and their effect 
on MAE rate, Raban and Westbrook (2014) assessed the effectiveness of these 
interventions on the rates of interruption and medication errors and concluded there was 
limited evidence to support their effectiveness on the rate of MAEs.  
 
In order to limit the effect of interruptions,  their characteristics must be understood; 
therefore, more descriptive studies on interruption during preparation and 
administration of medicines is required to better determine avoidable interruptions. In 
addition, examining how nurses manage interruptions in practice is another strategy 
requiring further investigation (Biron et al. 2009). Thus, further evidence on 
interruption management strategies used by nurses to minimise interruptions is required, 
in addition to controlled randomised or cluster randomised research to better assess the 
effectiveness of any interventions (Raban and Westbrook 2014).   
 




3.5.1.2. Increased workload 
Increased workload was also identified by most of interviewees in the current study as 
an important contributor to MAIs, particularly during the day shifts and at the end of 
night shifts. This is consistent with several studies on causes and contributing factors of 
MAIs which considered workload as one of the most common predictors of MAIs 
(Gladstone 1995, Tang et al. 2007, Cohen and Shastay 2008, Jones and Treiber 2010, 
Gill et al. 2012). Like other studies, our findings also showed that increased workload 
was mostly caused by inadequate staffing which, both in turn are related to 
organisational decisions regarding recruitment, although some interviewees linked this 
to the patient’s acuity and others to the number of patients’ medications rather than 
inadequate staffing.  
 
Tissot et al. (2003) defined nurses’ workload as “the number of patients per nurse” 
(Tissot et al. 2003 p69). The ratio of nurse to patient was commonly used as a measure 
for workload to investigate the relationship between nurses’ workload and patients’ 
outcomes (Aiken et al. 2002). However, this measure has some limitations, and 
workload was found to be multivariable and can be affected by several factors including 
the nurse/patient ratio, acuity of the patients, skill mix of the nurses, and shift pattern 
(Montgomery 2007). Other organisational factors may affect the workload such as cost-
cutting strategies by having fewer staff (Jones and Treiber 2010), which led Reason to 
suggest that workload should be resolved at the organisational level. Taxis and Barber 
(2003) also found that increased workload combined with interruptions and distractions 
led to error in a study of causes of IV administration errors (Taxis and Barber 2003). 
 
Interviewees revealed that workload-related errors included omissions and timing 
errors, which were reported to occur primarily during busy times. This may result from 
the multitasking nature of the nurse’s job and working under pressure to administer 
medicines and perform other tasks besides drug administration at the same time. 
Multitasking during drug preparation and administration is a time-saving activity 
commonly used by nurses to manage workload (Brady et al. 2009). Results from other 
studies showed that workload also contributed to other types of errors. Ozkan et al. 
(2011) identified in their observational study that heavy workload contributed to all 
types of MAEs, particularly errors of wrong timing, while Tang et al. (2007) found that 
because of time pressure caused by workload, nurses were likely to make calculation 




errors. In addition, studies which provided information about the origin of violations 
during medication administration suggested that situational violations by nurses may 
have been caused by high workload of nurses (Keers et al. 2013). A main form of these 
violations was nurse non-compliance with medication administration standards. Tang et 
al. (2007) indicated that the fact of time pressure and increased workload of nurses led 
them to modify the standard protocols of drug administration. In another recent study, 
nurses’ compliance with standards of medication administration practice was found to 
be affected by increased nurse workload or patient acuity (Gill et al. 2012). Gill and 
colleagues found that workload, in addition to other factors, influenced nurses’ 
compliance with the medication administration protocols as well as their compliance 
with the processes of checking and double-checking of medications (Gill et al. 2012). 
This is consistent with the current study, where nurses reported that the causes of 
inappropriate checking or non-compliance with the checking process, specifically with 
double checking, was mainly due to increased workload.  
 
3.5.1.3. Staffing level and skill mix 
The results of our study indicated that a majority of nurses believed that inadequate 
staffing and skill mix contributing to errors. Newly qualified, agency and bank nurses 
increased the workload of other nurses, as those nurses were either unqualified to 
administer medicines particularly IV or unfamiliar with the area and therefore needed to 
be closely supervised. These findings are consistent with other studies which reported 
short staffing and skill mix as a cause of MAIs, and similar to what was mentioned by 
the interviewees in the current study, staffing level and workload were collapsed into 
one factor by many other studies. 
 
There is widespread evidence regarding the impact of nurses’ staffing level and skill 
mix on patient safety outcomes in general, with few studies reporting data about 
medication errors (McGillis Hall et al. 2004, Ball 2010). The publication of the Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN) entitled “Guidance on safe nurse staffing levels in the UK” 
discussed different evidence which showed an association between inadequate nursing 
staffing and patient safety in hospitals. This report concluded that increased levels of 
registered nurse staffing were associated with lower rates of mortality and other adverse 
patient events. Over one year, the NPSA reported more than 30,000 patient safety 
incidents in England and Wales caused by staffing issues due to lack of experienced or 




trained staff, and about 20% of these incidents were associated with harm (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2009).   
 
Staffing level of nurses also has an impact on the rate of MAIs, as decreased nursing 
staff means increased in number of administrations per nurse and therefore increase in 
the possibility of making errors (O'Shea 1999). Poor staffing was found to promote 
errors by producing a busy environment, preventing nurses from administering 
medicines on time or conducting procedures correctly, and diminishing attention to 
detail (Balas et al. 2004, Tang et al. 2007). Furthermore, when short staffing was 
combined with increased patient acuity and heavy workload, it could lead to increased 
levels of stress and fatigue among nurses, further increasing risks to patients (Balas et 
al. 2004).  Studies which examined the impact of nursing staff levels on the rate of MIs 
concluded that the rate of MAEs was decreased by increasing the number and 
experience of nurses. In a research undertaken to evaluate the impact of different nurse 
staffing models on patient outcomes, including medication errors, McGillis Hall et al. 
(2004) concluded that a lower proportion of employed professional nurses was 
associated with higher rate of medication errors occurring in the study units. This is 
consistent with Beyea et al. (2003) data which found that more than 30% of 206 
medication errors were due to increased workloads and inexperienced staff. Using more 
reliable methods, Tissot et al. (2003) used direct observation to collect data on risk 
factors of MAEs and found that the risk of making an error was 2.44 times higher in 
nurses caring for more than 5.2 patients when compared to nurses with fewer than 5.2 
patients.  
 
Skill mix (e.g. the ratio of experienced nurses to inexperienced within nursing staff) has 
previously been found to affect safety of medication administration. Frith et al. (2012) 
examined the relationship between nursing skill mix and medication errors in 11 
hospitals. The study showed a significant relationship between the proportion of 
registered nurses in the team and the occurrence of medication errors, as the proportion 
of ME decreased when the proportion of registered nurses increased and when the 
proportion of licensed practical nurses decreased. 
 
In the UK, Ball and Pike (2009) surveyed nine thousand nurses and identified that more 
than 55% of surveyed nurses reported an increased workload when they provide care. 




Those who felt that they were too busy were working in an environment with an 
average of 9.3 patients per nurse, compared those who reported that their workload was 
not too busy and averaged 6.8 patients (Ball and Pike 2009). The same survey revealed 
that the average patient-to-nurse ratio was 11 during the night and 8 during the day 
shift. NICE guideline for safe staffing for nursing suggested that there is no standard 
ratio of nurse-to-patient for all wards that can ensure safe patient care and that it 
depends on the individual ward’s requirements. However, the guideline determined an 
evidence-based recommendation for safe nurses staffing to meet both nurse and patient 
needs (NICE 2014). 
 
3.5.1.4. Shift patterns 
Shift patterns, specifically night shifts and long shifts (i.e., 12-hour shifts); have also 
been identified as a major factor in the current study. A few nurses pointed to the 
increased frequency of errors during the day shift; however, other studies found that this 
might be because of the increased frequency of administered doses during the day or 
because of the higher rate of detection during the day shift.  
 
Interviewees indicated that the risk of error increase during night shifts and long or 12-
hour shifts when they were physically fatigued and sleepy, especially when associated 
with hunger and not taking adequate breaks. Although working long days is common 
practice for nurses in the study Trust during both day and night shifts, fatigue and 
sleepiness become more of an issue during the night shift because in the study trust, 
night shift nurses have to administer the morning dose of IVs before they leave, which 
is when their level of fatigue and sleepiness are expected to be high. Furthermore, the 
literature showed a significant association between working night shifts and poor or 
inadequate sleep of nurses, which in consequence may lead to both physical and mental 
fatigue among nurses.  Ruggiero (2003) concluded that night-shift nurses had poorer 
quality of sleep compared with day shift nurses, while Geiger-Brown et al. (2012) 
showed that nurses’ sleepiness toward the end of the shift was greater in the nightshift 
than the day shift. The relationship between inadequate sleep and increased level of 
fatigue among nurses due to extended working hours (i.e., 12 hours or more) has been 
demonstrated in previous research, especially if combined with shift rotations, 
inadequate recovery time, or working overtime (Trinkoff et al. 2001, Winwood et al. 
2006, Stimpfel et al. 2012).  




In addition, the association between working hours, fatigue and sleepiness levels of 
nurses and the rate of MAEs has been addressed by previous studies. Rogers et al. 
(2004) revealed that work duration has a significant effect on errors. The risk of making 
errors increased by three time when nurses worked 12.5 hours or more, or more than 40 
hours per week. In another study involving 502 critical care nurses, Scott et al. (2006) 
studied the impact of shift patterns and length of shift on nurses’ vigilance and the 
occurrence of medication errors. The findings of Scott‘s study supported the 
relationship between the extended working hours, decreased nurses’ vigilance and 
increased number of reported errors. They concluded that the likelihood of reporting 
errors increased by double when nurses worked 12.5 hours or more.  
 
As a result, the Joint Commission in 2011 released an alert to all hospitals to pay more 
attention to the risk of fatigue of healthcare professionals caused by long shift and to 
focus their efforts to address this issue. Nine evidence-based actions were recommended 
by the Joint Commission and involved “assessment of off-shift hours and consecutive 
shifts worked, and the inclusion of staff in the design of work schedules to reduce risk 
for fatigue” (Joint Commission 2011 p18). 
 
3.5.2. Task factors 
The most common task factor reported by the nurses was failure in the checking 
processes. Interviewees described inappropriate checking as a common practice, 
particularly when it came to checking allergy status, drug chart updates made by 
doctors, or with doses requiring double checking. Different causes were found to 
contribute to such practice. Nurses’ reliance on their knowledge and experience, as well 
as the complacency of nurses looking after patients for a long period of time, were 
common factors discussed by interviewees. Error-producing conditions that can 
contribute to such practise included workload and short staffing which led nurses to 
perform the medication task under pressure. These findings are consistent with previous 
research. The issues around faulty checking during medication preparation and 
administration were frequently reported (Brady et al. 2009, Keers et al. 2013). However, 
few details were provided about the nature and origins of such practice. In Jones and 
Treiber (2010) study which involved 202 nurses, nurses reported, regardless of other 
factors, that not following the 5 rights was a very important contributing factor to 
medication errors. Using mixed methods, Tang et al. (2007) also found that nurses 




believed “nurses’ personal neglect” was one of the most common contributing factors to 
errors, and that preparing and administrating medicines without rechecking was a major 
condition of such personal neglect, especially with frequent interruptions. Although 
nurses are required to follow standard protocols and policies in order to safely 
administer medicines (Ashton and Iyer 2003), increased workloads and working under 
time pressures caused them to deviate from these protocols as time-saving strategies 
commonly used to manage their workloads, resulting in error-prone situations (Brady et 
al. 2009). The few studies that reported causes behind these violations suggested that 
violations of MA policies may arise from increased workload, familiarity with the drug 
or patient, and staff relationships (increased level of trust between nurses), particularly 
in cases of double checking. 
 
Unclear or incomplete prescriptions were also reported as a factor related to the task and 
leading to a communication failure between nurses and doctors. This factor can be 
directly linked to other factors reported by some interviewees, such as the design of the 
drug chart. Small spaces provided in the drug chart, overwriting when the prescriber 
changed the prescription, and prescribing in the wrong place on the drug charts were all 
reported. Regardless of prescribing errors, poor written communication between nurses 
and doctors, including poor prescribing (mainly illegible, unclear, or incomplete 
prescription), have been identified by many researches as a widespread problem and 
common contributing factor for MAEs. In Gladstone’s study, poor prescribing, 
including poor handwriting, was identified by nurses as a significant factor in MAEs 
(Gladstone 1995). According to a survey-based study conducted by Jones and Treiber 
(2010) and involving 202 nurses, illegible or unclear handwriting in the prescriptions 
was rated by 86% of nurses as a very important factor to medication errors. This led 
various institutions such as the British Medical Association and Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society 2001 to release guidelines for written prescriptions. Therefore, the prominent 
impact of poor quality of prescriptions indicates that quality of medication 
administration also depends on the performance of other healthcare professionals (Keers 
et al. 2013). 
 
3.5.3. Team factors 
In line with most previous studies, communication problems within the nursing team 
and with doctors were frequently raised by participants in this study as common 




contributing factors to errors (Taxis and Barber 2003, Balas et al. 2004, Nichols et al. 
2008). In both cases, most miscommunications occurred within the drug chart and led to 
frequent omissions and late administrations. In the case of nursing team, such errors 
were partly related to lack of or incomplete documentation in the drug chart when 
administering the medicine or when intentionally omitted, although a few nurses 
reported miscommunication (that is, not delivering complete information about the 
patients) between teams during the handover as well. In the case of miscommunication 
with doctors, the main issue participants raised was also related to the drug chart and 
involved doctors inappropriately prescribing or forgetting to notify nurses about 
updates.  
 
One of the most important issues that emerged from different studies on medication 
safety was the need for effective communication between multidisciplinary teams, as 
many studies showed that miscommunication between multi-disciplinary staff may 
negatively affect patient safety and contribute to medication errors (McBride-Henry and 
Foureur 2007). Therefore, the strategies and interventions to improve medication safety 
should take into consideration improving the communication within the team and with 
multi-disciplinary teams. This may include structured communication tools. In the study 
trust, electronic administration has been introduced, and such system may play a role in 
improving communication problems recurring within paper-based drug charts. 
Furthermore, adherence to good practices of prescribing can play an essential role in 
avoiding prescribing and administration errors. Good or bad communications between 
healthcare professionals were found to contribute to both aetiology and prevention of 
MEs (Balas et al. 2004).  
 
3.5.4. Patient-related factors 
Different patient-related factors were reported. Respondents believed that patients with 
complex clinical conditions were at higher risk of MAIs due to either their ability to 
deteriorate quickly or because of the number of medications prescribed for them. 
Similar results were reported by many other researchers such as Tang et al. (2007) who 
indicated that patients with poor clinical condition commonly experienced errors during 
medication administration. Previous studies showed that patient acuity affected MAIs, 
either because of the complexity of those patients’ prescriptions (Benner et al. 2002, 
Tang et al. 2007) or because of the extra load on nurses, usually added because of the 




extensive care that they required or the high number of medications to be administered 
(Jones and Treiber 2010). Some research has associated patient acuity with increased 
frequency of interruptions and distractions, inadequate staffing levels, high workloads, 
and high levels of fatigue of nurses (Reason 2000, Balas et al. 2004, Keers et al. 2013). 
In the current study, nurses also stated the issue of misreading the drug chart of those 
patients because of the increased number of prescribed medicines, something which has 
not been discussed by other studies.  
 
Confused and unconscious patients who are unable to communicate were also 
mentioned by many nurses in the current study as high risk patients. However, this was 
rarely uncovered by studies which focused on causes and contributing factors of MAEs, 
which means that further investigations of the risk of MEs on those groups of patients is 
necessary. 
 
Our research, like others, indicated that patient behaviour and personality can also lead 
to errors during the medication administration process, usually due to non-cooperation 
(Hand and Barber 2000, Taxis and Barber 2003), non-compliance (Kim et al. 2011), or 
interrupting the nurses. In these cases, omissions and wrong timing errors are most 
common.  
 
3.5.5. Personal factors 
Inadequate knowledge, experience, and skills, such as mathematical skills of nurses, 
especially junior and bank agency nurses who may have limited experience, were 
reported during the interviews to contribute to errors during medication preparation and 
administration. This factor was recognised by many studies as a high-ranking 
contributing factor of MAEs (Gladstone 1995, Taxis and Barber 2004, Nichols et al. 
2008, Chua et al. 2009) and was found by other studies which have used human error 
theory to have a strong link to nurses’ knowledge and rule-based mistakes (Keers et al. 
2013). Tang et al. (2007) found that around one third of nurses related their errors to 
being new and having limited experience. In errors associated with IV doses, Taxis and 
Barber (2003) observed nurses (n=113) preparing and administering IVs in two UK 
hospitals and showed that lack of knowledge and experiences of nurses caused 79% of 
observed errors.  
 




Nurses’ lack of knowledge often includes knowledge about the drug, disease, protocols 
and procedures of medication administration, and also their unfamiliarity with the area 
and equipment used. Some research extended the insufficient knowledge of nurses to 
universities’ curricula and teaching of clinical pharmacology. Results from several 
studies around nurses’ education showed a lack of adequate pharmacological knowledge 
among nurses, combined with insufficient continuing education from the hospitals 
(Brady et al. 2009).  
 
Nurses’ lack of experience was related to being new and to the low level of nurses’ 
practical experience. According to Jones and Treiber (2010), nurses reported that errors 
mainly occurred at early stages of their nursing career. Reason (1995) stated that errors 
caused by inadequate individual knowledge can be limited by increase training. 
Moreover, several studies recommended extended training, especially for new staff, to 
strength the system and overcome the impact of nurses’ lack of knowledge on 
medication administration safety (Prot et al. 2005, Tang et al. 2007, Brady et al. 2009, 
Ozkan et al. 2011). Therefore, overcoming inadequate training and lack of knowledge 
was considered an organisational or institutional responsibility and not only an 
individual factor (Ozkan et al. 2011). In the current study, nurses also highlighted the 
need for training and put the responsibility of their training on Trust management, 
further, they believed that training and education provided by the Trust was insufficient 
to administer medicines safely. This was further emphasised when interviewees talked 
about the continuous training provided to them and when they mentioned the 
inappropriate assessment of their intravenous drug administration skills. Thus, the factor 
of inadequate knowledge and experience of nurses suggests that providing adequate 
training, particularly for new nurses, by extending their training period can be a key way 
to meet nurses’ needs and minimise MAIs.  
 
Another element of nurses’ individual knowledge and skills reported to be a common 
cause of MAEs is nurses’ calculation skills. Despite nurses’ calculation skills being 
considered a key nursing competency (Nursing Midwifery Council 2012), Wright 
(2007) and Fleming et al. (2014) identified a considerable insufficiency in both 
conceptual and mathematical skills among nurses which may affect their ability to 
calculate medicines doses accurately in the practice. In a recent UK-based study, 92% 
of student nurses and 89% of registered nurses failed the medicine calculation test 




(McMullan et al. 2010). This led the researchers to recommend further education on 
“mathematical and conceptual drug calculation skills” (Fleming et al. 2014p 60) as a 
part of medication education in the nursing curriculum and continuous education 
programmes (McMullan et al. 2010, Fleming et al. 2014).  
 
In terms of the role of nurses’ calculation skills on medication errors, several previous 
studies reported nurses’ poor calculation skills as one of the factors contributing to 
errors (Gladstone 1995, Deans 2005, Chua et al. 2009). However, a literature review 
conducted by Wright (2010) to identify whether there is a relationship between 
medication errors and nurses’ poor calculation skills showed insufficient evidence to 
suggest this relationship between nurses’ calculation skills and rate of medication 
errors, which suggests the need for further research on the calculation errors in practice, 
particularly among paediatric nurses. An explanation for this might be the use of 
technology, such as intravenous pumps with electronic drip-rate counters, which may 
contribute to reduced use of nurses’ calculation skills (McMullan et al. 2010). 
 
In this study, the few interviewees who identified poor nurses’ calculation skills as a 
potential factor to MAIs, suggested that this factor become more influential when 
preparing small doses for paediatrics which may require complex calculations. This is 
similar to other research which found the likelihood of making errors due to inaccurate 
calculations of dosage was found to be more significant in paediatric doses which may 
be prepared in small amounts and require complex calculations (Brady et al. 2009, 
Ozkan et al. 2011). 
 
3.5.6. Contributing factors associated with IV errors 
The study results have shown that both individual and organisational factors can 
contribute to IV drug errors. The main issues identified included inadequate training, 
the complexity of some IV preparations, and the confusion with different routes of 
administration among ICU nurses. The complexity of some IV preparations, which 
require complex calculations such as paediatric doses, have been recognised as 
contributing to errors of inaccurate dose preparations and setting the wrong infusion 
rate. Our results confirmed previous studies’ findings in terms of nurses’ lack of 
training in preparing and administering IV medicines, although only limited studies 
specifically investigated the causes and contributing factors of errors in IV medicine 




preparation and administration (Taxis and Barber 2003, Taxis and Barber 2004). 
Interviewees placed the responsibility of their training inadequacy and inappropriate 
assessment on the regulators and believed that the Trust needs to reassess the training 
approach provided to nurses before and after competency. Taxis and Barber (2003) 
added that pharmacists in wards can play an important role in recognising and 
addressing the training needs of nurses. 
 
Previous research also identified the presentation of ampoules and the complex design 
of some equipment such as infusion pumps as factors related to manufacturers; 
however, such factors were not recognised by any of our participants. Several attempts 
were suggested to reduce errors in IV preparation, and one of them was to centralise IV 
preparations, but no significant evidence was identified for success of this initiative 
(Taxis and Barber 2003).  
 
3.5.7. Type of ward in relation to factors contributing to medication 
incidents 
In general, there was no indication of influence from the area in which nurses worked 
on the factors reported to contribute to MAIs, and nurses agreed on the general themes 
that emerged from the interviews. Nurses from intensive care units reported that 
interruptions and distractions were more problematic from colleagues than patients, as 
patients in ICUs are mostly unconscious, although unconscious patients were reported 
to be at higher risk of errors because of their inability to communicate.  
 
When discussing their workloads, nurses working in ICU linked their heavy workload 
to patient acuity rather staffing levels as nurses from other directorates did. This may be 
because of the low nurse-patient ratio in ICU compared to other wards, as each nurse in 
ICUs is responsible to just one patient while the ratio in other wards may reach six or 
seven.  
 
Finally, when nurses discussed the feedback provided to them about MIs that occurred, 
this also seemed to differ from ward to ward; for example, nurses from Abdominal, and 
surgery directorates did not consider this as a factor and mentioned that they were 
receiving regular feedback from ward management, while interviewees from other 
directorates considered learning from reported errors is limited because of absence of 




feedback. This may be because senior nurses and ward managers in areas such as 
Abdominal, and surgery directorates were more proactive in providing their staff with 
such information about reported errors on a regular base. However, almost all nurses 
interviewed believed that receiving feedback is important and that more feedback on 
errors would be helpful. 
 
3.5.8. Limitations of the study 
A few limitations were identified in this study. As with all qualitative interview-based 
studies, the small sample size may limit the extent of our results. However, because no 
new themes emerged in the final interviews, the sample size might be sufficient for the 
purpose of this study. In addition, there are significant similarities between the findings 
of our study and earlier ones on that used either qualitative methods or different 
methodologies to report on factors contributing to MAEs. 
 
The study’s second limitation was that it was conducted in only one trust. Therefore, 
nurses’ views may be limited to the study site and may not be generalisable to other 
sites. However, as many participants had previously worked in other hospitals, they may 
have provided diverse views that minimise this limitation. 
 
Another limitation is that nurses’ views may reflect the ward or directorate in which 
they work and may not apply to other areas. However, the study sample involved nurses 
from a wide range of departments, grades, and levels of experience, thus these 
variations reflect the diversity of nurses’ and midwives’ backgrounds. Furthermore, the 
views and opinions discussed by interviewees were not influenced by the area the 
nurses lived in nor their years of experience or grades. The nurses were in general 
agreement about the main factors that contributed to MAEs.  
 
Another potential limitation of the study is that some interviewees were nurse managers 
and therefore subject to desirability bias (i.e., “participants tendency to present a 
favourable image of themselves”) (Van de Mortel 2008 p102). Such bias may lead to a 
modified response about MAIs in their areas because these nurses were in the position 
of responsibility and therefore tended to talk positively about their wards’ environments 
and staff. Staff nurses as well might have tried to speak positively when the discussion 
was about their individual or personal factors. However, we believe that this had a 




limited influence as participants were informed about the benefits of such research in 
improving medication safety and they were encouraged to suggest suitable solutions. 
This helped nurses to feel more comfortable when discussing this sensitive topic. In 
addition, many personal issues that contributed to errors, such as inadequate levels of 
knowledge and training, were volunteered by the interviewees themselves. 
 
3.5.9. Further work 
As this study and published literature indicated that the causes and contributing factors 
are interrelated, further studies are recommended to explore the nature and role of each 
factor leading to MAIs and to provide better understanding of how these factors are 
related. Future research should also focus on set interventions which could result in 
significant and long-lasting improvements in medication safety. 
 
Interruption and distractions were the most common contributors to MAIs. They have 
been reported in almost all studies that investigated the causes of MAEs. However, 
limited information is available about interruption and distractions aetiology and 
sources  and whether they combines with other factors such as workload and staffing 
levels. Thus, more research is needed to discover the role of this factor in MAIs’ 
causation.  
 
Many interviewees in this study acknowledged the problem of miscommunication 
between nurses, particularly poor documentation on drug charts, that contributed to 
omissions and delays in administrations. Errors due to miscommunication included 
documentation errors in which it was unclear when a dose had been given or whether a 
dose had been given at all. If medicine had not been administered to a patient, 
documentation sometimes did not specify the reasons why. Documentation problems 
perhaps could be improved by introducing an electronic administration system, which 
had already been activated in some areas of the study trust. Further studies should  
assess whether an electronic administration system  improves the rate of documentation 
errors and reduce omissions and wrong timing errors.  
 
Another factor in MAIs identified in this study and others was low staffing levels and 
skill mix especially in areas with a high number of bank or agencies’ nurses. Such 
nurses may have insufficient training; some may not be permitted to prepare and 




administer IVs. Several studies demonstrated the negative influence of nurses’ workload 
and staffing levels on medication safety. These studies also showed that an increased 
level of staffing, particularly of experienced staff, was associated with better patient 
outcomes and reduced medication errors. However, only a few American and Canadian 
studies identified a relationship between the proportion of registered nurses and 
medication errors using secondary data analysis. Therefore, staffing levels needs to be 
taken into consideration by nurses’ managers and institutional management. Further 
research with more robust methods is needed to investigate whether there is an optimum 
staffing level for different wards, taking into consideration the patients’ factors (i.e., 
acuity and dependency) and shift patterns. Further work is also needed to quantify the 
relationship between the proportion of registered nurses (experienced nurses) within a 
team and the rate of medication administration errors. Patients' nursing care needs also 
must be factored into that relationship.  
 
Interviewees in this study identified the lack of adequate training and assessment 
provided by the Trust as an issue. For example, nurses reported a need for more training 
in the practical side of IV preparation and administration, which led them to learn from 
each other. However, nurses may learn bad practices from each other, such as deviation 
from guidelines which may become accepted (Taxis and Barber 2003). Therefore, 
ensuring that nurses receive the training they need is essential, by extending the training 
provided to them particularly for new nurses. Improving nurses’ knowledge and skills 
would enhance patient safety and reduce risks. This can be achieved by reassessing the 
competency test that nurses undergo before they are allowed to administer medicines. 
Continuouse education programs for nurses should also be considered to ensure that 
nurses’ knowledge of medicines is up to date. A senior nurse interviewed also 
emphasised the importance of re-assessing nurses’ competency for administering IV 
doses at regular intervals to ensure their eligibility to do medication tasks. Further work 
is needed to evaluate the training approaches set in the Trust and measure their impact 
on nurses’ knowledge and skills.  
 
Nurses indicated that they are more likely to make errors due to fatigue and sleepiness 
particularly during night and long shifts. As long shifts are common practice in many 
organisations and in the study trust, assessing the impact of fatigue and sleepiness 
during long shifts on the rate of MAEs is essential to evaluate the risk  to benefit 




balance of such practice. Although some studies addressed this association, to date most 
of these studies relied on reported errors, or questionnaires to nurses. There is as yet no 
quantitative research that investigated this relationship in the form of observational 
studies. Observational studies are considered the gold method for gathering data about 
MAEs. Therefore, further work using direct observation is needed to better assess the 
effect of nurses’ fatigue and sleepiness during long hours of nurses on MAEs. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
Medication preparation and administration are frequent, high-risk tasks in the nursing 
profession. The literature showed that medication errors during the administration stage 
were common. The objectives of the semi-structured interviews in this study were to 
identify what nurses believed about the causes and contributing factors of MAIs and 
how those factors could be reduced. Such research was not available in the study Trust 
before conducting this study. The study results revealed that MAIs have multiple causes 
and interrelated factors that can contribute to errors. The contributing factors of MAIs 
can be personal, managerial or organisational factors. Therefore, both organisations and 
individual nurses share responsibility to ensure safe medication administration to 
patients. Identified factors concerned the work environment (e.g., heavy workload, 
insufficient staffing, interruptions and distractions, and shift patterns), the task of 
medication preparation and administration (mainly prescribing quality, and 
inappropriate checking), patients (acuity of conditions, patients’ personalities, 
communication and language barriers), individual nurses (lack of knowledge, 
unfamiliarity with the area or medications, and physical health problems such as fatigue 
and sleepiness), problems within teams (mainly lack of communication or 
miscommunication between nurses or with doctors, supervision, lack of or over-
confidence of nurses), and institutional factors (insufficient staff training, lack of 
feedback about medication errors). This study confirmed the main factors identified 
earlier in the literature. To improve the safety of medication administration, the 
identified issues need to be addressed. Future research should investigate the nature and 
contribution of each of the emerging factors to help prioritise the efforts to reduce MAI 
rates. The most important contributors need to be determined as well as which 
interventions may result in long-lasting improvements in medication safety.










Chapter 4. The Impact of Nurses’ Fatigue 
and Sleepiness on Intravenous Preparation 
and Administration 
  




4.1. Introduction  
4.1.1. Background 
Increased PSIs and worker injuries have been recognised as serious challenge within the 
healthcare organisations (Kohn et al. 2000, Treanor 2000). Nurses are strongly 
associated with the quality and safety of healthcare because of their role in providing 
direct patient care (Tourangeau et al. 2006). Furthermore, nurses are more commonly 
exposed to occupational injuries and illnesses compared with other healthcare workers 
(Smedley et al. 1997, Trinkoff et al. 2002). The specific critical causes and contributing 
factors leading to safety incidents and decreased performance may vary within different 
healthcare domains (Barker and Nussbaum 2011). However, studies of the factors 
contributing to medication errors identified many factors linked to work conditions. 
Among these were shift patterns, heavy workloads, frequent interruptions, and low 
staffing levels (Armitage and Knapman 2003, Brady et al. 2009). The working hours of 
nurses were considered by the IOM as a potential risk to patient safety. The IOM 
specifically commented on the potential impact of fatigue that may cause reduced 
attention to detail, slow reaction times, omission errors, decreased energy, and lack of 
motivation (Child et al. 2004) . 
 
4.1.2. Working conditions 
Providing 24-hour nursing care inevitably requires nurses to work different shift 
patterns including “long days” or 12-hour shifts (Newey and Hood 2004, Lorenz 2008). 
Long shifts have become common practice across different industries including 
healthcare organisations (Ball and Pike 2009, UNISON 2015). However, there are 
concerns about the impact of long  shifts on nurses’ fatigue, stress, performance, and on 
patient safety (Ball et al. 2015). Traditionally, daily shift patterns consisted of three 
eight-hour shifts (Estabrooks et al. 2009). However, over the past 20 years, working 
pattern have altered in preference to the 12-hour shift. Long-hour shifts are currently 
widely used in UK nursing practices with many hospitals adopting  long-hour shifts as 
the primary pattern (Ball et al. 2015).  
 
The main advantages of long shifts are based on cost effectiveness in providing 24-hour 
care, and the ability to provide a greater continuity of staffing and patient care 
(Estabrooks et al. 2009). Long shifts also enable staff to have more off time and has 




been shown to increase job satisfaction (Trinkoff et al. (2006). Jones and Brown (1986) 
surveyed a sample of 15 North Carolina hospitals to evaluate the objectives of 12-hour 
shifts. The objectives identified included: increase continuity of patient care, increased 
staff cohesiveness, reduced rate of absenteeism, additional off days for nurses, and 
reduction in the number of staff and recruitment costs for the hospitals. The perception 
of nurses regarding 12-hour shifts was elicited by McGettrick and O'Neill (2006), who 
surveyed 80 critical care nurses in a large NHS hospital. Nurses identified the continuity 
of care in 12-hour shifts and the opportunity to plan care enhanced patient care. Job 
satisfaction, and increase off-duty time were other advantages if the shifts were well 
managed. In contrast, fatigue and feelings of tiredness were the most negative responses 
from nurses. Josten et al. (2003) investigated the advantages of extended work shifts 
among 134 nurses working in three nursing homes in the Netherlands. A questionnaire, 
was used to evaluate the fatigue, performance, and satisfaction of nurses. They reported 
that they preferred long shifts as they could work fewer shifts and had more off-duty 
days. Nurses also commented  that extended shifts were associated with higher fatigue 
levels at the end of the shifts as well as higher need for recovery between shifts (Josten 
et al. 2003). 
 
Concerns have increased about the potential risks of long shifts on the quality of patient 
care and safety (Stimpfel and Aiken 2013). Therefore, some employers have questioned 
the benefits of such extended hours (12 hours) rather than eight-hour shifts (Geiger-
Brown and Trinkoff 2010).  
 
4.1.3. Prevalence of 12-hour shifts  
Several studies explored the prevalence of working 12-hour shifts among nurses. A 
survey-based study by Ball and Pike (2009) found that 41% of NHS hospital and 63% 
of care home nurses regularly worked 12-hour shifts. A UK,  survey by UNISON 
(2015) showed that the number of nurses working long shifts increased from 2013, with 
around one-third (32%) of nurses worked a long day in 2015 compared with 18% in 
2013. The survey also revealed that around half (47%) of respondents worked a shift 
that was already contracted to last for 10 hours or more. Of those shifts, 26% were 
scheduled to last 12 hours or more. 
 




In the US, Trinkoff et al. (2006) surveyed 2,273 nurses about their work schedule and 
hours worked per day and per week. The study found that 19% of hospital nurses were 
working more than 12 hours per day. This percentage was even greater in adult critical 
care units (36%), paediatric critical care units (27%), and emergency departments 
(26%). A-third of nurses worked more than 40 hours per week. Of all nurses, those in 
hospitals were most likely to work long shifts but less likely to work more than five 
days per week. In another US study by Stimpfel and Aiken (2013), 65% (1, 4370) of 
nurses reported they regularly work 12-13 consecutive hours per shift. Kalisch and Lee 
(2013) found that among the 3,769 nurses from 95 units within six hospitals surveyed, 
59% (2230) worked 12-hour shifts, 30.5% (1150) worked 8 hours, 4.3% (163) worked 
10 hours, and 5.1% (191) worked rotating shifts. 
 
Across Europe, considerable differences have been noted. A European cross-sectional 
study of 31,627 nurses from 2,170 general medical and surgical units in 487 hospitals 
was undertaken by Griffiths et al. (2014). This study found that 50% (15,930) were 
working less than eight-hour shifts, 30% (9,963) worked 8-10 hour shifts, and only 
14%(4,314) worked 12-13 hour shifts. This pattern is different from that in the UK, 
Ireland and Poland, where 12-hour shifts were common. 
 
4.1.4. Impact of long shifts on nurses and patient outcomes 
Several studies examined the outcomes associated with long shifts, including nurses’ 
fatigue, stress and burnout, job/career satisfaction, occupational injuries, and 
performance. As shift work is common practice in many industries, fatigue associated 
with working long shifts has been linked with disasters such as the Three Mile Island  
and Chernobyl nuclear plant accidents, and the grounding of the Exxon Valdez oil 
tanker (Ball et al. 2015). A systematic review by Smith et al. (1998) compared 8-hour 
and 12-hour shifts across a range of industries. The review concluded that working long 
shifts (12 hours) was associated with increased fatigue levels compared to shorter shifts 
(8 hours). However, longer shifts improved job performance. Among healthcare 
professionals, fatigue levels were found to increase over the shift period. Extended 
shifts (9-12 hours) were found to a risk of accumulation of fatigue (Poissonnet and 
Veron 2000). Geiger-Brown and Trinkoff (2010) reviewed nursing practice studies and 
concluded that 12-hour shifts were associated with increased fatigue, drowsy driving, 
and sleep deprivation compared to shorter shifts. In another study of 134 nurses who 




completed self-rating questionnaires on fatigue, satisfaction, health, and quality of care 
they provide, Josten and colleagues (2003) linked extended nurses’ shifts of nine hours 
with increased levels of nurses’ fatigue, and more health problems. A decrease in the 
quality of care nurses provided compared to 8-hour shift was also identified (Josten et 
al. 2003). Furthermore, Trinkoff et al. (2001) noted increased levels of fatigue among 
nurses working long shifts because of excessive exposure to both physical and mental 
demands, especially if long shifts were followed by inadequate recovery time.   
 
One of the concepts linked to fatigue and shifts schedules is the need for recovery from 
fatigue caused by work. Increased daily and weekly working hours usually means that 
greater recovery from work is needed. Workers were found to need more time for 
recovery when they worked long hours, night shifts, or work overtime (Jansen et al. 
2003, Winwood et al. 2006). Long and irregular work shifts such as weekends or those 
requiring overtime and/or rotation worked by nurses were associated with adverse 
effects and reduced recovery time between shifts. The impact of these shifts increases if 
nurses do not get enough sleep between shifts (Winwood et al. 2006).  
 
In a survey-based study involving 22,275 nurses from 557 US hospitals, Stimpfel et al. 
(2012) showed that nurses working ten hours or more were two-and-half times more 
likely to suffer from burnout and job dissatisfaction compared to those working shorter 
shifts. Furthermore, patient dissatisfaction, assessed using a survey about their 
experience during their hospital stay, coincided with the increase in the percentage of 
nurses working thirteen hours or more per shift. Another study by Stimpfel and Aiken 
(2013) revealed that during 12-hours or longer shifts, nurses were significantly more 
likely to report poor quality of care and poor patient safety compared with eight-hour 
shifts.  
 
Fatigue is one factors specifically linked to stress, decreased performance and safety in 
different work environments (Winwood et al. 2006, Barker and Nussbaum 2011). 
Within the nursing profession, fatigue was found to be a factor in nurses’ injuries, 
adverse health consequences, and work dissatisfaction (Josten et al. 2003, Geiger-
Brown et al. 2004). Nurse fatigue has also be linked to absenteeism (Rogers et al. 2004), 
decreased performance (Barker and Nussbaum 2011), and reduced patient safety 
(Rogers et al. 2004, Barker and Nussbaum 2011). Moreover, increased working hours 




and fatigue were found to be potential contributing factors for occupational injuries 
(Dembe et al. 2005). When combined with work-related stress, fatigue was found by 
Trinkoff et al. (2002) and Smith et al. (2003) to be associated with disorders of the neck, 
shoulders, and knee musculoskeletal and back pain among nurses. Studies have 
demonstrated that increased fatigue and sleepiness levels among nurses were associated 
with reduced reaction times, lapses, reduced motivation, and reduced energy which 
contributed to errors and omissions made by nurses during tasks (Rogers et al. 2004, 
Carroll 2005, Scott et al. 2006). 
 
Following these studies, the IOM recommended that nurses should not work more than 
12 consecutive hours per shift and not more than 60 hours per week (Trinkoff et al. 
2006). In 2011 the Joint Commission issued an alert to all hospitals to focus more 
efforts on managing the risk of fatigue caused by long shifts. The Joint Commission 
recommended that in order for hospitals to reduce the risk of fatigue among healthcare 
professionals, they should regularly assess the off-shift hours as well as consecutive 
shifts worked (Joint Commission 2011). In addition, to ensure the safety of both the 
nurse and patient, the American Nurses Association (ANA) recommended that 
individual nurse should be provided with:  
 
“A work schedule that provides for adequate rest and recuperation between scheduled 
work; and sufficient compensation and appropriate staffing systems that foster a safe 
and healthful environment in which the registered nurse does not feel compelled to seek 
supplemental income through overtime, extra shifts, and other practices that contribute 
to worker fatigue” (American Nurses Association 2008, p 1). 
 
At the same time, the ANA recommended that: 
 
 “regardless of the number of hours worked, each registered nurse has an ethical 
responsibility to carefully consider his/her level of fatigue when deciding whether to 
accept any assignment extending beyond the regularly scheduled work day or week, 
including a mandatory or volunteer overtime assignment” (American Nurses 
Association 2008, p 1) 
 




4.1.5. Fatigue and sleepiness among nurses 
Fatigue has been described as a: 
 
 “multicausal, multidimensional, nonspecific, and subjective phenomenon which results 
from prolonged activity and psychological, socioeconomic, and environmental factors 
that affect both the mind and the body” (Tiesinga et al. 1996, p 64).  
 
Occupational fatigue was frequently described as acute fatigue, although many 
definitions of occupational fatigue do not distinguish between chronic and acute fatigue 
(Winwood et al. 2005). Nurses perceived higher levels of acute fatigue than chronic 
fatigue (Winwood et al. 2006). However frequent exposure to acute fatigue caused by 
long shifts with insufficient recovery time means nurses are likely to suffer from 
chronic fatigue (Josten et al. 2003, Winwood et al. 2006). Therefore, both acute and 
chronic fatigue should be considered when quantifying levels of fatigue within a 
nursing population (Barker and Nussbaum 2011).  
 
Previous studies have suggested that fatigue is multifactorial and that different 
biological, psychological, and social factors can contribute to fatigue. Biological factors, 
e.g. sleepiness, and psychological factors e.g. anxiety and depression, in addition to 
other demographic and work-related factors, e.g. gender and shift work, were found to 
have an influence on fatigue levels (Ruggiero 2003). Ruggiero (2003) examined the 
contribution of depression, sleep quality, and anxiety to levels of chronic fatigue among 
ICU nurses. The study revealed that poor sleep quality and depression significantly 
contributed to chronic fatigue. Sleep disturbances and depression were most common 
among night shift nurses compared with nurses working day shifts. 
 
In a study of fatigue prevalence among general shift workers in the Netherlands, Jansen 
et al. (2003) used self-reported questionnaires administered to 12,095 workers. The 
study found that around 20% of shift workers suffered from fatigue. While in nursing, 
Kunert et al. (2007) examined the sleepiness and fatigue level among 2,025 nurses using 
two validated scales. The study identified that both fatigue and sleepiness were common 
in nurses working both day and night-shifts. However, nurses working night-shift 
reported higher fatigue levels and poorer sleep quality than nurses undertaking day-
shift.. This study suggested that implementing interventions to enhance sleep quality 




and reduce fatigue is essential for nurses to provide safe and competent patient care. An 
Australian study involving 23 registered nurses used self-reported logbooks to collect 
error data and information about their symptoms of sleepiness. Nurses reported 22 
errors and reported that they were struggling to keep awake during one-third of shifts 
worked (Dorrian et al. 2006). 
 
An online survey of 745 US registered nurses using several fatigue scales was 
conducted by Barker and Nussbaum (2011). This study evaluated the perceived levels 
of fatigue dimensions (mental, physical and total fatigue, together with acute and 
chronic) among registered nurses and examined the relationships between these 
different dimensions and nurse performance. Nurses reported increased levels of mental, 
physical and total fatigue. The OFER scale, which measures acute and chronic fatigue, 
showed that the nurses perceived significantly higher levels of acute fatigue than 
chronic fatigue. Different factors were associated with chronic fatigue. These included: 
sleep hours per night, total hours worked every week and type of shift worked. Acute 
fatigue was significantly associated with hours of sleep per night, shift length and work 
schedules (Barker and Nussbaum 2011). 
 
4.1.6. Long shifts and patient safety 
The impact of long hours on the incidence of medical errors was studied among 
residents (Landrigan et al. 2004). Residents were assigned to work either traditional 
shift lengths or shorter shifts. The study concluded that residents assigned traditional 
shifts made 36% more errors than interns who worked shorter shifts. Among nurses, 
long working hours was considered a risk to patient safety. The evidence report 
summaries of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) considered 
there was sufficient evidence to conclude that some working conditions affected the 
occurrence of medical errors. These working conditions involved workforce staffing,  
e.g. the workload allocated to staff, skills and training required, level of experience, and 
impact of work schedules (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2003). The 
AHRQ also conducted a comprehensive review to evaluate how nursing staffing and 
nurses’ working hours affected hospital patient outcomes. This review concluded that 
increased nurses’ working hours per patient day was associated with reduced patients’ 
mortality, morbidity, and occurrence of AEs. The study also identified the need to 
assess the impact of work hours on patient safety (Kane et al. 2007) .   




Few studies have assessed the impact of nurses’ shift lengths on medication safety. 
Rogers (2004), used 14-day logbooks completed by nurse to collect data on time, and 
length of shifts worked together with a full description of any errors and near errors that 
occurred during their shifts. The study involved a sample of 393 nurses who were 
generally working more than 40 hours each week. Results showed that the risk of error 
significantly increased with increased shift length, overtime, and when the nurses’ total 
weekly time worked exceeded 40 hours. The probability of making errors during shifts 
of 12 hours or more was three times higher compared to 8.5 hour shifts. More than half 
of the 199 errors (58%) and 213 near errors (56%) reported involved MAEs.  
 
In another US study involving a random sample of 502 critical care nurses, nurses used 
logbooks to record information about the type and duration of shifts worked, overtime, 
sleeping patterns, and any errors or near errors that occurred during their shifts (Scott et 
al. 2006). The study revealed that 44% of critical care nurses were scheduled to work 
12.5 hours or more per shift with 62% actually worked shifts of 12.5 hours or more. The 
study also revealed that 61% of the nurses worked ten or more overtime shifts during a 
28-day period. The study identified that working 12.5 consecutive hours or more, or 
working more than 40 hours per week, doubled the risk of a nurse making error 
compared to when they worked 8.5 consecutive hours or less. In addition, increased 
shift length was associated with reduced vigilance by nurses and increased drowsiness 
and sleepiness during a shift. Again, most (56.5%) of the 224 errors reported were 
MAEs. 
 
In a case study involving six nurses from a neonatal ICU, nurses self-reported three 
MAEs and three procedural errors. The nurses involved mentioned that lack of 
sufficient sleep, and reduced alertness were factors which contributed to errors in all 
cases. The study concluded that nurses are required to “be alert enough to provide safe 
care for their patients…and alert enough to detect and correct the errors made by others” 
(Dean et al. 2006, p.123). 
 
In summary, these studies have identified that long nursing shifts are associated with 
increased incidence of errors because of the effect of fatigue and sleepiness on nurses’ 
accuracy during medication preparation and administration. In the study trust, night 
shift nurses commonly administer the morning doses of IV medications at the end of 




their shift when sleepiness and fatigue is anticipated to be high, as discussed above. 
Furthermore, interviews with Trust nurses and midwives suggested that long shifts (12-
hour shifts) and night shifts could be important contributors to MAEs. Interruption and 
distraction was the most common contributing factor beside increased workload and 
long shifts. However a number of studies have investigated the different interventions 
employed to manage interruptions during medication administration and no significant 
evidence has been identified to support their effectiveness. In addition, Raban and 
Westbrook (2014) in their systematic review concluded that in order to provide 
evidence of effectiveness of intervention targeting interruptions to nurses, further 
research need to be controlled randomised or cluster randomised studies across multiple 
sites.  In addition, to date, only studies involving questionnaires and self-reported 
logbooks have been employed to evaluate the impact of long working hours on the 
safety of medication preparation and administration but medication preparation tasks 
have not been used. Therefore, quantitative observational research is required to 
evaluate the effect of long working hours on nurses’ fatigue and sleepiness, and on the 
occurrence of MAEs which could be undertaken at a single site. 
 
4.2. Study aim and objectives 
4.2.1. Study aim  
To investigate whether nurses’ fatigue and sleepiness during long shifts (12-hour shifts) 
have an impact on the rates and types of errors during IV preparation and 
administration. 
 
4.2.2. Study objectives 
 To determine the baseline chronic and acute fatigue of nurses working 12-hour 
shift as well as their recovery experiences between these shifts.  
 To determine the relationship between nurses’ work hours and the occurrence of 
errors during simulated IV preparation and infusion rate setting tasks. 
 To determine the relationship between nurses’ work hours and nurses’ 
deviations from the best practice during simulated IV preparation and infusion 
rate setting. 




 To assess the differences in nurses’ sleepiness at the beginning, 8 hours and at 
the end of a 12 hour night shift. 
 To determine the relationship between sleepiness and the occurrence of errors 
during simulated IV preparation and infusion rate setting tasks undertaken at the 
beginning and end of a 12 hour shift. 
 
4.3. Methods 
4.3.1. Study design 
An observational study of IV preparation and administration errors was conducted using 
simulated tasks for nurses assessed during night shifts (8pm to 8am). This study 
required observing nurses preparing the tasks and setting the infusion pump for 
administration of the prescribed dose, at the beginning of their shift and again at the end 
of the same shift. In additions, fatigue and sleepiness were measured using validated 
questionnaires. Background fatigue was assessed at the beginning of the night shift, 
with sleepiness assessed at three points during the shift (beginning of shift, eight hours 
after start, and end of shift). 
 
Direct observation is considered the 'gold standard' for collection of data on the 
incidence and nature of MEs (Allan and Barker 1990, Dean and Barber 2001, Flynn et 
al. 2002). This technique dates back to the early 1960s, when Barker and McConnell 
(1962) used this in medication error research. In this technique, the observer 
accompanies staff during the preparing and administration of medication to record 
details involved in the process. Direct observation was found to be the most effective 
and reliable technique in detecting MEs, particularly during the administration stage of 
the MUP, compared with other methods, which were found to underestimate the true 
incidence of errors (Barker and McConnell 1962, Flynn et al. 2002). Flynn et al. (2002) 
found that, among 2,556 doses, 300 MEs (11.7%) were detected using direct 
observation, compared to only 17 (0.7%) detected by record review and one (0.04%) 
identified by incident report analysis.  
 
Many advantages of using observation technique in medication error research have been 
identified compared with other methods such as analysing legal and voluntary incident 




reports, chart reviews, and using laboratory tests to check drug levels in urine or blood. 
The objectivity of direct observation overcomes other methods’ limitations, such as 
unawareness of the error occurrence, unwillingness to report, and difficulty 
remembering to report during periods of high workload, which are considered to be the 
main causes of underreporting incidents. Therefore, in the observation technique, MEs 
are detected independently, regardless of the awareness of the people who made the 
error (Allan and Barker 1990). In addition, direct observation enables the observer to 
collect additional information which can be useful in identifying causes and factors 
contributing to errors although it focuses on the “sharp end” or on the care providers 
instead of latent conditions and the entire system of delivery (Thomas and Petersen 
2003). 
 
The impact of the observer is considered one of the main limitations of the observation 
technique (Allan and Barker 1990, Thomas and Petersen 2003). However, Dean and 
Barber (2001) examined the potential effect of observation on medication 
administration error incidence and found that the proportion of documentation of 
reasons for omitting drugs was the same during observation and non-observation 
periods and, therefore, observation had no effect on the incidence of omission errors 
during the administration process (Dean and Barber 2001). 
 
4.3.2. Study settings and sample size calculation 
The study was conducted in medical and surgical wards, and ICUs at one large acute 
teaching Trust (section 3.3.1). A total of 39 nurses from medical wards, surgical wards, 
and ICUs were selected to take part in this study. The sample size was calculated based 
on the assumptions that 25% of nurses will report high levels of sleepiness at the end of 
their shift (Geiger-Brown et al. 2012), and that  the baseline human error probability in 
a drug preparation task is 3% for nurses (Garnerin et al. 2007). An assumption was also 
made that error rate would increase.  
 
This study tested the hypothesis that nurses reporting high levels of sleepiness would be 
more likely to commit an error during a simulated drug preparation task. As an initial 
study and because of the lack of published literature linking the relationship between the 
two variables, assumptions were made. One assumption was made that the error rate 
would increase by 40% i.e. from 3% to 43% at the end of the shift. When both 




variables, sleepy and not sleepy AND error or no error were treated as dichotomous 
variables, and based on chi-square test, 39 nurses were needed to find a statistically 
significant association. 
 
4.3.3. Simulated drug preparation tasks 
The simulated drug preparation tasks were developed in collaboration with a specialist 
pharmacist responsible for the safety of injectable medicines at the study hospital. Both 
tasks were chosen to provide a comparable degree of difficulty on preparation across 
study wards and challenge capacities on a fatigue status but reflect real life situations.  
 
Each participant was asked to prepare an infusion at the beginning and at the end of the 
shift. These were:  
a. Amphotericin liposomal 145mg infusion: This drug is not frequently prescribed 
and requires a calculation for dose and dilution, use of part vials and 
administration via an infusion pump. 
b. Magnesium sulphate 10mmol infusion for peripheral administration: Although 
magnesium is more frequently prescribed, the usual dose was different to the 
dose used in the study. Preparation of the infusion required a calculation, 
dilution to specific minimum volume for peripheral administration, use of part 
vials and administration via an infusion pump. 
 
4.3.4. Tasks allocation 
Nurses were randomly assigned to two groups using block randomisation: Group A 
prepared magnesium at the start of the shift and amphotericin at the end of shift, and 
Group B prepared amphotericin at the beginning of the shift and magnesium at the end. 
 
4.3.5. Development of data collection tools 
4.3.5.1. Occupational Fatigue Exhaustion Recovery (OFER) 
The participants’ fatigue levels were measured using the Occupational Fatigue 
Exhaustion Recovery (OFER) scale (Winwood et al. 2005). This scale consists of three 
subscales measuring occupational chronic fatigue, acute fatigue, and inter-shift 
recovery. It consists of 15 items, and based on the fatigue and strain experienced at 
work and home. Responses are given using a seven-point scale (ranging from 0 = 
strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree). OFER scale was developed to measure acute 




fatigue, chronic fatigue, and inter-shift recovery in workers. This scale was chosen 
because it has been used and validated in healthcare workers, specifically nurses, and 
was found to have high reliability and to be gender independent (Winwood et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, it can differentiate between fatigue states (acute and chronic) and measure 
the recovery from fatigue between shifts (Winwood et al. 2005, Winwood et al. 2006). 
 
4.3.5.2. Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) 
The Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) was used to measure participants’ sleepiness. 
This measure, developed by Akerstedt and Gillberg (1990), is a single-item scale of 
sleepiness (1 = “very alert” to 9 = “very sleepy-great effort to keep awake, fighting 
sleep”). The KSS has been validated to measure subjective sleepiness in occupational 
studies. It has been also used to measure nurses’ sleepiness over 12 hour shifts (Kaida et 
al. 2006, Geiger-Brown et al. 2012). The KSS was used because it allows measurement 
of sleepiness state, i.e. sleepiness at a particular time during the day (Shahid et al. 
2010). Participants in this study were required to record their level of sleepiness at the 
beginning of the shift, at eight hours, and at the end of their shift to assess differences in 
nurses’ sleepiness between the end of 8 hours shift and 12 hours shift. In this study, a 
score greater than seven was considered to be a high level of sleepiness (upper one-third 
of the scale range) (Akerstedt and Gillberg 1990). 
 
4.3.5.3. Study poster 
The study poster (Appendix 8) was developed and displayed in nurses’ clinical areas to 
invite them to participate in the study. The poster included brief information about the 
aim of the study and the anticipated inclusion criteria for participants. The poster also 
provided participation instructions for nurses interested in this study. In addition, the 
contact details for the research team were provided in case the nurses required further 
study information. 
 
4.3.5.4. Selection questionnaire 
A selection questionnaire (Appendix 9) was developed to identify and select eligible 
nurses. The questions were developed to collect the required information to identify 
eligible participants according to Oppenheim (1992)’s specifications. This career 
questionnaire consisted of two sections. The first section obtained information about the 
participant’s current job and job title, grade, ward or department where the participant 




worked, years of practice as a registered nurse, and shifts worked,. The second section 
obtained the participant’s contact details.  
 
4.3.5.5. Participant information leaflet 
A participant information leaflet was developed to provide the participants with detailed 
information about the study (Appendix 10). The leaflet provided information regarding 
the background and aim of the study, eligibility requirements for participants, a 
description of the recruiting process, the potential benefits that would be acquired from 
the research, any possible risks, the participants’ rights, anonymity, and confidentiality, 
plans for publication, and contact details of the research team in case the participant 
required any further information. 
 
4.3.5.6.   Consent form 
A consent form was developed to be read and signed by participants before participation 
(Appendix 11). The consent form was provided along with the information leaflet with 
enough time to allow participants to read all the information provided. The consent 
form consisted of statements about the participant’s agreement to participate and use of 
data collected during observation or from the questionnaires. Each participant was 
provided with a copy of the consent form to keep for reference. At the end of the form, 
the contacts details of the research team were again provided. 
 
4.3.5.7. Pre-shift questionnaire 
A pre-shift questionnaire was developed for completion by the participants at the 
beginning of the participation shift before they began the simulated preparation 
(Appendix 12). This questionnaire was developed to collect some additional 
demographic and work-related information and consisted of three sections. The first 
section contained career-related information, including the length of the participant’s 
usual shift, total working hours per week, average hours of sleep during each 24-hour 
period over the seven days before participation, and whether the participant had any 
additional paid employment other than the current nursing job in the study hospital. The 
second section collected demographic data about age, marital status, and the highest 
educational degree of the participant to evaluate if there was any relationship between 
fatigue levels and demographic and work characteristics. The last section of the 
questionnaire contained the fatigue and sleepiness scales, where participants were asked 




to score their acute and chronic fatigue and intershift recovery in addition to their 
current sleepiness at the beginning of the shift.  
 
4.3.5.8. Shift diary 
A one-page shift diary (Appendix 13) was developed and given to participants to allow 
them record any breaks and/or naps taken during the study shift. The diary also included 
a sleepiness scale to be self-completed by the participant at eight hours.  
 
4.3.5.9. Post-shift questionnaire 
The post-shift questionnaire (Appendix 14) was developed for completion by 
participants at the end of the shift and just before they began the post-shift observation 
task. The questionnaire was used to collect information about the participation shift, 
including the number of patients the participant was responsible for and any additional 
responsibilities assigned during the participation shift other than direct patient care. The 
final section of the questionnaire, allowed participants to score their sleepiness at 12 
hours. 
 
4.3.5.10. Observation instrument 
The observation instrument (Appendix 15) was used by the observer as a checklist 
during observation. This observation instrument was developed from the Trust 
Injectable Medicines database (Medusa) and the Trust guideline for administration of 
medicines (Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015). The instrument consisted of 
23 points (Table 4.1) representing the IV preparation and administration steps, 
beginning with reading the prescription to writing the label and preparing the pump with 
the appropriate infusion rate. These points were divided into four main sections. The 
first section involved the steps performed before preparation, such as checking expiry 
dates and selecting infusion fluids. The second section, involved all preparation process 
steps, ranging from conducting the calculation to completing the preparation and 
checking the medicine against the prescription. The third section, involved setting the 
infusion rate, and requesting the final independent check used in the administration 
process. A fourth section collected data about whether the nurse prepared an infusion 
label for the final product, and if any of the label fields contained omitted or incorrect 
information. Failures in steps 1-3, 6-7, 9, 11 13-14, 16-19, and 21-23 were considered 
deviations from best practice, while failures in steps 4-5, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 20 were 




considered errors. The observation instrument was also used to record the time needed 
(in minutes) to complete the task.  
 
Table 4.1. Steps assessed in the observation instrument 
Before preparation 
Reading and checking the prescription before start 
Washing hands 
Wearing gloves 
Selecting correct diluent  
Selecting correct infusion fluids 
Checking expiry date 
Assessing product integrity 
Preparation process 
Performing calculations 
Disinfecting the vial 
Using correct solvent volume for reconstitution  
Shaking the vial after adding the solvent 
Using correct drug volume 
Request independent check  before dilution 
Using a filter and change the needle 
Using correct volume of infusion fluid 
Mixing after adding the drug 
Assessing appearance of the final product  
Checking the medicine against the prescription 
Retain vials/ampoules for checking purposes 
Administration process 
Setting up the correct infusion rate 
Request independent check 
Labelling 
Labelling the preparation 
Complete and correct labelling information 
 
4.3.5.11. Simulation prescriptions  
Simulated prescriptions were provided to the participants as images of prescriptions 
from the electronic prescribing systems used in each ward (Appendix 16). These 
prescriptions contained all the standard information usually contained in real 
prescriptions, including the medication name, dose and route, and patient allergies. The 
prescription screenshots were accompanied by a cover letter with general instructions 
about the task to be read by the participant before beginning the preparation task.  
 




4.3.6. Research permission 
Ethical approval from the Biomedical Sciences, Dentistry, Medicine and Natural and 
Mathematical Sciences (BDM) Research Ethics Subcommittee (RESC) at King’s 
College London (KCL) was acquired for this study on 17
th
 July 2015 (LRS-14/15-
1432). Approval was also granted from the Research and Development department at 
the study hospital on 14
th
 September 2015 and the study was allocated a Trust R&D 
registration number (RJ115/N256). 
 
4.3.7. Piloting of data collection tools 
Data collection tools, including the questionnaires, printed prescriptions, and the 
observation instrument were piloted with two nurses. Each of these nurses was also 
observed preparing two simulated tasks (one at the beginning and one at the end of the 
shift). The aim was to assess the clarity and validity of the questionnaires and 
observation instrument and to ensure that key details were collected clearly without any 
potential confusion. This pilot resulted in a minor amendment of one question in the 
pre-shift questionnaire to provide a new education level option, “PGDip 3 years”. 
 
The layout and order of some of the steps in the observation tool were slightly amended 
as per the routine sequence of preparation, to allow the observer to better follow the 
observation. The preparation and administration steps in the observation instrument 
were divided into four main sections: “before preparation”, “preparation process”, 
“administration process”, and “labelling section”. The pilot observations also allowed 
the observer to practice and develop his observation skills using the observation 
instrument. 
 
4.3.8. Study participants 
4.3.8.1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
All nurses involved in IV preparation and administration on the study wards and 
working 12 hour night shift were eligible to participate. Nurses who were practicing in 
settings outside the study directorates and any nurses who did not administer IV doses 
were excluded.  
 




4.3.8.2.   Sampling 
It was anticipated to select participants from different levels of grade/seniority (from 
Band 5 to Band 7) to represent the different levels of experience (Table 4.2). However, 
due to the nature of staffing level during the night shift, the majority of nurses 
participated in the study were band 5 with few band 6 nurses. 
Table 4.2. Study settings and nurses sampling criteria (sample size=39)
Staff grade ICU Surgery wards Acute Medicine wards 
Band 5 5 5 5 
Band 6 4 4 4 
Band 7 4 4 4 
Total 13 13 13 
 
4.3.9. Participant identification and recruitment process 
Details of participant identification and recruitment process are presented in Figure 4.1. 
All nurses in the wards involved in this study were informed about the study at least 
seven days before the study start, to increase awareness of the study and give nurses the 
opportunity to ask questions or obtain further information about the study. This was 
achieved using: 
 
1 Information poster (Appendix 8) displayed in nurses’ areas at all study 
directorates, to invite eligible nurses to participate.  
 
2 An email with information about this study sent, via group emails for matrons 
and ward managers, to all hospital nurses to inform them about the study and to 
invite them to participate. The email provided information about the study aim, 
approvals obtained, eligibility criteria, details about participation, and 
instructions to complete and return the career/participant selection questionnaire. 
 
Copies of the participant selection questionnaire (Appendix 9), and the participant 
information letter (Appendix 10) were provided alongside the poster and attached to the 
invitation email. 
 




Nurses interested in participating in this study were asked to complete and send the 
selection questionnaire, by internal mail or by email, to the researcher, or leave it in the 
secure box provided on each study ward. Following review of the returned selection 
questionnaires, nurses selected to participate in the study were contacted to identify a 
convenient shift. They were also sent a personalised invitation letter together with 
copies of the participant information leaflet and consent form. Two copies of the 
consent form were provided; one for return to the research team and the other one for 
the participant to keep for reference. Any participant selected who did not subsequently 
respond to the invitation letter within seven days was excluded from the study and an 
alternative eligible nurse selected from the career questionnaire respondents was invited 
to participate.  
 
4.3.10. Data collection and analysis 
4.3.10.1. Data collection 
All preparation tasks were performed in the ward’s usual area for IV medication 
preparation in order to simulate the usual situation (i.e., at the bedside in ICUs and in 
the medication room in all other wards). Participants were asked to tell the observer 
when they would require an independent check of the simulated drug preparations. On 
the participation shift, before starting the observation, the researcher provided brief 
information about the study and the nature of the observation, and the participant had 
the opportunity to ask questions. The researcher also ensured that the participant had 
read and signed the written consent form before starting participation.  
 
4.3.10.2. Data storage 
All study data including all participants’ questionnaires, observation tools, and consent 
forms, were stored in a locked filing cabinet in a locked office at, Kings College 
London. Each participant was given a reference number which was used throughout the 
study and stored separately from their contact details. Only the research team had access 
to this data.  
  





Figure 4.1. Flow diagram of participant identification and recruitment process  
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4.3.10.3. Data analysis 
The opportunity for error was used as a unit of analysis to obtain the error rates for each 
observation period (Allan and Barker 1990). “Opportunities for error” were all doses 
that were prepared by participants. The error rate was obtained for each observation 
period. A research group meeting, which included the specialist IV pharmacist and a 
specialist in medication safety, was held at the end of all observations to discuss the 
data collected. All gathered information about observed errors, deviation from best 
practice, and any other information was discussed to finalise what were considered 
errors and what should be considered deviations from best practice based on the Trust 
IV guideline (Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015) and previous studies on IV 
medication errors (Taxis and Barber 2003, Cousins et al. 2005, Westbrook et al. 2011). 
The research group also classified the observed errors and deviations from best practice 
into the appropriate groups.  
 
Participants’ scores on the OFER scale items were calculated according to the specified 
criteria to quantify levels of acute fatigue, chronic fatigue, and intershift recovery 
among participants. Fatigue levels in OFER range between 0-100, with zero as the least 
fatigue and 100 as the most. Cronbach’s alpha values were used to evaluate the internal 
reliability for OFER scale. Mean sleepiness scores were calculated for each time point. 
Paired two-sided t-tests were used to identify differences between acute and chronic 
fatigue states and whether any of these fatigue states occurred significantly higher than 
the others. Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test and McNemar's test were used to evaluate the 
differences between sleepiness scores over time. Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test was also 
used to examine the progression of “errors” and “deviation from best practice” at each 
time of observation (beginning and end of shift). Correlations among perceived acute 
fatigue, chronic fatigue, intershift recovery, and sleepiness scores were evaluated using 
nonparametric correlation analyses (Spearman’s rs). Multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was used to examine the differences in fatigue levels of OFER measures 
across different demographic and work-related characteristics. McNemar's test was 
performed to examine the hypothesis that nurses reporting high levels of sleepiness 
were more likely to commit an error during the simulated drug preparation task. High 
level of sleepiness was defined as a score of seven or of greater on the Karolinska 
Sleepiness Scale. Both variables were treated as dichotomous variables i.e. sleepy/not 
sleep AND error/no error. 





4.4.1. Study sample 
A total of 51 selection questionnaires were returned from the study directorates (medical 
= 19, surgery = 16, and ICU = 16). Of these, 45 were collected from the ward by the 
researcher, two were received via Trust internal mail, and four returned by email. Two 
of the received questionnaires were excluded because insufficient contact details were 
provided, resulting in 49 completed questionnaires from eligible participants. In total, 
49 questionnaire respondents were contacted either by phone or email to arrange a day 
for their participation, of which three nurses did not respond to this communication, and 
seven could not complete their participation due to their increased workload on the 
observation day. A total of 39 nurses were finally observed resulting in 78 observations.   
 
4.4.2. Demographic data of nurses 
Details of participants’ demographics and work characteristics can be found in Table 
4.3 and Table 4.4. Similar number of nurses from medical (36%, n= 14) surgery (31%, 
n= 12) and ICUs (33%, n= 13) participated in the study. All participants reported 
working both day and night shifts. All participants indicated that they work 12 hours or 
more per shift and 85% (n=33) indicated that they worked over 40 hours per week at 
this nursing job. Years of experience as a registered nurse ranged from less than one 
year to 15 years. Participants’ characteristics were similar between the two groups i.e., 
those who prepared the amphotericin at the beginning of the shift (n=19) (group A) and 














Table 4.3. Demographic characteristics of participants (n=39) 
 
  
Participants’ characters Total (%) Group A1 (%) Group B2 (%) 
Gender 
 Male  2 (5) 0 2 (5) 
 Female  37 (95) 37 (95) 0 
 
Age  
 Under 25 12 (31) 6 (15) 6 (15) 
 25 – less than 35 22 (56) 12 (31) 10 (26) 
 35- less than 45 3 (8) 1 (3) 2 (5) 
 45- less than 55 1 (3) 0 1 (3) 
 55 - less than 65 1 (3) 1 (3) 0 
 
Marital status 
 Single  31 (80) 18 (46) 13 (33) 
 Separated   0 0 0 
 Married  7 (18) 2 (5) 5 (13) 
 Divorced  1 (3) 0 1 (3) 
 
Number of dependents 
 0 36 (92) 19 (49) 17 (44) 
 1 - 2 2 (5.1) 1 (3) 1 (3) 
 3 - 4 1 (2.6) 0 1 (3) 
 More than 4 0 0 0 
 
Average hours of sleep per night  
 Less than 5 hours 5 (13) 1 (3) 4 (10) 
 5 – 6 hours                      14 (36) 10 (26) 5 (13) 
 7 - 8 hours 18 (46) 8 (21) 10 (26) 
 9 – 10 hours 1 (2.4) 1 (2.6) 0 
 
 
Highest educational degree 
 Nursing degree (3 years) 26 (69) 11 (28) 15 (36) 
 PGDip (2 years) 1 (3) 1 (3) 0 
 PGDip (3 years) 9 (23) 6 (15) 3 (8) 
 Master degree   3 (8) 2 (5) 1 (3) 
 PhD 0 0 0 
1 
Nurses prepared amphotericin at the beginning of the shift 
2 
Nurses prepared magnesium at the beginning of the shift 




Table 4.4. Work related characteristics of participants (n=39) 
  
Participants’  characters Total (%) Group A1 (%) Group B2 (%) 
 
Work settings 
 Medical  14 (36) 6 (15) 8 (21) 
 Surgical 12 (31) 8 (21) 4 (10) 
 ICU 13 (33) 6 (15) 7 (18) 
     
 
Job title 
 Deputy ward manager 1 (3 0 1 (3) 
 Staff nurse 38 (97) 20 (51) 18 (46) 
 
Band 
 5 36 (40) 20 (51) 16 (41) 
 6 3 (8) 0 3 (8) 
 
Years as registered nurse 
 Less than one year 5 (13) 2 (5.1) 3 (8) 
 1 – 5 years 30 (77) 18 (46) 12 (31) 
 >5 – 10 years 3 (8) 0 3 (8 
 >10 – 15 years 1 (3) 0 1 (3) 
 
Usual shift length (hours) 
 8 hours or less                                 0 0 0 
 9 to10 hours                         0 0 0 
 11 to 12 hours    14 (36) 7 (18) 7 (18) 
 More than 12 hours 25 (64) 13 (33) 12 (31) 
 
Total hours work per week 
 Less than 20  0   
 20-40  6 (15) 4 (10) 2 (5) 
 41 - 60         33 (85) 16 (41) 17 (44) 
 More than 60 hours 0 0 0 
 
Additional responsibilities rather than direct patient care (on the 
observation shift) 
 Yes  8 (21) 3 (8) 5 (13) 
 No  31 (80) 17 (44) 14 (36) 
 
Number of patients the participant was responsible for during the 
observation shift 
 1-2 15 8 (21) 7 (18) 
 3-4 7 (18) 2 (3) 5 (13) 
 5-6 9 (23) 5 (13) 4 (10) 
 7-8 8 (21) 4 (10) 4 (10) 
1 
Nurses prepared amphotericin at the beginning of the shift 
2 
Nurses prepared magnesium at the beginning of the shift 




4.4.3. Fatigue levels 
Data from OFER subscales evaluated the levels of acute and chronic fatigue, and 
intershift recovery among participants. Details of participants’ perception of chronic 
fatigue, acute fatigue and intershift recovery can be found in Table 4.5. Cronbach’s 
alpha values for all sub-scales ranged between 0.80 and 0.85. Paired t-tests showed that 
perceived acute fatigue (62.6%) at beginning of shift was significantly (P < 0.001) 
higher than chronic fatigue (49.6%). The mean scores of acute fatigue, chronic fatigue 
and intershift recovery were similar in the two groups of nurses (nurses who prepared 
amphotericin at the beginning and those who prepared magnesium at the beginning of 
the shift). 
 


















Acute fatigue  5 30.0 - 96.7 63.4% 63.0% 63.8% 19.5 0.80 
Chronic fatigue  5 20.0 - 86.7 49.6% 48.8% 50.5% 23.3 0.85 
Inter-shift recovery  5 13.3 - 86.7 45.3% 47.9% 42.7% 20.5 0.85 
*
 All subscales scores range from 0-100 
1 
Nurses prepared amphotericin at the beginning of the shift. 
2 
Nurses prepared magnesium at the beginning of the shift. 
 
4.4.4. Sleepiness 
Acute sleepiness of nurses was evaluated at three time points over the work shift. Table 
4.6 presents the means of participants’ sleepiness at the beginning of the shift, at 8 hours 
and at the end of the shift. Mean scores of sleepiness increased by the end of the shift, 
with mean scores starting at a shift of 2.85, increasing at 8 hours to 5.41, and then 
increasing further by the 12
th
 hour (the end of the shift) to 5.62. In general, sleepiness 
scores were significantly different over time (p = 0.000). Significant differences were 
identified between scores at the beginning of the shift and 8-hour scores (p = 0.00), and 
between scores at the beginning of the shift and at the end of the shift (at the 12
th
 hour) 
(p = 0.00). However, insignificant differences were found between 8-hour scores and 
12-hour scores (p = 0.80). 
 




Eleven participants had the opportunity to take a nap during the shift. The average 
length of naps taken was 52.7 minutes (range 30 - 80). The mean sleepiness scores at 
the end of the shift of the nap group decreased from 6.64 at 8 hours to 6.45 at the end  of 
the shift, however this was not significant (p = 0.71). In addition, there were no 
significant differences in the mean sleepiness scores at the end of the shift between the 
nap group and other participants (Figure 4.2). 
 






Figure 4.2. Sleepiness (KSS) into shift for nurses who took naps, nurses who did 
not take a nap and for all participants. 
 
 
Means of sleepiness scores 
P* Beginning 
of shift 
At 8 hours 
End of shift 
(12h) 
All participants (n=39) 2.85 5.41 5.62 0.00* 
Participants with nap (n=11) 2.55 6.64 6.45 0.00* 
Participants without nap 
(n=28) 
2.96 4.93 5.29 0.00* 
*p-value for significance at α = 0.05 
Hour into shift 
Sleepiness scores 




4.4.5. Differences in fatigue levels across demographic and work 
environment variables 
Among demographic and work related variables, perceived fatigue levels of participants 
significantly differed between levels of age, and average hours of sleep. Both acute and 
chronic fatigue levels were significantly different across age as increased age was 
associated with increase in chronic fatigue levels (p = 0.025). For example, participants 
within the age group of 35-45 scored lower levels of chronic fatigue than those within 
the group of 45-55 and higher than those within the group 25-35.  Acute fatigue also 
increased as average hours of sleep decreased (p = 0.035). Similarly, increased age of 
participants was associated with increased levels of acute fatigue. None of the other 
demographic or work related characteristics significantly associated with fatigue scores 
of participants.  
 
4.4.6. Relationships between fatigue and sleepiness measures 
Acute and chronic fatigue were significantly (p = 0.00) and positively correlated (Table 
4.7). Both acute and chronic fatigue measures negatively and significantly (p = 0.000) 
correlated with intershift recovery. The only significant (p = 0.000) correlation between 
sleepiness scores was between sleepiness at 8 hours and at the end of the shift which 
was a positive relationship. When fatigue measures and sleepiness scores were 
considered, the only significant (p < 0.05) positive correlation was between acute 
fatigue and sleepiness at the end of shift.  
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
1 
Sleepiness at the start of the shift
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4.4.7. Observed errors and deviation from best practice 
A summary of numbers of errors and deviations from best practice can be found in 
Table 4.8. A total of 13 (17%) tasks were associated with errors in both observation 
periods, 5 of which occurred at the beginning of the shift (13% of observations), 
compared to 8 errors at the end of the shift (21% of observations). Amphotericin was 
involved in 69% (9/13) of the observed errors while 31% (4/13) of errors occurred with 
magnesium. 
 
Deviations from best practice for each preparation were also observed in both 
observation periods. At the beginning of the shift, a total of 163 deviations from best 
practice were observed in the 39 preparations, mean deviations per preparation of 4.18 
compared to 247 (6.33) at the end of the shift. One or more deviation from best practice 
were observed in 97% (38/39) of nurses at the beginning of the shift and in 100% of 
observed nurses at the end of the shift. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests showed that within 
the two observation periods, the mean error rate at the end of the shift did not differ 
significantly from the mean error rate at the beginning of the shift (p = 0.257). 
However, a significant difference was found in the mean number of deviations between 
the two observation periods (p = 0.000).  
 
Table 4.8. Numbers and means of observed errors and deviations from best 
practice 
 Total (mean/observation) of errors 









Errors 5 (0.13) 0.34 8 (0.21) 0.41 0.08 0.26 
Deviations from 
practice 
163 (4.18) 1.83 247 (6.33) 1.55 2.13 0.00* 
*p-value for significance at α < 0.05 
 
4.4.8. Types of observed errors  
Details of the types of observed errors in both observation periods are presented in 
Table 4.9. The five main types of errors identified were: incorrect dose preparation 
(n=8), setting incorrect infusion rate (n=2), inability to perform calculation (n=1), 
wrong dose identified (n=1), and using incorrect fluid (n=1). Incorrect dose preparation 
was the most common observed error, which occurred in 10% (n= 8/78) of all 




observations and accounted for 62% (n= 8/13) of observed errors. Incorrect dose 
preparation occurred on 4 (10%) occasions during each observation period and was 
mainly associated with amphotericin (62%, n= 5/8) compared to magnesium (38%, 
n=3/8). Among all amphotericin preparations (n=39), incorrect dose preparation 
occurred in 13% (n= 5/39) compared to 8% (n= 3/39) of magnesium preparations. Table 
4.10 shows the magnitude differences between the prepared dose and prescribed doses 
in errors which resulted in incorrect dose preparation for each medication and at both 
observation periods. All incorrect dose preparations resulted in an excessive dose. In all 
incorrectly prepared doses of magnesium, nurses prepared twice the prescribed dose. 
However, with amphotericin, the differences from the prescribed doses ranged from 
+1.3%% to +3.5%. 
 
Incorrect infusion rate occurred in one observation at the beginning of the shift 
(amphotericin) and in one observation at the end of the shift (magnesium). Wrong dose 
identified (amphotericin), inability to perform calculation (amphotericin), and using an 
incorrect diluent (amphotericin) each occurred on one occasion and all of them occurred 
at the end of the shift (Table 4.9). 
 
Table 4.9. Types of observed errors at both the beginning and end of the shift 
(n=13)
 Error type No (%) of observed preparations with errors 
Beginning 
of shift 
Medication End of 
shift 
Medication Total 
Wrong dose identified 0   1 (3) Amphotericin 1 
Inability to perform 
calculation  
0   1 (3) Amphotericin 1 
 
Incorrect  dose preparation 
     
      
 Incorrect  volume added 
to the bag  




  2 (5) Magnesium 
Amphotericin 
6 
 Incorrect reconstitution  0    2 (5) Amphotericin 
(x2) 
 2 
       
Incorrect  diluent used 0  
1 (3) 
Amphotericin 
     1 
Incorrect  infusion rate 1 (3) Amphotericin   1 (3) Magnesium   2 
Total (%) 5 (13)  8 (21)  13 (33%) 




Table 4.10. Incorrect dose preparations including magnitude of dose error 
Medication 
involved 
Total  % less or more than prescribed dose 
Beginning of shift End of shift 
Magnesium 
 
3 + 100% + 100% 
+ 100%  
Amphotericin 5 + 3.5% + 3.5% 
+ 1.3% + 3.5% 
 + 3.5% 
 -65.5% 
 
A total of 10 nurses made at least one error, with three nurses making errors both at the 
beginning and end of shift. In ICU, 15% (n= 2/13) of participants made at least one 
error compared to 33% (n= 4/12) on surgical and 36% (n= 5/14) on medical wards. 
 
4.4.9. Types of deviation from practice 
The observed deviations from best practice were classified into four main types and 14 
subtypes. Table 4.11 provides details of these types and subtypes together with their 
occurrence at the two observation periods. The four main classes were deviation from 
aseptic technique, failure to conduct the required checking, manipulation and 
assessment of product integrity, and deviations associated with setting up the pump. 
Within the observed deviations from best practice, the compliance with seven out of 
fourteen best practice steps at the end of the shift was significantly lower than the 
compliance at the beginning of the shift (Table 4.11). 
 
When adjusting the volume in the pump, nurses usually adjusted the total volume (i.e. 
the total volume of the bag in addition to the volume of drug added). During some tasks 
at both observation periods, the participants did not take into consideration the drug 
volume when setting the pump volume. The drug volume was equal to 5mL for 
magnesium and 34.8 for amphotericin. This deviation occurred with both medications, 










Table 4.11. Types of observed deviations from best practice at each time point 
 
4.4.10. Labeling errors 
The infusion label consists of 12 fields. A total of 36% (n= 14) of labels at the 
beginning of the shift were complete and correct compared to 28% (n= 11) of labels at 
the end of the shift. A summary of the errors observed on infusion labels is provided in 
Table 4.12. Details of drug name and amount of drug, were completed and correct in all 
labels at both observation times. Other details such as diluent used, total volume, 
preparation date and time, patient details (name and hospital number), and route were 
also completed and correct in most labels. Documentation of infusion expiry date and 
time were the most likely details to be either incomplete or incorrect. Expiry date and 
time were incomplete in 46% (n= 18) of labels and incorrect in an additional 18% (n= 
7) at the beginning of the shift compared with 51% (n= 20) incomplete and 15% (n= 6) 
Deviations from best practice 





End of shift 
Aseptic technique   
1 Wash hands 15 (38) 26 (67) 0.00* 
2 Wear gloves 1 (3) 1 (3) 1.00 
3 Disinfect the vial 12 (33) 18 (46) .031* 
 
Checking processes 
4 Expiry date 1 (3) 2 (5.1) 0.32 
5 Request independent check  17 (44) 27 (69) 0.00* 
6 Prepared medicine against prescription  34 (87) 38 (97) 0.04* 
7 Retain vials/ampoules for checking 
purposes 
0 0 1.00 
 
Manipulation and assessment of product integrity 
8 Assess product integrity and  that there is no 
damage to containers or vials 
7 (18) 24 (62) 0.00* 
9 Use a filter and change the needle 22 (56) 29 (74) 0.31 
10 Shake the vial after adding the solvent 2 (5) 4 (10) 0.16 
11 Mix after adding the drug 20 (51) 34 (87) 0.00* 
12 Assess appearance of the final product  24 (61) 38 (97) 0.00* 
 
Setting up the pump 
   
13 Setting up the correct volume 7 (18) 5 (13) 0.45 
14 Setting up the correct time 1 (3) 1 (3) 1.00 
Total of deviations  163 247 0.00* 
*p-value for significance at α < 0.05 




incorrect labels at the end of the shift. In all cases of documentation of wrong expiry 
date and time, participants wrote the expiry date of the original medication. However, 
among labeling errors, no significant differences were observed between the two 
observation periods. 
 




No (%) of complete 
and correct labels 
No (%) of 
incomplete labels 















Drug 39 (100) 39 (100) 0 0 0 0 
Amount of drug 39 (100) 39 (100) 0 0 0 0 
Diluent 37 (95) 39 (100) 1 (3) 0 1 (3) 0 
Total volume 33 (87) 32 (82) 0 0 6 (15) 7 (18) 
Route 38 (97) 37 (95) 1 (3) 2 (5) 0 0 
Preparation date and 
time 
33 (95) 26 (67) 6 (15) 13 (33) 0 0 
Expiry date and time 14 (36) 13 (33) 18 (46) 20 (51) 7 (18) 6 (15) 
Patient name 33 (87) 29 (74) 6 (15) 10 (26) 0 0 
Hospital number 35 (90) 35 (90) 4 (10) 4 (10) 0 0 
Ward  36 (92) 36 (92) 3 (8) 3 (8) 0 0 
Signature  38 (97) 38 (97) 1 (3) 1 (3) --- --- 
 
4.4.11. Preparation time 
The time needed to complete preparation and set the pump is shown in Table 4.13. The 
mean preparation time for magnesium was 11.9 minutes (range 6 - 21) at the beginning 
of the shift and 12.1 minutes (range 7 - 22) at the end of the shift. For amphotericin, the 
mean preparation time was 22.4 minutes (range 16 - 29) at the beginning of the shift and 
22.9 minutes (range 15 - 38) at the end of the shift. No significant differences were 









 Table 4.13. Means of preparation time in minutes for each drug 
Medication Beginning of shift SD End of shift SD P 
Magnesium 11.9 min (n=20) 5.6 12.1min (n=19) 4.2 0.55 
Amphotericin 22.4 min (n=19) 3.9 22.9 min (n=20) 5.5 0.72 
Mean 17.0 min (n=39) 7.2 17.7 min (n=39) 7.2 0.72 
 
4.4.12. Relationship between sleepiness and errors and best practice 
deviations  
McNemar's test showed a significant (p = 0.002) association between being sleepy and 
making errors at the end of the shift. However, this association was not significant at the 
beginning of the shift. There was no significant relationship between sleepiness scores 
and number of deviations from best practice either at the beginning of the shift (p = 
0.16) or the end of the shift (p = 0.25).  Furthermore, no significant relationship was 
found between acute or chronic fatigue and the observed errors (p = 0.45) or deviations 




4.5.1. Observed errors and deviations from the best practice 
Errors were observed in 13% of observations at the beginning of the shift and in 21% of 
observations during the end of the shift, yielding an increase of around 8%. The 
baseline error rate was higher than the assumption used in the sample size calculation 
(3%), whilst the change was less than the assumption made when the sample size was 
calculated (40%). Of all simulated preparations observed during this study, 10% were 
associated with incorrect dose preparation, which was the most frequent type of error. 
Errors of incorrect dose preparation represented the majority of observed errors (62%). 
These errors occurred equally in each observation period and were more frequent with 
amphotericin than magnesium. The steps in which the dose preparation errors occurred 
varied. In six cases involving both magnesium and amphotericin, the errors occurred 
during the step of withdrawing the drug from the ampoule or vial into the infusion bag. 
Taxis and Barber (2003) determined the incidence and clinical importance of errors in 
the preparation and administration of IV drugs and the stages of the process in which 




errors occur in teaching and non-teaching hospitals in the UK. The study found that the 
most common types of preparation errors were errors in using diluents (8%) and wrong 
dose preparation (3%). In the current study, in cases of magnesium where the 
participant drew up the whole content of the ampoule, resulting in a double dose, the 
observer was not able to observe the participant performing the calculations. Therefore 
it was not possible to determine whether the incorrect volume withdrawn was because 
of miscalculating the dose or misreading the prescription. The incorrect dose of 
magnesium prepared, however, is considered a usual dose in some areas such as in 
ICUs and therefore, nurses’ lapses in checking the dose in the prescription could be a 
potential cause. In cases that involved amphotericin, although correct calculations and 
reconstitutions were performed, an incorrect volume was withdrawn and added into the 
bag when nurses withdrew the whole reconstituted volume instead of the calculated 
volume. This also could be due to nurses’ lapses in double checking the calculated dose 
before adding the drug into the infusion bag.  
 
The step of reconstitution was associated with another two errors and resulted in 
incorrect dose preparation. These errors occurred when the participants confused the 
reconstitution volume of the diluent and the volume that should have been withdrawn 
and added into the infusion bag. In both cases, the participant used the volume that 
should be withdrawn to reconstitute the drug, which led to adding an excessive dose 
into the infusion bag. The study of Taxis and Barber (2003) also identified that the most 
preparation errors were associated with multiple step preparations (14%, n= 50/345), 
such as drugs that required reconstitution with a solvent and addition of a diluent. A 
typical error was preparing the wrong dose; all three severe errors observed in this Taxis 
and Barber’s study occurred at this stage. McDowell et al. (2010) showed that the 
reconstitution stage in IV preparation was the most error-prone step and that eliminating 
this step by using ready-to-use infusions reduced the probability of making an error in 
IV preparation and administration from 0.73 to 0.17. In another study, using the wrong 
volume of solvent or diluent to prepare an IV medication was the second most common 
(33%, n= 121/363) type of errors observed (Westbrook et al. 2011). 
 
An incorrect infusion rate occurred on one occasion in each observation period with 
both medications. This rate of incorrect infusion rate error is lower than reported in 
other studies: 27% (Wirtz et al. 2003); 48% (Cousins et al. 2005); and 47% (Westbrook 




et al. 2011). However, incorrect infusion rate was the second common type of errors 
observed after incorrect dose preparation. In most IV errors studies, incorrect 
administration rate was observed as one of the three most common types of errors 
(Wirtz et al. 2003, Cousins et al. 2005, Westbrook et al. 2011). 
 
Almost all preparations in both observation periods were associated with at least one 
deviation from the best practice. High nurses’ compliance with some steps e.g. wearing 
gloves, checking the expiry date, and shaking the vial after adding the solvent was 
observed in both observation periods. No significant differences in nurses’ compliance 
with these steps were found between the beginning and end of a shift.  The compliance 
by nurses to these steps in the current study was higher than the few studies which 
assessed the prevalence of nurses’ deviations from best practice while preparing and 
administering IV doses. The observational study of Ong and Subasyini (2013) showed 
26% of nurses comply to wearing gloves when preparing IV doses while, Gill et al. 
(2012) showed that 83% of nurses check the name and expiry of IV medication before 
administration.  
 
In contrast, low compliance with checking processes was observed in almost all 
preparations during both observation periods, which may be considered as a usual 
practice by nurses. Previous studies found that inappropriate checking is a common 
practice by nurses which may considered a significant contributor to errors particularly 
with IV doses (Armitage and Knapman 2003, Westbrook et al. 2011, Gill et al. 2012, 
Keers et al. 2013). A study on errors in IV administration by Westbrook et al. (2011) 
revealed that steps of reading medication labels, using aseptic technique, double 
checking, and documenting medication administration were the most violated 
procedures by nurses. The systematic review of McDowell et al. (2010) found that 
appropriate checking during IV dose preparation and administration reduced the error 
rate from 0.73 to 0.22. Variation in compliance by nurses with the checking process 
during medication preparation and administration was found in previous studies, 
ranging from 50% (Westbrook et al. 2011) to 89.5% (Gill et al. 2012). In the current 
study, lower compliance with double checking was observed at the end of the shift 
(31%) than in previous studies although higher compliance was seen at the beginning of 
the shift (56%). This difference which was found to be significant might be linked to the 
impact of the shift length and nurses’ sleepiness at the end of the shift. 




The nurses’ compliance to five steps became increasingly reduced over the course of the 
shift compared to the start of the shift. These were hand washing prior to the start of 
preparation, disinfecting the vial before use, assessing product integrity, mixing the 
solution after adding the drug, and assessing the appearance of the final product. 
Specifically nurses’ compliance with washing hands prior to the start of the preparation 
significantly decreased over the shift time, even though the Trust policy emphasised the 
importance of washing hands before starting preparation as aseptic requirements for 
infection control (Trust Drug and Therapeutics Committee 2015). Nurses’ non-
compliance rate with hand washing requirements (38% - 67%) in the current study was 
higher compared to Ong and Subasyini (2013) and Westbrook et al. (2011) (26% and 
10% respectively). Absent or inappropriate use of a filter needle was observed in a high 
percentage of preparations in both observation periods. A high proportion of nurses 
used the filter without changing the needle. Poor compliance with filter use and frequent 
inappropriate use in both observation periods suggests that this is a routine deviation 
acted upon by a large proportion of nurses. However, none of IV error studies reported 
data about the compliance and appropriateness of using filter needle among nurses.  
 
Overall, the mean number of deviations per task significantly increased at the end from 
the beginning of the shift. This indicates that nurses were less compliant with best 
practice standards when preparing and administering IVs at the end of their 12-hour 
shift, compared to their performance at the beginning of the shift.  
 
4.5.2. Fatigue levels 
In the OFER scale, fatigue scores range from 0-100 where a higher score indicates a 
higher level of fatigue. Winwood et al. (2006) indicated that scores of 25-50 reflect 
low/moderate fatigue and 50-75 reflect moderate/high fatigue. Cronbach’s alpha values 
in this study (0.8-0.85) indicated that all fatigue sub-scales had acceptable reliability 
(Winwood et al. 2005). In this study, nurses showed that they perceived more acute 
fatigue (moderate/high) than chronic fatigue, although the chronic fatigue levels, which 
averaged ~50%, would be considered moderate. Fatigue levels in the current study are 
comparable to levels reported among nurses in the US and Australia using the same 
scale (Winwood et al. 2005, Winwood et al. 2006, Barker and Nussbaum 2011). Acute 
fatigue has been described by Barker and Nussbaum (2011, p1372) as: 
 




“a temporary state which is commonly experienced by healthy people during the course 
of work or daily life activities” . 
 
The increased levels of acute fatigue scored by nurses in the current study were also 
consistent with previous research that showed that acute fatigue is more common than 
chronic fatigue among workers, especially those who work irregular shifts (Winwood et 
al. 2006, Barker and Nussbaum 2011). Acute fatigue was demonstrated to be a result of 
work-related demand that exhausts energy (Winwood et al. 2005). However, chronic 
fatigue was also identified as a common result among workers who experienced 
increased acute fatigue levels with insufficient recovery between shifts (Winwood et al. 
2005). 
 
The current study identified a significant negative correlation between inter-shift 
recovery and both fatigue statuses (acute and chronic). The fact that nurses in the 
current study described moderate to high levels of acute fatigue (62.6%) and low levels 
of recovery between shifts (45.0%) indicates that nurses may did not experience 
sufficient recovery from acute (end of shift) fatigue between shifts, which may 
exacerbate chronic fatigue levels. Furthermore, acute and chronic fatigue in this study 
and other studies (Winwood et al. 2006, Barker and Nussbaum 2011) were found to be 
significantly correlated, which indicate that fatigue components may overlap and that 
the transition of acute fatigue to chronic fatigue therefore is expected (Winwood et al. 
2006). Therefore, nurses may need longer time between consecutive long shifts to 
recover from acute fatigue. It is important to consider the measurements of chronic 
fatigue levels as well as inter-shift recovery when evaluating the efficiency of extended 
work shifts for nurses (Barker and Nussbaum 2011). In addition, the maximum number 
of consecutive shifts nurses perform as well as the rest time nurses receive between 
shifts should be considered when designing shift schedules.  
 
Previous research in occupational fatigue (Trinkoff et al. 2006, Winwood et al. 2006) 
also found that increased prevalence of long shifts was associated with moderate levels 
of chronic fatigue among workers. This study could not determine the relationship 
between the type of shift and perceived fatigue as all participants were working long 
irregular shifts. However, the moderate levels (~50%) of chronic fatigue found in the 




current study might be resulted from the length of the shifts they work and insufficient 
rest time between shifts 
 
Although acute fatigue is considered more common among workers, chronic fatigue 
was found to have a more considerable effect on workers’ health and performance 
(Winwood et al. 2005). Barker and Nussbaum (2011) conducted a study about the 
relationship between different fatigue dimensions and performance among nurses. This 
study, which reported comparable fatigue levels to the current study (moderate/high 
acute fatigue with moderate chronic fatigue), found that both fatigue status have 
comparable negative correlation with nurses’ performance, as measured using Nursing 
Performance Instrument (NPI) for nurses’ mental and physical performance. In 
particular, chronic fatigue had a stronger correlation with some nurses’ malpractice, 
such as taking shortcuts, which may provide an explanation for the increased prevalence 
of non-compliance of nurses in the current study to the Trust standards for IV 
preparation and administration. Therefore, when evaluating long shifts in the nursing 
practice, both chronic fatigue and inter-shift recovery measures should be considered to 
avoid any potential impact of fatigue on nurses performance and medication safety.  
 
4.5.3. Sleepiness levels 
This study showed a significant progression in nurses’ sleepiness across the shift. The 
mean KSS scores increased from 2.85 at the beginning of the shift to 5.62 at the 12th 
hour, with 15 nurses reporting a high level of sleepiness at the end of the shift defined 
by Geiger-Brown et al. (2012) as the upper one-third of the scale. This is much higher 
than the sleepiness reported in another US study using KSS when the means of 
sleepiness scores across the shift started from 2.8 to 3.9 at the 12th hour (Geiger-Brown 
et al. 2012). In addition to increased sleepiness during the shift, 49% of participants in 
the current study also reported short sleep duration between shifts with an average of 
less than six hours. This is expected, given that 95% of our sample were aged less than 
45 years, wherein increased sleepiness often results from sleep deficiency (Duffy et al. 
2009). In addition, this is consistent with previous studies which showed that short sleep 
duration a between shifts is common among healthcare staff working shift schedules 
(Luckhaupt et al. 2010), and in particular in nurses (Geiger-Brown and Trinkoff 2010, 
Geiger-Brown et al. 2012). 
 




The risk of nurses’ insufficient and poor sleep on patient safety incidents has been 
demonstrated by several studies. An Australian study among hospital nurses using 
logbooks found that the risk of medical errors increased when nurses reported shorter 
sleep duration (Dorrian et al. 2008). In another study, Dorrian et al. (2006) identified 
that reduced sleep among nurses may be associated with increased likelihood of making 
errors and also decreased likelihood of intercepting errors. Both failures are important 
for nurses, given that nurses are a principal interceptors of errors detecting about 50% of 
prescribing errors and around 30% of transcribing and dispensing errors (Leape et al. 
1995). Sleep deprivation has also been found to affect other healthcare professional. 
Baldwin Jr and Daugherty (2004) revealed that around 20% of 3,604 doctors who 
responded to a survey about their experience reported an average sleep per night of five 
hours or fewer, with 66% reporting an average of six hours or fewer. This survey 
showed that doctors with five or less hours of sleep per night reported more accidents or 
injuries, and more medical errors compared to those averaging more than five hours 
sleep per night.  
 
When considering the effect of long hour shifts on observed errors and deviation from 
best practice, observed errors did not significantly differ between the two observation 
periods. However, nurses’ compliance with best practice at the end of the shift 
significantly decreased compared to the beginning of the shift. The findings of this 
study also showed a significant progression of nurses’ sleepiness over time (between the 
beginning of the shift and at 8 hours and between the beginning of the shift and at 12 
hours). A significant association was identified between reporting high levels of 
sleepiness at the end of the shift and committing an error. This indicates that when 
nurses were sleepier at the end of the 12 hour shift, they were more likely to make an 
error. The current study observed nurses performing simulated tasks at the beginning 
and end of the shift and measured nurses’ stated sleepiness during the shift rather than 
self-reported errors identified in previous studies. Therefore, the impact of nurses’ 
sleepiness on IV medication safety at the end of night shift should be considered when 
assigning tasks to night shift nurses such as preparation and administration of morning 
IV medications. 
 




4.5.4. Study limitations 
This study had some limitations. When it was designed, it was anticipated that the 
observations would be performed before and after the shift; however, due to the length 
of nurses’ shifts, it was difficult for them to arrive before and stay after the night shift. 
Therefore, all observations were conducted within the first and last hours of the shifts to 
ensure adherence to the study objectives. Nurses were aware that the IV preparation task 
was a simulation and therefore none of the prepared doses in the study were intended to 
be administered to patients. This may have affected nurses’ performance as they may 
not have behaved in the same way as in real situations. However, before the observation 
began, clear instructions were given to the nurses, and they were asked to consider the 
task as a real preparation and to undertake the task on that basis. 
 
When the study was designed, the initial plan was to recruit nurses from different grades 
(Bands 5 to 7). However, the nature of night-shift staffing levels only allowed 
recruitment of Band 5 nurses and a few (n=3) Band 6 nurses. Nonetheless, the sample 
size reflected the reality of night-shift nursing in the study trust. Furthermore, the 
recruited nurses represented all study settings, and a similar number of participants were 
recruited from study wards.  
 
Another limitation of the study was the small sample size and the limited number of 
observations possible, which resulted in a small number of errors. However, this was an 
initial study and given the lack of published literature on the relationship between errors 
and sleepiness, certain assumptions had to be made. Errors at the start of shift (13%) 
were higher than the assumption in sample size calculations, whilst errors at shift end 
were fewer (21%) than the assumption (40%) used when the sample size was calculated. 
However, the sample size was sufficient to confirm the association between nurses’ 
sleepiness and occurrence of errors. 
 
Although the two simulated tasks used for this study were developed in collaboration 
with a specialist pharmacist in injectable medicines safety, it was not possible to 
validate the equivalency of these preparations by the nurses because of time constraints. 
Finally, the study Trust has two sites, however due to logistical issues with only one 
researcher collecting observation data, participants were recruited from only one site. 
ICU staff rotate between sites, and both sites have similar work environments, therefore 








This study identified the effect of nurses’ fatigue and sleepiness during long shifts on IV 
medication preparation and administration errors using an observational technique and 
simulated IV preparations. The study identified moderate to high levels of fatigue 
among nurses. High levels of sleepiness were also identified with a significant 
progression into shift hours. Furthermore, a significant association was identified 
between being sleepy and making error at the end of the shift. The current study also 
showed a significant decrease in nurses’ compliance with best practice at the end of the 
shift compared with the beginning of the shift. Nurse managers should consider the 
impact of nurses’ fatigue and sleepiness on IV medication safety at the end of night shift 
when assigning morning IV doses to night shift nurses. In addition, the findings of this 
study can be used to identify IV preparation and administration processes in which 
nurses need more training. This would allow education to be developed on the steps that 
nurses should follow when preparing and administering IVs.   









Chapter 5. General Discussion 
  





This thesis investigated the safety of medication administration in hospitals, starting 
with a description of issues related to patient safety, iatrogenic injury, and the resulting 
consequences. Different policies and dedicated quality and safety organisations were 
developed by governments and healthcare systems to address healthcare quality issues 
and improve patient safety. The main role of organisations like the US AHRQ, the NCC 
MERP, UK NPSA, and WHO Patient Safety Programme is to monitor and analyse 
incidents, and then develop strategies to minimise them. For example, the UK NPSA 
was established to lead the government’s agenda for improving healthcare quality and 
patient safety by launching a national reporting system for patient safety incidents and 
publishing lessons learned from analysing these incidents (DoH, 2001b, NPSA, 2004). 
Since 2012, the patient safety key functions of the NPSA have transferred to the NHS 
Commissioning Board Special Health Authority (the Board Authority) to ensure 
developing patient safety improvement and address patient safety issues (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2015). The introduction of this thesis also discussed the models 
of clinical incident causation analysis, including human contribution theory by Reason 
(1990) and Vincent et al’s (1998) framework for factors influencing accidents in clinical 
practice (section 1.3).  
 
As the most common treatment given to patients, medications are considered a main 
source for PSIs (Vogenberg and Benjamin 2011, Cousins et al. 2012, National Patient 
Safety Agency 2013). However, medication incidents were found to be highly 
preventable (Bates et al. 1995, Wilson et al. 1995, Barker et al. 2002, Runciman et al. 
2003). Therefore, extensive research has been conducted internationally to investigate 
safety incidents associated with medication use in healthcare settings (Leape et al. 1991, 
Wilson et al. 1995, Vincent et al. 2001, Barker et al. 2002, Taxis and Barber 2004, 
James et al. 2008, Morimoto et al. 2010, Poon et al. 2010, Cousins et al. 2012, 
Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al. 2012)  
 
Many studies have found that medication-related incidents were more common during 
the administration stage than during other stages of the MUP (Ashcroft and Cooke 
2006, National Patient Safety Agency 2007, Alrwisan et al. 2011). Furthermore, in the 
UK, most medication-related incidents which resulted in patient harm or death related to 
administration (National Patient Safety Agency 2007). This suggests that efforts are 




required to improve the safety of administration of medication in hospitals. 
Understanding how and why errors occur is fundamental to achieving this aim (Keers et 
al. 2013).  
 
In focussing on the problems of MAIs in the hospital setting, this thesis first 
investigated the reported administration-related incidents in one large NHS acute 
teaching Trust over one year. This study used the number of reported MAIs compared 
to the total number OBD as a unit of comparison to accurately identify clinical 
directorates where reporting rate was higher. Following this retrospective study, a semi-
structured interview-based qualitative study was conducted to explore the views and 
perspective of nurses and midwives about the common causes and contributing factors 
leading to administration incidents in hospitals. Finally, this thesis used direct 
observation to investigate the impact of nurses’ sleepiness and fatigue, during long night 
shifts, on errors and deviations from best practice when preparing IV doses and setting 
up an infusion pump for two simulated tasks. 
 
5.2. Evaluating safety incidents during medication 
administration  
Chapter 2 of this thesis analysed the reported medication related incidents to the 
electronic incident reporting system in one NHS teaching trust. One of the advantages 
of incident reporting is that it provides a broad set of data from different locations over 
an extended period of time, which allows researchers to more easily compare incidents 
between different settings or in the same setting over time, and monitor harmful 
incidents (Allan and Barker 1990, Barker et al. 2002). Therefore, this analysis weighted 
the number of reported MAIs by the total number of OBDs. Incident reports also seek to 
learn from incidents, and identify potential solutions (Thomas et al. 2002, Thomas and 
Petersen 2003, Shojania 2010). 
 
Most MI studies using voluntary incident reports have reported the overall number of 
reported incidents and have not used any denominator such as bed occupancy to 
compare the number of reports between different settings (Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, 
Alrwisan et al. 2011, Cousins et al. 2012). High patient occupancy in some clinical 
areas resulting in a higher number of incident reports may be assumed to have higher 
medication risk, while areas with fewer beds and incidents reports may be assumed to 




have lower medication risk. The result of this difference in unadjusted reporting rates 
means that some locations may be less likely to be investigated and therefore miss the 
opportunity to implement preventive strategies. Thus, this study weighted reported 
incidents by OBDs in each clinical area to correct for areas with high occupancy and 
generated incident reporting rates for each clinical area. As shown in Table 2.8, this was 
more useful in comparing the incident reporting rate between different clinical areas 
than just providing the absolute number of incidents.  
 
In the current study, when the number of reported MAIs compared to the total number 
of OBDs was considered, some clinical areas which reported fewer incidents were 
found to have higher reporting rate of MAIs than other areas with more patients. For 
example, based only on the number of reports, ‘Children’s Services’ had the highest 
number of reported incidents and almost double the number of incidents reported in 
‘Perioperative, Critical Care and Pain’. However, as shown in Table 2.8, the rate of 
reported incidents to the total number of OBDs in the ‘Perioperative, Critical Care and 
Pain’ directorate was much higher than all other areas. Therefore, this study 
demonstrated that some clinical areas associated with a high number of reported 
incidents do not necessarily reflect the increased rate of reporting in these areas. 
Conversely, the increased reporting rate associated with clinical areas with low bed 
occupancy may not be accurately identified by incident reports analysis.  
 
Comparison between studies may be limited because of the different hospital settings; 
definitions; and prescribing and administration systems (Allan and Barker 1990). 
However the results of this study were consistent with previous UK studies (Hicks et al. 
2004, Ashcroft and Cooke 2006, Alrwisan et al. 2011) in that the proportion of reported 
incidents during the administration stage was higher than other stages of the MUP. 
Almost half of the reported incidents in these studies were administration-related. The 
incident types in the current study were also comparable to other UK and international 
studies which also identified omissions, delays, and administering the wrong dose or 
drug to be the most common types of administration incidents (Ashcroft and Cooke 
2006, Franklin et al. 2007, Poon et al. 2010, Cousins et al. 2012).  
 




5.3. Causes and contributing factors of medication 
administration incidents 
The increased proportion of reported incidents during the medication administration 
stage led the researcher to propose a semi-structured interview-based study to 
investigate nurses’ and midwives’ views about the causes and contributing factors of 
MAIs (Chapter 3). Most studies which investigated the causes and contributing factors 
of errors have relied on self-reported questionnaires/surveys, medication error reports, 
or direct observation, and focused on the causes behind the documented, reported, or 
observed errors. Only one study has been conducted in the UK and considered the 
perception and views of nurses on causes and contributing factors of MAEs using 
qualitative interviews (Hand and Barber 2000). In addition, several recent changes had 
been introduced in the study trust, e.g. long shifts, automated dispensing cupboards on 
wards, an electronic prescribing and medication administration system, and increased 
recruitment of new junior nurses, especially in critical care units. These changes may 
have had an impact on medication administration safety in the study hospital, 
particularly given UK healthcare’s ongoing move towards greater use of electronic 
medication systems. 
 
Interviews with healthcare professionals have been used in previous medication safety 
research to investigate the causes and contributing factors of prescribing and dispensing 
errors (Dean et al. 2002) as semi-structured interviews enable the interviewer to explore 
further details about the topic (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). This study yielded seven main 
themes, with 46 codes and sub-codes emerged from the interview data. The themes 
identified were environmental, task, patient, team, management, personal or individual 
factors, and factors associated with IV doses. 
 
Factors of increased workload, low staffing levels, frequent interruptions and 
distractions, fatigue and sleepiness associated with long working hours, inadequate 
nurse training, inappropriate checking and lack of communication or miscommunication 
between nurses or with doctors were mentioned by nurses and midwives as the most 
common factors contributing to administration incidents. Most of these factors have 
been previously reported as issues affecting the focus of nurses and contributing to 
administration incidents in qualitative and quantitative studies (Pape 2001, Pape et al. 




2005, Tang et al. 2007, Biron et al. 2009, Brady et al. 2009, Westbrook et al. 2010, 
Keers et al. 2013).  
 
Consistent with the interviews study, increased workload was also considered by 
several studies as one of the most common predictors of MAEs and related to 
inadequate staff or inappropriate staffing level (Tang et al. 2007, Jones and Treiber 
2010, Gill et al. 2012, Keers et al. 2013). Appropriate staffing level and skill mix has 
been also identified as a factor affecting the safety of medication administration (Tissot 
et al. 2003, Frith et al. 2012). Increased workload was also linked to patient’s acuity the 
number of patients’ medications by some interviewees. In this thesis, interviewees 
suggested that incidents commonly associated with increased workload were omissions 
and delays. These were the most common administration incident reported in the 
incident report study (Chapter 2). Interviewees reported that such incidents were more 
likely to occur during busy times when medication tasks were performed under time 
pressure. In addition, nurses and midwives in the interviews reported that increased 
workload and short staffing are also common causes of non-compliance with the 
checking process, specifically with double checking which was reported as one of the 
common causes and contribution factors of MAEs (Gill et al. 2012, Keers et al. 2013). 
 
Interruption and distraction was commonly reported by nurses and midwives as a 
contributing factor beside increased workload and long shifts. A number of studies have 
investigated the rate and impact of interruption on MAEs. Furthermore, Dieckmann and 
colleagues (2006) demonstrated that human prospective memory, which enables 
remembering intended activities and supports correctly resuming actions, can be 
impaired by interruptions and distractions. Studies have also examined different 
interventions employed to manage interruptions during medication administration. 
However, no evidence was identified to support the effectiveness of these interventions 
in reducing interruptions to nurses (Raban and Westbrook 2014). Moreover, this 
systematic review concluded that in order to provide evidence of effectiveness of these 
any intervention, further research require a controlled randomised or cluster randomised 
studies across multiple sites (Raban and Westbrook (2014).  
 
One of the contributing factors to MAIs which were commonly reported in nurses’ 
interviews in the current study was long shifts (12-hour shifts) and night shifts. In the 




study hospital, morning doses of IV medications are commonly administered by the 
night shift nurses at the end of their shift. This is when sleepiness and fatigue may be 
anticipated to be high, as previous studies have found that night shifts are associated 
with poor sleep and consequently increased levels of fatigue Ruggiero (2003), (Kunert 
et al. 2007, Geiger-Brown et al. 2012). Furthermore, Geiger-Brown et al. (2012) found 
nurses’ sleepiness increased toward the end of 12-hour shifts compared to the beginning 
of the shift. Geiger-Brown and colleagues also found night shift nurses to be sleepier 
toward the end of their shift than day shift nurses. The relationship between long shifts, 
inadequate sleep, and increased levels of fatigue has been demonstrated in previous 
research, especially if combined with shift rotations and inadequate recovery time 
(Trinkoff et al. 2001, Winwood et al. 2006, Stimpfel et al. 2012). Previous studies have 
also assessed the impact of hours worked on the rate of MEs, showing that the risk of 
error increased when nurses worked 12.5 hours or more (Rogers et al. (2004), (Scott et 
al. 2006). However, these studies were limited to questionnaires and self-reported 
logbooks to evaluate the impact of long working hours on the safety of medication 
preparation and administration (Rogers et al. 2004, Scott et al. 2006) and ,therefore, a 
quantitative observational research was conducted (Chapter 4) to evaluate the effect of 
nurses’ fatigue and sleepiness during night shifts on the occurrence of errors and 
deviations from best practice during IV dose preparation and administration. 
 
5.4. Evaluating the impact of nurses’ fatigue and sleepiness on 
medication safety 
Thirty-nine nurses were observed preparing simulated IV tasks at the beginning and the 
end of the night shift. In addition, background fatigue was assessed at the beginning of 
the shift, with sleepiness assessed at three points during the shift (start, eight hours and 
end of shift at 12 hours) using validated scales. Thirteen percent of observations at the 
beginning of the shift were associated with errors compared to 21% of observations at 
the end of the shift. However, this difference was not statistically significant. Incorrect 
dose preparation was the most common type of error observed. All dose preparation 
errors occurred either during the step of reconstitution of the drug or during the step of 
withdrawing the drug from the ampoule or vial. These findings are consistent with 
previous observational studies on IV preparation and administration errors which 
concurred with common types of errors and error prone steps (Taxis and Barber 2003, 
McDowell et al. 2010, Westbrook et al. 2011).  




Nurses showed low compliance with the steps of hand washing prior to the start of 
preparation, disinfecting the vial before use, assessing product integrity, mixing the 
solution after adding the drug, and checking including failure to check the medicine 
against the prescription at the end of preparation and also failure to obtain a second 
check when preparing the dose and when setting the infusion pump. These deviations 
from the best practice were observed during both observation periods and significantly 
increased at the end of shifts. This might be linked to the impact of the shift length and 
nurses’ sleepiness at the end of the shift. However, other reasons for poor compliance 
with double checking were discussed in the interviews which included low staffing 
levels and increased workload. 
 
Perceived levels of fatigue in this thesis (moderate to high levels of acute fatigue and 
moderate levels of chronic fatigue) were comparable to the levels reported by American 
and Australian nurses using the same validated scale (Winwood et al. 2006, Barker and 
Nussbaum 2011). A significant positive correlation between acute and chronic fatigue 
was identified in the current study. This indicated that increased levels of acute fatigue 
were usually associated with increased levels of chronic fatigue particularly when 
associated with short recovery periods between shifts. A transition of acute fatigue to 
chronic fatigue therefore is expected. It is important to consider the measurements of 
chronic fatigue levels as well as inter-shift recovery when evaluating the efficiency of 
extended work shifts for nurses (Barker and Nussbaum 2011).  
 
Increased levels of nurses’ fatigue was found to have a significant impact on nurses’ 
health and performance (Winwood et al. 2005). Chronic fatigue was more associated 
with nurses’ malpractice such as taking shortcuts. The comparability of fatigue levels in 
the current study to that of Barker and Nussbaum (2011) may explain the increased 
prevalence of deviations from preparation policy observed. Fatigue could be a cause for 
these deviations from best practice.  
 
The current study showed a significant increase in nurses’ sleepiness across night shift. 
In addition, 39% of nurses reported high level of sleepiness at the end of the shift. The 
sleepiness recorded by nurses in the current study was higher than the sleepiness 
recorded among US nurses reported by Geiger-Brown et al. (2012), although both 
studies reported a significant progression over the study shift. The increased sleepiness 




among nurses in the current study was also associated with short sleep duration in 49% 
of participants. Several studies have demonstrated that insufficient sleep among nurses 
and other healthcare professionals is a contributor to medical errors. Dorrian et al. 
(2006) identified that reduced sleep among nurses might be associated with an increased 
likelihood of making errors and also a decreased likelihood of intercepting errors.  
 
In addition to the significant progression of nurses’ sleepiness between the beginning of 
the shift and the end of the shift, the findings of the current study showed a significant 
association between being sleepy and making error at the end of the shift i.e. nurses 
were sleepier at the end of the 12 hour shift and when they were sleepy, they were more 
likely to make an error. Furthermore, the current study showed a significant decrease in 
nurses’ compliance with best practice at the end of the shift compared with the 
beginning of the shift. This is consistent with results from the interviews in Chapter 3, 
that long (12-hour) shifts and night shifts may be important contributors to MAIs 
particularly when preparing IV doses at the end of night shift when nurses are sleepy 
and fatigued. This is consistent with studies discussed above which showed a 
relationship between insufficient sleep and making errors among nurses and other health 
care professionals. However, these studies relied on questionnaires and self-reported 
logbooks to report the sleep duration before or between shifts instead of measuring 
nurses’ state of sleepiness during the shift as undertaken in this study. In addition, the 
current study observed nurses performing a simulated task at the beginning and end of 
the shift and measured nurses’ sleepiness rather than using self-reported errors that 
nurses identified during the shift.  Therefore, the impact of nurses’ sleepiness on patient 
safety at the end of night shift should be considered when assigning tasks such as 
administration of the morning IV medications. 
 
5.5. Implications for policy and practice 
Analysing medication incidents is essential for safe medication use (Cousins et al. 
2012). Reporting enables an understanding of the nature of incidents as well as common 
causes and factors that contribute to incidents. This is important when developing 
effective risk reduction strategies (Leape 1997, Cousins et al. 2012). Collectively, the 
studies described in thesis used different methods to provide a detailed analysis of the 
proportions, types, and causes of MAIs, as well as the impacts of long night shifts on 
the error rate of IV preparation and administration at one UK NHS Foundation Trust. 




An appropriate and regular analysis of incident reports can be used within or across 
organisations to improve learning from incidents, identify risks, suggest potential 
solutions, and monitor progress. Furthermore, the investigation of reported incidents 
supports the sharing of experience nationally and internationally. Therefore, with the 
increased proportion of MAIs reported, data should be routinely reviewed to identify 
areas with higher reporting rate of administration incidents. It is also essential that 
causes and contributing factors for these incidents are identified so prevention strategies 
can be applied, thereby ensuring the quality and safety of medication use. Promoting the 
reporting of all MAIs which occur is essential; this may be facilitated by establishing a 
blame-free reporting culture (Horns and Loper 2002). 
  
Previous incident report analyses have described the overall number of reported 
incidents; the first study in this thesis compared the number of reported incidents to the 
total number of OBDs in each clinical area. This approach provides a more reliable 
view than merely reporting the number of incidents when comparing safety between 
different areas and identifying areas of higher reporting rate. Therefore, it is important 
that bed occupancy is taken into consideration when evaluating MAIs. This first study 
also identified the necessity of applying quality assurance measures to the submitted 
reports to ensure all necessary information is provided. Some incident reports were 
submitted without essential information about the incidents, which may affect the 
quality and usefulness of the reports and limits the benefits of investigating and 
analysing such incidents (Hua and Gong 2011, Thomas et al. 2011, National Health 
Service England 2014). It is recommended that key fields in electronic incident report 
systems be mandatory. 
 
Trust policy states that nurses should not administer medicines before obtaining the 
required training and completing competency assessments (Trust Drug and Therapeutics 
Committee 2015). In the second study described in this thesis, nurses highlighted that 
the training and education provided by the hospital and even universities, including the 
training provided during the IV dose competency test, was insufficient to assure safe 
administration of medicines. Interviewees emphasised the necessity of adequate training 
and suggested extending the training the Trust provides for new nurses. Several studies 
also recommend providing extended and continuous training to nurses, especially new 




staff, to overcome the impact of nurses’ lack of knowledge regarding safe medication 
administration (Prot et al. 2005, Tang et al. 2007, Brady et al. 2009, Ozkan et al. 2011) 
 
Results from the third study described in this thesis demonstrated that deviations from 
best practice by nurses preparing IV doses were common. In particular, poor 
compliance with checking steps was common at both observation points. Several causes 
for such deviations were suggested during interviews with nurses and midwives such as 
heavy workload and insufficient staffing levels. Causes and contributing factors 
reported in the interviews can be used to address the poor compliance with the checking 
steps. In addition, educational programs on IV medication preparation and 
administration may require review to ensure deviations observed in the current study are 
included. Finally, the study Trust may wish to consider ongoing competency 
assessments for IV preparation to reduce deviations from best practice.  
 
The results from the third study described in this thesis also showed a significant 
association between sleepy nurses and an error occurring at the end of the shift. They 
were also less likely to comply with the published Trust standards for IV preparation 
and administration process compared to the beginning of the shift. Nurses and nurse 
managers should be aware of this finding and take it into consideration when identifying 
tasks for completion at the end of 12 hour night shifts. Although in the current study 
fatigue was not related to errors, the moderate to high levels of fatigue and high 
sleepiness scores of nurses throughout the long shift was a concern. In addition, the 
insufficient recovery that nurses report obtaining between shifts may exacerbate these 
issues. Managing the shift length of nurses and also shift allocation is important to allow 
sufficient rest between shifts as this may reduce fatigue levels and decrease sleepiness 
during shifts. Nurses’ managers should also be aware of levels of both acute and chronic 
fatigue in their staff and the impact of high fatigue levels on a nurse’s health and 
performance.  
 
Using direct observation, the third study in this thesis collected data regarding nurses’ 
deviations from best practice when preparing IV doses. This has rarely been discussed 
in previous medication errors research. Collecting such data is important in order to 
improve the safety of medication administration. This data has identified an area that 
needs to be discussed and addressed in order to further enhance medication use and 




patient safety. Nurses’ poor compliance with checking steps can be considered the most 
important deviation from best practice affecting medication safety.  
 
5.6. Limitations 
Several limitations were identified in the methods used in this thesis. In the incident 
reports study (Chapter 2), potential under-reporting is considered a main limitation of 
incident reports although voluntary incident reports are considered an accepted method 
to collect safety data and routinely used (Allan and Barker 1990, Leape and Abookire 
2005, Hazell and Shakir 2006, Shojania 2010). The study hospital is the highest reporter 
of medication incidents across similar NHS Foundation Trusts, with 20% more reports 
than the next best acute teaching Trust and double the median number of incident 
reports in acute teaching trusts (National Patient Safety Agency 2013).   
 
A limitation of the incident reports study was the scoring of patient harm, which may 
vary between individual reporters. However, to minimise this, clear guidance and 
supporting documents were available on the reporting system and the Hospital 
Assurance Department also aims to review all incident reports and verify harm. As part 
of this study the OBD was calculated. The actual number of patients may have been 
underestimated because the calculation was based on a midnight census, which may 
have been affected by rapid patient turnover. However, this would only have had a 
limited effect on MAIs because when medications are due to be administered, there can 
only be one patient in the bed at that time. 
 
In the interviews study (Chapter 3), generalisability of the results might be limited by 
the relatively small sample size. However, as no new themes emerged in the final 
interviews, the sample size was likely to be sufficient for the purpose of this study. In 
addition, a sampling matrix was used to recruit nurses and midwives of different grades 
and clinical directorates. Another issue that may limit the generalisability of the results 
is that the study was only conducted in one hospital and therefore the nurses’ views 
explored may be limited to the study site. However, any effect of this limitation may be 
reduced as many participants had previous experience in other hospitals and thus 
provided diverse views. Some interviewees may have been subject to desirability bias 
(Van de Mortel 2008) and might have presented a favourable and positive image of 
themselves, their wards or the study trust. However, the research team believe that this 




influence was minimal as interviewees were informed about the benefits of such 
research in improving medication safety, and this helped nurses to feel more 
comfortable when discussing this sensitive topic. In addition, participants were 
informed that participations was completely voluntary and confidential. 
 
Finally, some methodological limitations were associated with the observational study 
(Chapter 4). As simulated tasks were used, nurses were aware that none of the prepared 
doses were intended for patient administration; therefore, their performance and 
behaviour might have been affected. The intention was to recruit nurses from different 
grades (Bands 5 to 7); however, it was only possible to recruit Band 5 and a few Band 6 
nurses due to the nature of staff mix on the night shift. 
 
The sample size may be perceived as a limitation of this study, yielding limited 
observations and a small number of errors, as errors at the end of the shift only 
increased by 8%, less than the 40% used in the sample size calculation. Nevertheless, 
the sample size was sufficient to confirm an association between nurses’ sleepiness and 
occurrence of errors. A similar number of participants from medical wards, surgical 
wards and ICUs were recruited. This study could now be extended to include a wider 
range of staff grades and cover all clinical areas. Lastly, the two simulated tasks used 
for this study were not validated for equivalency because of time constraints, although 
they were developed in collaboration with a specialist pharmacist in injectable 
medicines safety at the study hospital. 
 
5.7. Further work 
In this thesis, incident reports with bed occupancy data were used to evaluate the 
number of reported incidents to the OBD, types, drugs involved, and severity of MAIs. 
However, it was not possible to use another denominator, i.e. the number of 
prescriptions or the number of administered doses, in order to calculate the incident rate 
of individual drugs. The high number of reported administration incidents associated 
with some drugs or classes may be linked to their higher rate of prescribing or dose 
frequency. Identifying incidents associated with specific drugs or groups of medication 
and “the number of opportunities for incidents with these drugs” may provide more 
reliable and valid comparison (Kiekkas et al. 2011). With electronic prescribing and 
medication administration systems being adopted across the NHS, data on drugs 




prescribed and doses administered can be captured. Therefore future work could use the 
number of prescriptions or doses administered as a denominator to provide greater 
insight into the risk associated with specific drugs or classes.  
 
Dose omissions was the most frequently reported incident in the first study described in 
this thesis, and many of the drugs reported are considered time sensitive (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2010, Institute for Safe Medication Practices 2011). Therefore 
future research could be undertaken in order to further explore reasons for medication 
administration omission and delay and also to assess the effectiveness of interventions 
to address this issue. A common problems contributing to omissions and delays 
identified by interviewees, was poor documentation on drug charts. Documentation 
weaknesses may be improved by introducing an electronic administration system, which 
has already been introduced in some clinical areas of the study Trust. Further research is 
needed to assess whether an electronic administration system improves the rate of 
documentation errors and reduces omissions and timing errors.  
 
The studies in this thesis indicated that the causes and contributing factors to MAIs are 
interrelated. Further studies are needed to obtain a better understanding of the nature 
and role of each factor and how they are related. In particular, further research is needed 
to investigate factors of interruptions and distractions, staffing level and training, and 
the relationship between the proportion of registered nurses (experienced nurses) within 
teams and the rate of MAIs. Future research should also focus on interventions 
addressing contributing factors that could result in significant and long-lasting 
improvements in medication safety. 
 
The observational study described in this thesis can be extended to involve all clinical 
areas, staff grades and include day shifts. This is important to assess whether the impact 
of nurses’ sleepiness on medication errors and deviations from practice is found across 
clinical areas and during the day shift. Furthermore, given that nurses described 
increased levels of acute and chronic fatigue with insufficient recovery between shifts in 
the third study, further research could be undertaken to investigate the relationship 
between nurses’ number of days off between consecutive shifts and their recovery 
levels. In addition, such research could suggest a minimum rest periods between 




consecutive shifts needed by nurses to ensure sufficient recovery and minimise the 
impact of long work shifts on both nurses’ fatigue and patient outcomes.  
 
5.8. Summary of findings 
This thesis provided a comprehensive analysis of the reporting rate, types, severity, 
causes and contributing factors of MAIs in one acute NHS Foundation Trust. The 
number of MAIs reports to OBDs was calculated and allowed a better comparison 
between different clinical areas than simply using the number of incidents to determine 
areas with higher reporting of MAIs. The first study in this thesis identified that more 
incident were reported during the medication administration stage than during other 
stages of the MUP. It also identified that omissions or delays, wrong dose, wrong 
frequency, and wrong infusion rate were the most common reported incidents types.  
 
Nurses’ and midwives’ views and perceptions of the causes and contributing factors of 
MAIs in hospital were explored in the second study in this thesis, using semi-structured 
interviews. Interviews revealed that factors contributing to administration incidents 
could be related to the work environment, the task of preparing and administering 
medicines, patients, individual fallibility and institutional deficiencies. Workload, 
particularly when combined with low staffing levels; frequent interruptions; fatigue and 
sleepiness associated with long working hours; inadequate nurse training; and lack of 
communication or miscommunication between nurses or with doctors were mentioned 
by nurses and midwives as the most common factors contributing to administration 
incidents. 
 
The impact of nurses’ sleepiness during long night shifts on their preparation of IV 
doses and setting of infusion pumps was investigated in the final study described in this 
thesis. This was conducted using an observational technique with simulated IV 
preparation tasks. This study demonstrated that nurses experienced moderate to high 
levels of fatigue. In addition, high levels of sleepiness were identified among nurses 
during night shifts with significant sleepiness progression into the end of the shift. No 
significant relationship was identified between nurses’ fatigue and the occurrence of IV 
medication errors. However, a significant association was found between being sleepy 
and making errors at the end of the shift. This thesis also revealed that long shifts 
affected the nurses’ compliance with best practice: deviations from best practice while 




preparing IV doses at the end of the shift were significantly higher than at the start of 
the shift.  
 
5.9. Overall conclusion 
This thesis highlighted the high proportion of MAIs in hospitals. Analysing incident 
reports is useful for evaluating and understanding the nature of existing medication-
related incidents in hospitals and therefore for developing risk-reduction strategies. 
Considering the bed occupancy of different clinical areas when determining reported 
MAI rates may be a better method of identifying areas with higher reporting rate and 
may therefore help to prioritise risk-reduction strategies and efforts for improvement. In 
addition, understanding the most common causes and contributing factors of MAIs is 
essential to improve the safety of medication administration. One of the common factors 
that may contribute to medication preparation and administration incidents is nurse 
fatigue and sleepiness during long shifts, especially when they perform medication 
administration tasks at the end of the shift. A significant relationship was found between 
being sleepy and making errors among nurses at the end of the shift. Furthermore, long 
shifts were found to reduce nurses’ compliance with best practice when preparing IV 
medications as deviation from best practice significantly increased at the end of the shift 
compared to the beginning of the shift. In order to ensure the quality and safety of 
medication administration, it is essential to address the causes and contributing factors 
in medication incidents in order to identify potential error reduction strategies for 
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Appendix 9. (Continued) Participants’ selection questionnaire for nurses' 
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Appendix 10. Participant information leaflet provided to all eligible nurses 
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Appendix 11. Consent form signed by all participants in nurses' fatigue 
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Appendix 16. Image of prescription used in the simulation tasks 
 
 
 
 
